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The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES • CRITICAL STUDIES • COLLOQUIUM • EXPLANATIONS
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The Narrative in the Philosophy

Contemporary Vedantic Philosophy, Continued

Why Not Nothing?

On the Difference Between Actuality and Possibility

Substantial and Commensurate

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ARTICLES

MEMORY

WILLIAM EARLE

MEMORY, as a phenomenon, would seem to be especially suited to a purely descriptive analysis. It is not some foreign datum or motion imposed upon us, but rather something we ourselves enact, and enact frequently. We have an abundance of examples, and so it might seem that nothing remains but to turn our attention upon a few clear cases, and say right out what we find. If we are not concerned with discovering hypothetical physiological explanations, but simply with phenomenological description, the problem might seem to be solved as soon as it is posed. But if we turn to the philosophical and psychological literature, expecting to find unanimous agreement upon the matter, we will be disappointed. There is no agreement, and, after two thousand years of discussion, the phenomenological facts themselves have become radically obscured. The problematic character of the facts is acutely experienced when we ourselves try to return to the pure phenomenon to check one or another of its purported descriptions.

Memory, of course, is not a trivial or isolated act, and therefore truth or falsity in descriptions of memory will have consequences for large reaches of our philosophical theory. Memory at least purports to give us our only direct knowledge of the past. And our only indirect knowledge of the past, through inference, must credit some memories somewhere. If then our knowledge of the past is vitiated, what remains of our knowledge of the present, or our expectations for the future? But if memory lives up to its pretensions of acquainting us with the past, then what sort of world is it where an existent mind now can become directly acquainted with what is no more existent, but passed away? What in other words, are the ontological presuppositions of the act of memory?

We shall ask the following questions about memory: 1) what

is memory as a phenomenon, what is its structure as it presents itself to our reflective attention? 2) can its phenomenological claim to acquaint us with the past be credited? 3) what are the ontological consequences of the phenomenon? It is clear, I think, that we must first arrive at some clarity about the phenomenon of memory before we can further investigate its claims, physiological causes, or ontological presuppositions, for it must be about this phenomenon and not some other that any further reasoning must be. Further, we can not rule upon what the phenomenon *must* be; we can only look. Having looked, we may then search for the conditions, presuppositions, or validation of what we see. And since it is the phenomenal character of memory which has become problematic, we shall turn our attention first to it.

A. *The Copy Theory.*

There would be little purpose in surveying all the theories which have ever been suggested, but let us focus our attention upon one principal class of theories, one which certainly is most wide-spread, most directly opposed to common-sense, and, in my opinion, opposed to the truth as well. This is the famous copy theory of memory, and for a good account of it we turn to William James.¹ In principle, the theory is remarkably simple. Memory is the feeling or belief that a certain complex image, formed in my imagination, resembles the past. The complex image in which I believe has three factors: the *event imaged*, its *reference to the past*, and its *reference to my past*. It is not sufficient simply to form an image; the event must also be located in its past context, and further it must be thought to be in my own past. Such, I believe, are the basic elements of any copy theory. James adds that the idea of the past itself comes from conceptual extrapolation from the past I directly intuit in the specious present. But whatever the detail, the copy theory will be examined here only insofar as it describes memory as an indirect knowledge of the real past, mediated by images. I believe there are three

¹ *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1890), I, Ch. XVI.

things wrong with the theory, namely each of its distinctive features.

In the first place, when I recall a past event, there is, I believe, no sense in which I can be said to form an *image*, *copy*, or *representation* of anything. The objection at this point is not to the somewhat simplified "picture" theory involved, which is subject to qualifications on other grounds, but rather to the logical paradoxes involved in phenomenological copying. This particular species of theory in effect describes what memory is by first taking its proper place within the mind in order to become aware of some past event, and then slipping outside the mind altogether in order to look at the real past event and affirm that the remembered event is indeed a copy of the real past event! Surely this is neither what memory presents itself to be, nor can it be the truth about memory from any but a very confused alternation of standpoints.

It is certainly not the structure of memory as we enact it. For if what I remember *presents itself to me* as a copy of the past event, then indeed, still within memory, I must have both that past event itself and my copy of it present to my mind, in order to affirm that my memory image is a copy. But in that case, of course, I already have the past event itself present, in person, and what on earth would be the utility of forming a copy of it? Further, the presence of that past event itself would be the genuine act of memory, and not the copying of it. What I remember, then, cannot appear to me, the rememberer, as a copy of the past, but must appear as the past event itself.

Now it is possible of course to become aware of one thing copying, representing, or imaging another; but such cases are only possible where both the copy and the original are present, as when I see a picture and its model, and also see that the one copies the other. But this is not memory.

There is another sense in which I may only have an image of the past, and not the past itself before my remembering mind. Here I remember something which I *assume* is a copy of the past itself. I simply "take" it to be a copy, make it into a copy, or endow it with this role. However, this can not be the phenomenological character of memory either. For memory now be-

comes even more complicated and ridiculous than before. Here memory consists in the complex of forming an image of the past, and then deliberately forming a second image of the past, or conceiving that there is such an image, again comparing the two, and finding either agreement or disagreement. In the case before, we compared an image with the real past itself. Now we compare the image with a past constructed to resemble it, a second past which itself can be but one further image of the genuine past, and the whole weary round begins again. In short, if the image is to *appear* in any form whatsoever as an image or representation, both it and what it copies must appear; but that implies that eventually the past itself and not any image of it must appear to the remembering mind. If memory does not seem to itself to grasp images or copies of things, then such can not be the phenomenon.

Let us suppose then that it is *not* the phenomenon, but rather a mixture of the phenomenon of memory plus the objective, external truth about it. Unknown to memory itself, the past which we seem to recall is *in fact* nothing but a copy of the real past. But now for *whose* mind can such a theory be even *meaningful*? If to ours, then we must have at least the idea of a past which is not remembered, but only conceived in independence of all memory. We must then have at least the idea of the genuine concrete past against which we compare any remembered image of it. And now what about this idea of the genuine past? Is it one *more* copy of the real past, or does it at last confront us with the past itself? If the first we have an infinite regress; if the second, we have simply another name for memory, and the point is granted that somehow we have a direct acquaintance with the past itself and not merely with its copies.

Thus, as far as I can see, there is no way of fixing up the copy theory which makes any sense at all. It is neither phenomenologically correct, nor is it a possible theory about the truth of memory. It isn't true at all. And the logical absurdities which follow are not accidental, I believe, to some particular formulations; they follow from the roots of the conception, from the view, in other words, that memory gives us only indirect or mediated knowledge of the past, and not that past itself.

Now if we turn to the second feature of all copy theories, we

encounter some further distressing results. The copy theory says that we are faced with a number of images or copies, some of which we "refer" to the past, and others of which we do not. All the images are of the same genus, essentially products of the imagination, perhaps "traces" left by what we hope was previous experience. No matter; as rememberers we can not know which are traces and which not. But we do have the problem of which we shall refer to our past, and which not. But the only criteria which the copy theorists can employ to differentiate a memory image from a pure work of the imagination must be some internal present characteristics of the image itself. And so most frequently the criterion employed is that of "vivacity"; the image which we are to refer to the past must be of less vivacity than a present perception, so as not to become confused with it, but of greater vivacity than something purely imagined. And so we are faced with the problem of measuring the relative strengths of images in order to know which image is to be called "memory." But this is of course absurd. First of all, it is obvious that many times our imaginations are stronger than our memories, and that we rightly show no inclination whatsoever to regard as memory itself a present strong imagination, which may be a good deal stronger than any memories. Nor do we have any inclination to take rather weak memories as imaginations on grounds of weakness alone. I submit that strength and weakness of image have and should have little or nothing to do with which "images" we are to regard as memories and which imaginations. Secondly, what *reason* should we have for regarding a *degree of vivacity* as a sign of memory in the first place? Degree of vivacity is on a continuous scale, whereas the *significance* of memory makes it radically distinct from imagination; they belong to absolutely different genera, the one being a recapture of what once was, and the other being something constructed in the present. Now this radical difference of internal significance has no logical or other relation to "degree of vivacity." In short, when we "refer an image" to the past, we must have some *logical motivation* for our act, or it will appear even to us as the most arbitrary attribution in the world. We are not at liberty to remember whatever we like, or rather, to treat as a memory any image we like. The first aspect of the copy

theory separates what we remember from the genuine past, relating them only by possible resemblance. This second feature ends by making memory an arbitrary act of positing or referring some images to the past. The image itself is not already past, or we should have to remember it by still another image; it is present then, and merely referred to the past. Our question is what in the present image can cue or motivate such a reference?

Suppose I perform an experiment. I form an image, say that of myself walking about among the craters of the Moon. And now I simply "refer" this image to my own past, and accordingly I should find myself "remembering" it. But somehow or other I do not find myself remembering any such thing, and it remains what it is, nothing but an imagination. The stronger I exert my powers of imagination and of reference the more I feel myself slipping into hallucination. *That* cannot be what memory is. The dilemma may be stated thus: either memory is identical with the act of "referring," in which case we have explained nothing, or the two are distinct, in which case the act of referring becomes arbitrary.

The third feature of the copy theory touches on a matter essential to any description of memory, but unfortunately, as it occurs in the context of this theory, it becomes perverted. James says we refer the image to *our* past. "It must be dated in *my* past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that 'warmth and intimacy' which were so often spoken of in the chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences 'appropriated' by the thinker as his own."² Now this is true enough, so long as we forget that the "appropriation" of an experience as mine is itself for James and for anyone else holding the copy theory nothing but a present attribution or feeling and therefore represents no genuine acquaintance with my genuinely past self. "I must *think* that I directly experienced its occurrence." But what makes me think that *I* experienced some imaged events and not others? "Warmth and intimacy." Forgetting warmth, let us look at intimacy, for what we remember is more intimately connected with our past than what we imagine,

² Op. cit., p. 650.

since it indeed *was* a part of our past. What is intimate is mine; and I must recognize that what I remember was indeed my experience once. But it is quite insufficient to assimilate our recognition of our past with a present feeling of intimacy with the imagined event. Thus the entire insight is transformed by the supposition that I need only *think* now that the event was mine, whereas memory claims to *recognize* that it was mine. Again, the alteration is from a theory of memory which credits it, to one which seeks to describe it purely "psychologically" as a series of present images, all of which is but a "complex representation" of what may or may not have been the truth.

In a word, the copy theory must find the remembering mind enclosed within a gallery of present images, embarrassed by its task of choosing which are to be regarded as memories, and frustrated by the very *significance* of regarding them as memories. To make the rickety theory work, we must be both within and without our minds at the same time, we must both credit and discredit our only access to the past, and we must be endowed with faculties for measuring quantities of strength, vivacity, warmth and intimacy, which have, as interpreted, no particular significance anyway.

Now the philosophical motivations for the copy model are not far to seek. What is it but an elaborate device to quiet an epistemological fear: the notorious fallibility of memory? And indeed if memory is in principle fallible, then we might have to construct some sort of representational theory, to put the real past at one remove from direct knowledge. The copy theory can account for some sort of error, but it is questionable whether it can account for anything else. Error, or what seems to be such, shall certainly have to find its explanation; but it would seem to be dubious procedure to become so impressed with error, that we introduce it as a permanent possibility within any unique mode of awareness. If any unique access to an object is declared fallible in principle, wherewith shall we correct it?

To make memory in principle fallible, and therefore dependent upon external inferences for validation, seems to solve one problem; but of course it merely conceals it under another name. For how are we to validate the very rules of inference by which

we are to check memory, if all memory is fallible? If memory in principle is fallible, then every memory can be wrong; and the past becomes a perfectly gratuitous assumption. Not only is it a gratuitous assumption, but ultimately a meaningless one. For if our only knowledge of the past is mediated, or constructed from present materials, by what magic does the mind arrange, rearrange, or interpret ever present data and acts, to make them copies, traces, or representations of that which never appears in person? Is it not like some attempt to construct sound out of colors?

There is need therefore for returning to the phenomenon of memory itself, first suspending our epistemological dreads and ontological suppositions, to see whether memory as it presents itself to reflective consciousness is not what common sense supposes it to be, a direct vision of the genuine past, and veridical to the extent that it is clear. We shall then see whether such a description of memory is not perfectly capable of taking care of the erroneous cases as well, and further, whether it may not have important implications for ontology.

B. *Memory as Direct Awareness of the Past.*

1. The first thing to be decided about memory is precisely *what* it is that is remembered. At first glance it might seem that what I remember is simple past events, the building burning yesterday. And indeed, this is where our explicit attention usually focuses, upon the thing or event remembered. But it is equally clear that in fact I am not simply related to a past burning building, but rather to my past *experience* of the burning building, since if I did not experience it in the past, I certainly could not now remember it, that is, remember myself experiencing it. It is emphatically true, that when I remember the past event, my explicit, thematic attention is on the *past event*, and not upon myself; but reflection discloses that in fact I am also implicitly aware that the event was an object for a past act of experience. However, since that act of experience itself was intentionally directed upon its object, the burning building, it becomes relatively invisible or transparent, leaving me now simply with the explicit event itself.

That what I now remember, the event, is not an event taken simply but an *event as experienced*, is not itself a hypothesis but a present phenomenological fact.

And, of course, I do not exclusively remember sense experiences, but also any past object so long as it was the object of some mode of consciousness; thus I can remember reasoning about mathematical objects, entertaining ideal entities, etc. Hence I can remember any object whatsoever, so long as that object was the object of some past act of consciousness.

Thus the total fact remembered now is a past act of consciousness directed to its own object, wherein the *object* is explicit and thematic since the past act of consciousness was itself directed to it intentionally. Or, in other words, I now remember (myself looking at) a burning building. Now this is obviously a *reflexive* conscious act, for insofar as I am now aware of a past awareness of an object, that past object has become accessible to me only through my present awareness of a past awareness, an awareness of an awareness. If consciousness were not capable of this reflexivity, memory would be impossible. It should be noticed that the reflexivity in question is not that of one act of consciousness folded back over another simultaneous or present act of consciousness, but a present act of consciousness reflexive upon a *genuinely past* act of consciousness, and through that reflex, upon a genuinely past object. It should also be noted that in this view, nothing copies anything else. I am now directly aware not of a copy of the past experience with its object, but of that past experience itself. And even if we extend the analysis to that past experience, it is not the awareness of a copy of its object, but of its object itself. This latter problem carries us into the vexed problems of neo-realism, critical realism, idealism, etc., and a further discussion is not strictly necessary for our present purposes.* For in the present case we are not concerned with the so-called past *physical* object, but solely with its past appearance. A physical thing is not related to its sensory appearances in the same way in which those sensory appearances are related to our memory of them. For in the first case we may suppose there to be no homogeneity of categories be-

* For a fuller analysis see the author's *Objectivity* (New York, 1955).

tween cause and effect, but in the second this is impossible, since we are only trying to recall a past experience as it was at the time, and not its physical causes. It is this content of a past act of awareness which I now try to recover through memory. Our first observation then is that memory is a reflexive act of awareness wherein a present act of awareness has as its direct and unmediated object a past awareness of some object.

2. The second observation concerns the *content* of memory. If we turn to the intrinsic character of what it is we are remembering, it is clear, I think, that it does not and can not contain within itself the predicate "past." Now it is past, of course; but it is only past relative to my present act of remembering it; and what could it have known of me now? And so what I recall is myself in the past seeing a burning building, but the content, myself seeing a burning building, is in its own present and not at all past with respect to itself. Hence nothing remembered can carry the predicate "past" stamped on its face for easy identification, neither the past experience nor its past object. They are in their own present.

If we should suppose, for a moment, that the event recalled had as one of its internal properties the fact that it was past, we should find ourselves in the ludicrous position of remembering an event which is past with respect to itself, an event whose very passage was retrospective, which lived for the sole purpose of being remembered, an event which was, precisely while it was occurring, something which had already occurred. If then the content recalled is in its own present, and I who am recalling am in my own present, where does the past come in? How do I ever become aware that it is indeed a past event I am now recalling? It is a mistake, I believe, to look for some intrinsic character in the *object experienced* which will suggest to us that it is past, either its vivacity, its coherence or incoherence with present perceptions, or some other internal part of it such as its inclusion of a calendar page. None of such criteria could conceivably result in memory of that object, or distinguish it from anything imagined. That object is *remembered* solely by virtue of the fact that *I experienced*

it before; and therefore we must look to the character of the reflexive act of consciousness which brings it forth again. When I am aware that I experienced it before, I then remember it. Otherwise I simply entertain it as an imaginative object.

The essence of memory then is located in the relationship between two acts of *consciousness*, my present and my past; and, descriptively, what more can be said but that I now am simply aware that I was aware of something before? Since, according to our first observation, our thematic attention is on the *object* of the past experience, and since according to our second observation, this object itself contains nothing of the past in it, we should now say that our awareness of the pastness of our *experience* of that object is "lateral" or "implicit." Hence the more we turn our attention upon the objective content remembered, the less certain we are that we are remembering and not imagining, since the same object might be given imaginatively. But the more we become aware of the fact that we did actually experience that object, the more certain we are that we are remembering.

Our awareness of the past then focuses itself *between two acts of consciousness*, the present recollecting act, and the past recollected act; and while our attention directs itself to the object of that past experience, we have a lateral awareness that it is an object *once experienced*. The conjunction of past and present occurs then within reflexive mind, and is a genuine conjunction of the actual past of consciousness with the actual present of consciousness, and has nothing to do with images, copies, or representations of anything.

3. The third and most important aspect of memory is one which was noted by James, although I think incorrectly interpreted. It is that when I remember, I invariably remember *myself* having had an experience. Thus, part of the original and immediate deliverance of memory is that some particular event happened to *me*. Obviously, I do not remember *another's* experiences or an experience that happened to nobody. But what interpretation should this receive? And here it should be borne in mind, first that when I genuinely remember, I do not *infer* that the past event happened to me, but rather

recognize it as mine. And secondly, the me to which it happened in the past, is itself not wholly a past me, but also precisely *me* now, identical with the I that is now remembering, for it is the I now which claims the past experience as its own. Now these simple facts are, I think, rather remarkable. I have the same assurance of them as I have that *I* am now remembering. But what does it mean for me now to recognize some past experience as *mine*? Again, the direct deliverance of memory itself makes a claim which I believe can not be denied, nor explained away no matter how complex our hypotheses. And that claim is that on one level, *I am numerically identical now and then*, that there is only one myself which once had some experiences I now recall as mine. The inescapable fact is that they could not be recognized as *mine now* unless I am the same now and then. Otherwise, they would have belonged to another. It is always the I *now* which says that the past experience *belongs* to it, not that it once belonged to it: The "mine" therefore is the name of the relation which unites past with present.

If the I is identical now and then, it is, of course, atemporal; time has made no bite into it, nor differentiated it into passing events. The I is of course related to passing events, or time itself would be an illusion. And it is related to them by its *acts* of consciousness, which are temporal acts, unrepeatable, and separated in time. My present *act* of remembering is not identical with my past *act* of experiencing; but the *I* which then experienced and now recalls must be one and the same, or its past acts would not be "its" now.

One further point. We should be careful not to think of the identity of the self as some sort of *endurance*, as though there were a tube of selfness stretching back through a duration, one end of which looks at the other and notices that they are *similar*. Similarity presupposes numerical diversity; and what that past similar self experienced would not be mine now, but rather an act of a merely similar self. When I remember some experience as mine, I am not in the least peering down a corridor of the past, noticing various myselfs stationed along the way wearing more or less similar clothes. Rather the beginning and end of the tube must be made to coincide, which means of course that there is no

tube but instead, sheer identity. The self then in its core is a-temporal, while its various acts are enacted in time. Time differentiates only the acts, not the self which acts.

Of course, any description involving the word "eternity" has a good chance of being taken for a "speculative hypothesis." But our common inner conviction of the eternity of the self is hardly of this order. The conviction of the eternity of the self is found in children, savages, and sophisticated alike; it can hardly have the status of a theological or metaphysical hypothesis designed to account for rare and subtle matters of whose very existence we have no certain belief anyway. And since such a conviction is not a hypothesis, it can not be argued away, and remains in spite of all theoretical interpretations or refutations; a more likely source, then, is simply that it is uncovered by our own instinctive explorations of consciousness. We have tried to show how there is the possibility of a lateral awareness of our own eternity simply in the phenomenological exploration of the act of memory.

4. Let us now try to gather together all these remarks and see if they form a coherent description of the phenomenon. Our first observation is that memory is reflexive, and that the reflex is within *consciousness*, not the objective world. It depends upon a consciousness of consciousness. The second observation was to the effect that there was a genuine factual difference between the past and present acts of consciousness, and that memory was simply the presence of a past act of consciousness to a present act of consciousness, along with the awareness of their factual temporal difference. The third finds that there is an intrinsic binding together of past and present in the identity of the self which both experienced that past event and now recollects it. Has not then the third aspect of the total phenomenon unified the whole into an intelligible scheme? The past event has gone and is no more; but now I have the power of calling it forth, or putting it in my presence. But that presence to me now of what is no more is rendered possible by the self which was identically present at both times. There is a genuine gap between the past and the present acts; but to say this is not to say the last word. If it were, how could we recall it? The gap must be bridged by the self which

presided over both occasions, the same and identical self. The entire affair occurs within mind, but there it is a *genuine event*. The past object can not act *physically* upon a present one; it has gone forever. But it can stand in the *presence* of ourselves now. The presence of the past to the present through memory is thus an actual event, occurring within the whole of Being; but it is not a *physical* event. It is an enacted relationship, where one leg of the relation stands in the present while the other stands in the past—in the past itself, and not in some present copy of it. Thus, memory supplies us with one of the most curious phenomena in the world: the past and non-existent appearing in person to the present and actual. Nothing like it is to be found in the physical world, and from what has been said, no purely physical or physiological mechanism can account for it. For we must either attribute to such a mechanism powers identical to those of the mind, which is of no explanatory help, or we leave them physical, which means located in their own space and time. But the phenomenon to be accounted for spans the gap; how can a mechanism which is itself located purely in the present, render present the real past?

Such then, I believe, is the phenomenon of memory. And this is all that I have to say positively about it. But there are some objections which may be considered which give us pause when we wish to accept the phenomenon of memory as it presents itself.

C. *Two Objections.*

1. The first is epistemological. If memory is a direct vision upon the past itself and not the awareness of an imaginative copy of the past, how then is error possible? And yet we all know the difficulty in some cases of knowing whether one's memory is correct or not. It is the fallibility of memory which has led many thinkers to suppose that we are in principle at one remove from the real past, that we know it solely through the mediation of present images which pretend to copy the past, but which may not live up to their pretensions. About this objection or epistemological worry a few things should be said. In the first place the *choice of example* is crucial. If we want to know the struc-

ture of memory, we should choose as our example the *very clearest case* we can find, the freshest recollection of the most immediate past, and not the most obscure case. This should go without saying, but is frequently violated in theory. If I wish to know what desire is, I should not choose some obscure mental act whose character is so indeterminate or indeterminately grasped that I do not know even whether it is an instance of desire and not perhaps emotion, thought, or perception. If we are interested in differentiating the essential structural peculiarities of things, we must select the simplest and clearest cases possible. If I am illustrating a geometrical theorem, I must draw a figure which is unmistakably a circle, and not an oval or square, or smudge of no particular outline. From vague and indeterminate instances, nothing can follow of any theoretical interest, except indeed that now we no longer know what we are talking about. Hence our examination should begin with the clearest and most unmistakable instances of memory, and not with dim, vague, fleeting phenomena whose character is too unstable to favor *any* theoretical interpretation. Having before us the clear cases, we must then indicate *precisely how* it may lose its outlines so as to become confused with something else. An ellipse is not a circle, but after having defined their differences, we can indicate how an ellipse with centers imperceptibly close may be *taken* for a circle. Now in the present case, memory is most frequently confused with imagination, so that "erroneous memory" is in fact simply imagination, accompanied by the judgment that what is imagined is indeed a past event being remembered. Let us then compare the clearest cases of imagination with the clearest cases of memory. I now deliberately feign having been in the next room a moment ago. I compare it with my clear memory of having been at this typewriter. Now I can not, in all honesty, declare that these two acts intrinsically resemble one another in the least, or that their differentiation rests upon external evidence. They should have to be very confused indeed to be mistaken for one another; whereas the clearer they are, the more clearly they seem to be acts of a radically different order. When I *deliberately* feign an event and attribute it to my past, I know precisely what I am doing, namely what I have just said. The imaginative surrogate for memory is my own construction, an

act of my constructive will forming and holding together voluntarily an "image", which I then assert by another act of will to be in my past. In the case of memory, I am aware of the past event and of the fact that it is in *my past*. Now an immediate awareness of a past event as in my past, is not at all the same as an awareness of an event combined with a *judgment* that it is in my past. Of this I can assure myself by deliberately judging events to be past, or feigning that they are past, or trying to believe they are past and comparing such an act with immediate memory. In the case of memory, I have the past event itself given through a lateral awareness that it was an event in my past; in the case of judgment or feigned memory, I have no such lateral awareness, but rather the lateral awareness of a deliberate act of judgment.

In these clear cases then there is no doubt whatsoever as to which is memory and which imagination. Memory declares itself to be memory by its own intrinsic character of being precisely an immediate awareness of the past, and imagination declares itself to be such by the accompanying awareness that indeed its bogus, memory-like appearance is the product of our own will. If the clear cases are indubitable, we must conclude that memory, to the degree that it is clear, is immediate and indubitable; and that it not only is not mistaken for imagination but cannot be, so long as it remains clear. The *structure* of memory then is to be an immediate vision upon the past; this is an eidetic truth about it. It now follows that any *given instance* will participate in this indubitability to the degree that it is an instance of memory, and, that the instance *of itself* can exhibit the essential properties which qualify it as memory. Hence any act to the degree that it is clearly memory will be to that degree an indubitable awareness of the past.

But, as we remarked above, not every act of the mind is an indubitable instance of memory. In fact, there are no acts of the mind which cannot lose their outlines and share in the essential character of some other act, or at least seem to do so when our attention on them becomes distracted, weak, or faltering. And so when the direct lateral awareness of an event being in my past weakens, or conversely, when my awareness of my own voluntary role in the production of imaginative images weakens or passes

unnoticed, then I am no longer sure whether I am remembering or imagining. Hence, the data supplied for our problem by cases drawn from the reports of children or of psychotics are of a most questionable relevance. To unclear, dreamy, unfocussed, or disintegrating minds, nothing whatsoever need be clear. What follows then of any significance for minds which are not so distracted? If there is some mind which is too distracted to see that one equals one, does this truth then become in principle dubitable, and all the intuitive insights of reason questionable? Must we then conclude that we really *do not know* when we see that one equals one and when we do not? Or that we are actually reasoning about *images* or *copies* of the mathematical truth, and not about that truth itself? Or, to take a more relevant example, if someone should adduce a rational error in a very complicated proof, does that invalidate reason when it works on something simple?

If then we do not know in certain cases whether a given act is memory or imagination, the explanation may be that the acts themselves are too dim and vague to be clearly classified. But most usually, the error is not so simple. Most usually, I genuinely remember something, but add to it certain imaginative contents. There remains a core of genuine memory but dressed up with imaginative additions. But the explanation of this is not difficult. The mind is of course enormously and systematically complex. The act of memory becomes itself the subject of another act of memory, and because the mind is invariably active, soon the original core is overlaid with additions from later perceptions, later memories, and later imaginations, all of which are again subject to intermodifications and further complexities. No wonder that we can hardly have much confidence about our memories of a week ago, unless the event was so novel or interesting that it emerges out of the matrix with especial clarity. And it is this mish-mash which worries us when memory is said to be indubitable. But it is certainly not such complex and compounded products that should supply us with examples, but the clearest cases possible, such as our memory of a moment ago.

In *certain cases* then, it may be difficult if not impossible to distinguish memory from imagination, that is to say, to decide on

internal evidence whether a given act is memory or imagination. But what would be the *sense* of trying to distinguish if memory were nothing but imagination which happened externally to agree with the past? In that case, *in principle*, there would be no utility in *trying* to distinguish, in *trying* to remember, since we would be exercising exactly the same faculty.

The second matter to be noticed in this connection is that the copy theory makes the relation between its "image" and the genuine past purely coincidental. That is, it is accidental to the image whether the past resembles it or not, and no inspection of that image can reveal its correspondence. Our own theory makes the past itself *internal* to the act of remembering, given along with the event itself which is past. Now clearly our sole acquaintance with the past must come through memory. Hence if we relocate ourselves back into our true position, that of minds whose exclusive access to the past is through memory, it turns out that according to the copy theory we are in a rather foolish box. For the past according to the copy theory is always given *external* to the act of memory, and therefore, since we are not external to our own minds, we have in principle *no* access either to the past itself, or even to the meaning of "past."

It is clear what has happened. The copy theory has intruded into its description of the essence of memory, a theory of a method of verification, so that memory becomes a compound of both itself and a method for verifying it. This is absurd in its own right, and futile in the long run, since the method of verifying memory by indirect means also presupposes precisely that validity of memory which is deemed questionable. The end result is that according to the copy theory there need be no past whatsoever, for all memories might be false copies; hence the very past itself becomes a gratuitous assumption, bolstered up by a series of elaborate arguments about the coherence of experience supposed to result from the assumption of a past. Phenomenologically however the past is no assumption, but rather a datum given directly in some clear cases to the mind.

2. The second objection to the notion that we can directly inspect the past is hard to specify but nonetheless effective in con-

trolling our beliefs. Memory has two aspects; it is a *cognitive* act claiming to acquaint us with the past, and therefore it must defend such a claim against epistemological objections; but also, since it is an *act*, it is something which occurs in the universe, something which must, therefore, defend itself against *ontological* objections which maintain that such an event *can not* occur. What, after all, does the phenomenological description of memory ask us to believe? Nothing less than that the mind here and now can establish actual relations to a past which is no more, or, that what has passed away forever can be called up and stand in the actual presence of an existing mind now. It maintains therefore that the remembering consciousness can somehow span one of the most fundamental diremptions in our experience, that between the past and present, or between what is no more and what is. Finally it takes seriously the eternity of the self, finding it not only a phenomenological *datum*, but precisely that mode of being which might conceivably make possible the union of past and present in memory. Now all of this is a good deal to believe, and surely one level of our common sense must cry out in protest that *this* sort of thing is simply impossible! And so once again we find ourselves with a *philosophic* problem: our own common sense would like to believe that its memory is a direct acquaintance with the past, but it also finds precisely this order of event quite incredible. In this paper, I have defended common sense in its first conviction, but I shall now oppose common sense in its fundamental ontological convictions. It goes without saying that common sense of itself is no touchstone for theoretical truth. At the same time, it has a long and intimate acquaintance with its own non-theoretical activities. We find accordingly that our immediate or naive views of memory, our pre-theoretical interpretation of memory, is quite stable, whereas our *theory* of what the whole thing is about is apt to shift with every shift in prevailing views of the nature of the universe. The *theories* of common sense then, being little but echoes of dominant theories, have little claim upon our attention, whereas its pre-theoretical interpretation of its own immediate life, where it has some practice and interest, is more likely to be of interest. Let us try, then, to render explicit the character of the ontology which forces our disbelief in

the immediate deliverance of memory, and see whether it itself is at all credible.

There are, I think, two basic premises of such an ontology, one having to do with time, and the other with causality. The first is an insistence upon the absolute finality of temporal distinctions. Within any specified coordinate scheme, past is past, and present is present; what exists is actual now, and the past has simply disappeared. This premise stated more abstractly identifies *being* with *present being*. All that is, in any sense, must be existent now. But the past does not exist now, and therefore it has no being whatever; and, having no being, how can I inspect it? It does exist for inspection. Therefore I am not inspecting it, but rather a present image of it.

The second premise has to do with causality. One of our convictions is that each thing is situated where it is and when it is. Things are dispersed in the media of time and space, each in its own pocket. If one thing is to affect another, its influence must travel through the medium, until it touches the thing to be affected. So long as two things remain separated in space or time, they must be indifferent to one another, neither acting upon nor knowing one another. In a word, no action at a distance. How then can the remembering mind pretend to jump across the gap of time and cognize directly something which lies in its past? What it cognizes therefore does not lie in its past, but is, again, a present image. Such then are some ontological reasons for insisting that what I now cognize in memory is nothing but a present image. The phenomenological description presents us on the contrary with a most paradoxical situation, where the act of remembering is enacted now, by a *present* mind, but the terminus or object of the act is in the genuine *past*. How then can the relationship between present act and past object be thought? It is a relation with one leg in the present and the other in the past; where or when is it?

Now both of these presuppositions should be well examined. The subject can not be discussed here with the thoroughness it demands, but enough can be said, I hope, to indicate that there are very solid reasons for rejecting both. The first premise reduces itself to a one dimensional ontology. If indeed being is confined

to the present instant, then memory is incredible. Similarly, if nothing is but the eternal, there could be no memory. Memory becomes incredible if being is reduced to *any* single dimension. The solution lies then in conceiving dimensions in being, such that neither the present nor the eternal by itself is an exhaustive interpretation of being. We have then no intention of declaring that the past is the present, nor that the past is not at all, nor that the past is eternal. All such assertions can be nothing but radical confusions of language and thought. What is the past? What mode of being does it have? Let us look again.

The past does not exist now. It is simply a flat contradiction in terms to imagine the past as now existing, for then indeed it is not past. The past as past is never present, and it is futile to try to imagine it as having some shadow or ghostly existence hovering around the same place it once occupied in full right. That would be precisely to deny the pastness of the past, which itself is a phenomenological datum. How would such a belief differ from the rank superstition which would like to believe that the dead, insofar as they are dead, are still living but simply invisible (or perhaps just *barely* visible to the believer), watching us, and ready to intervene for or against us? Souls may or may not be immortal, but they surely are not immortal in this fashion. Nor does the past still linger in the present, with its own subtle matter, and its own mode of efficacy. We can not then collapse the distinction between past and present; they are different, and never shall they be simultaneous.

Nor can we say that the past is not at all. As past, it is the subject of true propositions, and precisely what would such propositions be *about* if their subject matter had fallen back into pure nothingness? Propositions about the past are certainly not propositions about other propositions in the present, nor about our ideas of what the past might be like, but precisely about the past. If then they are true, their subject matter must have its own determinate mode of being and character. The past must be what true propositions assert it to be; the past therefore has its own distinctive and determinate mode of being.

Is the past then eternal? No, *as past*, it certainly is not simply an eternal fact. For the event which is now in our past, was

once present; it *became past*. It was not eternally past, or it never would have happened in the first place. To be sure, it has its fixed and immutable *order* in the series of events; but such an order simply dates it in the series and does not determine whether the event is occurring or not. It simply determines that the event is before another event in our present and after other events in its past. Thus the past can not be assimilated without remainder into an eternal serial order. We say, "Caesar *crossed* the Rubicon"; Caesar's contemporaries said, "Caesar *crosses* the Rubicon." The past therefore, insofar, as it is past, is not an eternal fact.

The past is not nothing at all, nor is it existent now in the present, nor is it laid up in eternity. All such notions rest upon a conviction that Being has no modes, that it is literally reducible to one of its own specifications. And so then, what mode of being *does* the past have? But is there any authentic puzzle here? There is only bewilderment in conceiving the past if we try to reduce it to something it is not. The past quite simply is past, and that is the end of it. It once was and now it is no longer, hence it is not present. It is what once was, a determinate something, hence it is not nothing; it once was but now is gone, hence at least that fact about it is not eternal. Precisely what further question then are we asking about the past which is not answered by its very name? Or has this term also suddenly become meaningless? We must, as Descartes remarked, stop asking questions when we already have something so clear that any further "explanations" would only obscure the object. The problem then is not *what* the past is; that is known as clearly as anything can be known. The problem is in *extending the notion of being* to include the past. And that problem is not solved by further analysis of the past, but by extensions in imagination and reason to render them adequate to what undoubtedly is.

If this is what the past is, how is it related to the present? It is, as we have been arguing, distinguished from the present. But is its distinction final? If so, how can we, in our present, inspect it? Is not the inspection itself a bond between them? If temporal *distinctions* are final, then again memory becomes incredible. But of course, as Hegel argues at length, distinctions

are never final. Items that are distinguished are also united, not in the same sense in which they are distinguished but in a higher sense. A distinction is a separation of what is not separated prior to the distinction. Distinction distinguishes within a whole, and the very *sense* of distinction implies the connectedness of what is being distinguished. Or, put otherwise, the sense of a distinction can never be to sunder the distinguished aspects into unrelated universes. Thus the past is past and present is present, and on this level, neither is ever simultaneous with the other. On the other hand, *what is it* that is being so differentiated? Within what whole are these moments distinct? That whole or unity can not be characterized by terms appropriate to the level where the distinctions are found; that unity therefore is itself neither exclusively in the past nor in the present. Nor is it unrelated to past and present, since it is precisely the whole of such moments. The traditional name for such a unity is of course "eternity."

The example of hearing a melody is used so frequently I hesitate to use it once again; but it is clear and decisive. The notes, we recall, are not heard atomically and wholly separated from one another. Individual notes are not a melody. Nor are they heard simultaneously, which also is not a melody but a chord. They are heard both together and separated; not in the same sense, which would be contradictory, but in their serial order, such that all are heard at once, yet preserving their order. Their serial order is a distinction within the whole, and that whole is not itself a member of that series. Now hearing the whole melody is itself an event within a larger whole. But we are not here talking about the event of *hearing* the melody, which is a psychological act, but the heard *melody* itself, and that melody is a whole of the same order as that which presides over all moments of time.

But external events do not remember themselves. We remember our former acts of *consciousness*. What is relevant to memory then is the eternal being of consciousness, since memory is an act of consciousness. And the eternal dimension of consciousness, which is identical now and then, and which is consciously so identical, we have called the eternal ego or self. In short, while all events strung out in time participate in eternal being, they do not all do so consciously; when it is done so consciously,

and on the level of intuitive perception and not hypothetical inference, we arrive at the possibility of memory with its collateral consciousness of the eternity of the self. The notion of eternity then is essential not only for any adequate description of objective temporal events, but also for any adequate description of the subjective act of remembering. And it is not such as to cancel temporal distinctions, but rather preserves them in a higher unity.

The second premise of "common sense" metaphysics whose influence lends an air of extreme paradox to memory, is a conviction about causality. Our notions of causality are derived for the most part from science, or what was science, until recently when notions of statistical constants assumed the role. No action at a distance, whether that distance be in time or space. If anything *was*, it can only act now by its influence being transmitted or enduring up into the present. And thus we feel that "brain traces" are the causes of memory; there must be present modifications of the physical matter of the brain to account for anything now occurring in the mind.

Now whatever the role of the brain is, and we do not wish wholly to forget it, we should also be clear about the categorical question. Let causation be what it is, it is certain that the mind is not related to the objects of its consciousness by *any causal relation* whatsoever. The relation between the conscious subject and its object is that of *presence* and not physical influence, touching, or any mode of causation whatsoever. When I recall the past, that past event as past can not be *acting* on my mind since indeed it is passed away, which means precisely that it has lost all power of acting. Nor is my consciousness acting upon it. How indeed can I alter in any way a past event insofar as it is past? In short, that past event is not modified in its own intrinsic character by my becoming aware of it, nor is it acting upon my present consciousness through any effort or influence of its own. It stands in my presence, and presence is not a physical relation. This is true of course not only for memory but for *any* cognitive act. Even in present perception, the external physical stimulus does not act upon my *consciousness*, but only upon my sensorium. I must become aware of its influence by my own free conscious act, by which I pose it as object. Hence the worry about causation is

a monstrous *ignoratio elenchi*. The conscious subject is in no case, let alone memory, touched, moved, or physically acted upon by any physical influence, whether it is actually perceiving such a physically existent thing or not. The problem then should be relocated from the sphere of seeking for some peculiar mode of causation by which the past actually acts now on present mind, into that of the phenomenological investigation of presence itself. And this of course will introduce other and unique categories. For the moment, we can only conclude that an ontology which finds the direct presence of the past to a mind in the present impossible rests upon assumptions which themselves need re-examination. Ontology can at best render possible the phenomenological datum; it can not serve to discredit or nullify data by declaring on a priori grounds what data are *possible*, or in general what is and what is not possible within the whole of being. Our argument, it should be repeated, is not directed against ontology; it is directed only against those ontologies which have forgotten memory.

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THE SELF AND THE BODY

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ALTHOUGH Descartes proposed it as the model of indubitable evidence, the *Cogito, ergo sum* has remained an enigma to philosophers, a sort of mystery in broad daylight, for it has the obscure clarity of something felt immediately. It is this immediacy, this primitivity of a mind present to itself, which perplexes and which yet cannot be dissipated by reducing the *Cogito* to a tautology or the conclusion of a suppressed syllogism,¹ inasmuch as Descartes himself expressly denies that it is a *raisonnement* or syllogism.² It is rather an inspection of the mind, a primitive intuition; yet the nature of this reflexive operation and of the datum which it apprehends is obscure and indeterminate.

What sort of existence does the *Sum* have? Whether we affirm it to be the conceptual being of thought or the concrete existence of an individual, we will be forced to draw conclusions inimical to the Cartesian philosophy, for the alternative interpretations give rise to a serious dilemma. Jules Lequier states the dilemma in this way: "I think, therefore I am. Now in saying: 'I am,' after having said: 'I think,' either I say less, or I say more. If I say less, I am proceeding with certainty, but backwards; if I say more, I advance indeed, but by what right? What perplexity! . . . Such are the two aspects of this proposition which is alternately evident and sterile, pregnant and obscure for the mind that examines it. But to the extent it is evident, it is sterile; to the extent that it is fruitful, it is obscure."³

¹ The full syllogism would be:
Quicquid cogitat, est.
Cogito,
ergo sum.

² "Cum autem advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima quidem notio est quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam cum quis dicit, 'ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo,' existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed tanquam rem per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit." (*Entretien avec Burman.*)

³ *Textes inédits*, p. 56.

Kierkegaard adopts the first hypothesis, namely, that the "I am" says less than the "I think." The proposition is a tautology, or at least indifferent to individual existence; and whatever is indifferent to existence cannot itself exist, for existence is an infinite interest in itself. "The Cartesian *Cogito, ergo sum* has often been repeated. It the 'I' which is the subject of *cogito* means an individual human being, the proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, ergo I am; but if I *am* thinking what wonder that I *am*.' The assertion has already been made, and the first proposition says even more than the second. But if the 'I' in *cogito* is interpreted as meaning a particular existing human being, philosophy cries: 'How silly! Here there is no question of your self or my self, but solely of the pure ego.' But this pure ego cannot very well have any other than a purely conceptual existence. What then does the *ergo* mean? There is no conclusion here, for the proposition is a tautology."⁴

Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the proposition is not analytic but synthetic. Since the *cogito* already contains being, then the *sum* must add something else. But what could this something else be? It can only be something which transforms being into existence by giving it a position in space and time; this addition must convey the notion of *thereness*, it must adjoin the *da* to *Sein* and make it *Dasein*, or existence. But it is impossible for thought to think itself into existence: it can only uncover the infra-structure on which it is erected, its concrete basis in the world. The only interpretation which remains is that the *Cogito* is an intuition of my *thereness*, of my posture in the world, of my body as an original facticity which reflexion brings to light. Descartes' very formulation of the problem of existence, however, excludes this interpretation; for in seeking an indubitable evidence, he has revoked the world in doubt, and therefore his own body as an object contained in the world. "*Age ergo somniamus, nec particularia ista vera sint, nos oculos aperire, caput movere, manus extendere, nec forte etiam nos habere tales manus, nec tale totum corpus.*"⁵

⁴ *Postscript*, p. 281.

⁵ *Meditatio I.*

The *Cogito* cannot prove my existence, my being there or *Dasein*, since the *there* has been expressly excluded by methodical doubt. It is pure act, pure transparency, which takes place nowhere, inasmuch as the *here* and the *there* have been put aside with the world itself. It proves only that there are operations of the mind, and methodical doubt shows that these operations are nowhere, not even at a point, since a point is still a spatial name signifying mere position; but the *Cogito* is absolutely positionless, and the *res cogitans* is neither inside the body nor outside, neither here nor there; for there is no body, and no here, and no there.

If, on the contrary, I wish to bring to light the *existence* of my consciousness, to unveil, as it were, the nudity of its situation in the world, it is self-defeating to begin by doubting everything, my body as well as the world. If, like Descartes, I shut my eyes, plug my ears, and seal up my senses, I will indeed arrive at the pure being of my doubt, at that point where pure being is identical with absolute nothing; for such a program of withdrawal from the world, taken seriously, can be accomplished only by voluntary death, by a radical negation of my existential position. Indeed, suicide would be an *experimentum crucis* for the Cartesian thesis, but its success would not be open to public inspection. And so long as I am unwilling to nullify my senses, I can never be sure that the existence of my thought is independent of the facticity of my body, I can never be sure that the evidence of the *Cogito* does not rest upon a more obscure and primitive evidence, which is the position of my body in the world. Methodical doubt must remain a fiction because, if exercised in act, it would destroy the very evidence it seeks to establish. It is only an imaginary doubt, a reflexion which remains exterior to its object, a negation which fails to negate, and therefore only conceals the concrete antecedents of the *Cogito*.

If by the "existence" of consciousness I mean my corporeal presence in the world, how am I to bring this evidence to light, make it an explicit object of consciousness without abolishing thereby the inherence I wish to establish? For, if I am aware of an object, I am also aware that I am not that object: consciousness cannot inhere in an object toward which it is directed. Therefore, I must withdraw my adhesion from every object in my field

of perception. Suppose then that I am seated at my desk and that I begin this reflexive withdrawal, discarding every object which falls under my gaze. My consciousness cannot be this piece of paper before me, nor the pen in my hand, nor even my hand itself insofar as it is for me another object on the desk. If I turn my gaze still closer to my *self*, in an attempt to find a being which I am and yet which is none of these objects, I can see my arms, shoulders, and the end of my nose, but further I cannot go. The origin of my perspective on the world is concealed from me. To the extent that such an "origin" *appears* in the process of introversion, it is an "elsewhere" of objects, a non-object, and therefore a subjectivity. It is not, however, a psyche sunk within my body or concealed somewhere behind my eyes, since it appears simply as the limit of my body, at that point where it disappears. Now some things are concealed because they are behind my back, but I have only to turn around for them to become explicit parts of my perspective. They are not my consciousness because they can always become its objects. Yet there is something which is always *there*, which I can never see, not because it is behind my back but because it can never become an object of consciousness. Nevertheless it is *something*, it is *there*, in the world, it is my *self*, the origin of my perspective, on which I can have no perspective.* It is not my eyes, nor my forehead, nor the back of my head, for these I can see in the mirror. It is a hole that I can never fill; a mote in my vision that I can never pluck out. If someone looks at me, sees *me*, I can cover my eyes in shame, but my fingers touch only objects, closed organs, and what they sought to hide has been displaced, has retreated elsewhere. And so it is with all my body. So long as it is apprehending the world, and not itself apprehended, it *is* my consciousness, its facticity, its concrete position in the world. But if I try reflexively to lay hold of my consciousness, it is always elsewhere, always retreating. If it is not in my eyes, then it is in my head; if not there, then it

* Cf. *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 406: "Mais je ne pouvais prendre aucun point de vue, tout à l'heure, sur mon corps en tant qu'il était désigné par les choses. Il est, en effet, le point de vue sur lequel je ne peux prendre aucun point de vue, l'instrument que je ne peux utiliser au moyen d'aucun instrument."

is a pure subject; but a reflexion which grasps the pure subject grasps rather the non-existence of consciousness, a mere identity without distinction which is the negation of consciousness. The self does exist, however, provided my attention is turned outward, to the objects of the world, for it is implicit in them as their point of final reference, as the center around which they turn in manifesting their properties. My consciousness of the world is thus a backward awareness of my self as that from which all objects are distant and against which they are framed as close or far away. The self is the fundamental distance, the ground on which all other distances appear. Yet what I am aware of is the closeness of an object, not its closeness to me, for objectively I am aware simply of a certain shape or form against a relatively indifferent background. A *Gestalt* can appear in such a way, however, only because I am *there*, adhering to a portion of matter, and the proximity of the form contains an implicit reference to a subjectivity-in-situation. Abstractive reflexion, on the other hand, transforms such a subjectivity into a universal "I am I" or as Kierkegaard put it, "a mathematical point which does not exist, and insofar as there is nothing to prevent every one from occupying its standpoint, the one will not be in the way of the other."⁷ The essential thing is that *my* consciousness is exclusive, that only I can occupy its point of view, and this can only mean that it is somehow *there*, existing in a certain region of space and time, yet not as an object beside others. It can only be there as a pure facticity, as an elusive presence, which is felt more as a pure absence, as a place where there are no objects, yet toward which all objects point as to their final ground.

Abstractive reflexion deprives the body of its dimension of subjectivity and constitutes it as an object beside others in the world. And because the body is pure object, a mere phenomenon of the outer sense, the subject is pure subject, a transcendental activity which constitutes the phenomenal world and is therefore beyond it. But reflexion-in-situation has revealed that my body can never be fully constituted and that, inasmuch as it takes itself as object and appears to itself, it is always *semi-constituted* and

⁷ *Postscript*, p. 176.

manifests the duality of subject and object in its own structure. Moreover, my subjectivity has appeared as a mere limit of introversion, as a sort of phantom of my phenomenal body.* This has led to the paradox that it is only when my attention is extraverted that I am aware of myself, for I am beyond myself in the world, I discover my presence in the way a door opens when I turn the knob, in the rhythm of things which appear and disappear, announcing to me my movements in the world. If things offer many perspectives and dimensions, it is only because somewhere there is something on which I have no perspective, where all the dimensions disappear, and this something is my body, a pure facticity, something which is there without my putting it there.

My body is my nature or ground, what I have not myself made but only presupposed in the mode of givenness. Hence it is a material a priori. Whether it be given marginally or as an explicit object of intuition, it accompanies every experience as its necessary ground. I cannot constitute the phenomenal world from above if I am already in the world when I become aware of it. The material apriority of the body anchors me once and for good within the horizons of time and space. Moreover, my body is equipped from the beginning with a specific motoricity; so that my perception of the world is always a sensorimotor activity. It is by moving among things, in search of our own possibilities, that we deliver them from their latency and indifference, allow them to manifest themselves, to multiply their properties, to stretch out in time and reveal the law that governs the series of apparitions. Indeed, we cannot perceive objects unless we handle them, turn them about, taste them, and thereby force them to reveal their multiple properties. It is impossible to remain in the rigidity of absolute contemplation; and if it were possible, such a contemplation would reveal rather the irreality of things, and its

* When reflexion reaches this limit, it may take a different path and descend into the body. Normally the inside of the body is itself only a part of the "phantom," since it usually appears marginally as a heavy yet empty mass. To the extent that it suffers certain internal affections, its phantasmal volume "fills up." As opposed to affections, emotions are, in the first instance, modalities of consciousness and hence intentionally related to objects of the world. It is abstractive reflexion which localises them and treats them as quasi-objects of the internal sense.

rigidity would be that of *rigor mortis*. That is why the philosophy of contemplation is an apprenticeship for death, and the things contemplated more unreal than real.

An object in the world, however, always has *another side*, and we say it is real because it is open to exploration and reveals itself progressively. Its "other side" is thus a guaranty of its reality, its transcendence beyond the here and now, which is validated only insofar as a subject handles it, uses it, and transcends it as a means to his own ends. The transcendence of the thing is thus correlative to the transcendence of the subject, to the movement of his own body toward certain ends. The thing therefore appears as a *manipulandum*, and the concept of utility points again to the subject's presence in the world, inasmuch as the potentialities of the utensil are but the reflex of his own possibilities of action. The world appears as *his* world, as a mechanico-teleological system of tools and commodities, and he accomplishes the destiny of this world by consuming its objects.

More than in the objects of perception, man finds himself in the objects of use. He perceives things only to the extent that he acts upon them, and his modes of intending cannot be separated from his modes of transforming and appropriating the material world. A reflexive withdrawal from the world ends up with a deceptive abstraction, for the self of which it speaks is a logical construct, no closer to me than to others. The human body is the first concrete self inasmuch as, on the one hand, it is exclusive of other selves and, on the other, it is an object which can appear to itself and thus pose itself as subject. It can see itself, touch itself, etc., and insofar as action upon itself is oriented toward ends beyond its surface, it constitutes itself as an instrument of action, extends itself into the world, and appropriates its substance. In a certain sense, the body ego is invisible, not because it is in the body, but because it is outside it, pursuing ends which objectively qualify the world as a system of utility. Thus it is not constituted by an "I think" but by its intentionality and finality, by its movement toward the world and beyond it, toward those ends which appear on its horizon.

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HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGY OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

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THE writings of Martin Heidegger are little known and even less understood by American philosophers. It is a curious fact that his philosophy was first brought to the attention of many philosophers in this country by the logical positivists who found the paradigm of meaninglessness in Heidegger's assertion that "the nothing nothings itself." But philosophical arguments, particularly when they are dogmatic, have a way of backfiring. They may serve as a kind of boomerang which returns upon the proponent with lethal power. It was obviously a mistake for the positivists to grant such prominence to even a single utterance of Heidegger, for it was inevitable that some philosophers, at least, should be fascinated by the statement and eventually endeavor to determine what it could mean. Philosophers are, even in spite of themselves, concerned about nothingness. The program of the positivists exhibits this interest negatively in its rejection of the meaningless. Metaphysical propositions, on the positivist view, do not refer to anything, or perhaps we should say they refer to *nothing*. This translation would obviously be rejected by the positivist because it represents metaphysical statements as having a referent. And we must grant that the two are not equivalent statements. But it is an interesting and important question whether or not statements which do not refer to anything and, hence, are *meaningless*, can be said to refer to *nothing*. The question cannot be dismissed as in itself a meaningless question for this is surely to beg the question in the most obvious fashion. For we would still have to deal with the problem of *meaninglessness* and the reference of meaningless assertions in relation to this question. If there are possible meaningless assertions in every metalanguage, the question about meaningless assertions must occur at every level of discourse and, hence, is ultimately inescapable. The question about nothingness has concerned philosophers from the time of Parmenides to the present. The positivists evidence

no less concern about it than do those who accept it as a legitimate philosophical problem.

Heidegger is noted for his concern with the nothing, *das Nichts*, and this may be partially due to the way in which his ideas were first introduced. Whereas the positivists regarded his writings as nonsense, employing his references to nothingness to prove them so, other of his interpreters took his thought seriously but regarded it as fundamentally nihilistic. He was pictured as an irrationalist philosopher, preoccupied with death and negativity. It is this representation of Heidegger which still prevails to a large extent among philosophers in this country. Unlike the positivists, they accept what he says as meaningful and important but as having consequences which must be rejected not only as mistaken but, perhaps, as immoral. That this appraisal requires careful examination is indicated by the fact that not a few theologians have borrowed heavily from Heidegger¹ and found in his writings important positive suggestions. The impression that Heidegger is a nihilist or even an irrationalist is mistaken from the ground up; it is difficult to understand how it could be sustained by anyone who had struggled through any one of Heidegger's essays.

Heidegger makes it indubitably clear in the first pages of *Sein und Zeit* that it is Being with which he is concerned.² It is unfortunate that nothingness has been made so prominent in representations of his thought, for it is Being rather than nothing with which he is primarily occupied. Heidegger is sharply critical of the whole tradition of Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche because it increasingly lost contact with Being and quite naturally ended in nihilism. With few exceptions, Heidegger argues, philosophers have been concerned not with Being itself but with beings. As a result they have not asked the most radical questions. The being and non-being with which they have concerned

¹ Both Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich have been positively influenced by Heidegger. Cf. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, and Tillich, *The Courage to Be*.

² Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, Einleitung: "Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn vom Sein." Heidegger's concern with nothingness is invariably a result of his fundamental concern about the "meaning of Being." Cf. *Was ist Metaphysik?*, pp. 20, 27; *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, pp. 23 ff.

themselves have not been absolute being or non-being.' Plato very early put aside the question about absolute non-being and attempted to analyze relative non-being, interpreted as otherness. Non-being, as considered in the *Parmenides*, is a mode of being. But, on Heidegger's analysis, this evades the most radical ontological question about Being: why is there something rather than nothing at all?⁴ It is not a question about being and otherness, but about Being and absolute non-Being—the complete absence of Being. It is an open question whether Heidegger succeeds in making any significant progress in wrestling with this problem. But in any event it is the question which underlies much of his inquiry and which must be constantly held in mind if one is to understand him.

It is with Being itself and not merely with beings that Heidegger intended to concern himself in *Sein und Zeit*. The primary question which that work is designed to answer is: what is the meaning of Being? Heidegger credits Aristotle with having stated this question as the proper concern of metaphysics, but criticizes him for not having gone about answering it in the right way. Being is not something alongside beings which may be investigated as an object in its own right. To treat Being in this fashion would be to assign to it the status of a being. To consider it even as the highest being is not to escape this difficulty. Ontology does not have a special object in the way that the various sciences may have special objects to inform their inquiry. It has no object at all, for Being is not an object. To objectify Being is to treat it as a being and hence not to inquire about it at all.⁵ The inquiry about Being is the most difficult of all investigations for the reason that we cannot engage in it directly. Ontology requires the subtlest and most indirect approach of which human reason is capable. Like the pursuit of happiness, it cannot be attained if pursued directly. This raises the question, of course, whether

⁴ Cf. *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 10.

⁵ *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 25.

⁶ "...denn die 'Seinsfrage' im Sinne der metaphysischen Frage nach dem Seienden als solchem *frägt gerade nicht* thematisch nach dem Sein. Dieses bleibt vergessen" (*Einführung*, p. 14). Cf. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 21.

even an indirect inquiry can succeed in the undertaking. Can Heidegger even by the most tortuous procedure divest Being of its mystery? Or is he predestined to failure by virtue of the very "ontological difference" to which he appeals in criticizing the philosophical tradition?

This is an important issue, the one, in fact, on which Jaspers and Heidegger differ most sharply. Heidegger believes that ontology is possible and that he has made a substantial contribution to the subject.⁶ Jaspers, on the other hand, maintains that Being remains mysterious, the limit beyond which inquiry can never reach. On this point Jaspers is fundamentally a Kantian. He adopts the Kantian doctrine of limits but interprets it dynamically. For Jaspers, Being is a receding limit which is ever drawing a line anew just in advance of the point reached in our speculation.⁷ He interprets Kant in the light of Hegel, admitting that no limit can remain fixed. But he stands with Kant in insisting that no limit can ever be finally transcended. Heidegger, who seems to begin so close to Kant and to formulate his "fundamental ontology" in Kantian terms, moves closer and closer to Hegel in the progression of his inquiry. If the "ontological difference" is so radical as Heidegger initially maintained, it is difficult to see how it could in principle ever be transcended. It would appear that we are confronted with a dilemma: either the attempt to construct an ontology inevitably results in metaphysics, namely the failure to determine the meaning of Being, or the distinction between Being and beings could not have been so radical as was initially maintained. In other words, the recognition of the "ontological difference" would seem to make ontology impossible. Hence, it is understandable that *Sein und Zeit* has been interpreted as a contribution to philosophical anthropology, an interpretation which Heidegger vehemently rejects. But if one rejects this interpretation, does he not have to reject the premise on which the inquiry was originally predicated? With what right, we may ask, can Heidegger claim to be doing ontology?

⁶ "Die Enthüllung der Seinsverfassung des Daseins ist Ontologie" (*Kant und das Problem*, p. 209).

⁷ "Das Umgreifende der Welt ist nur im Transzendieren zu berühren, nicht im Wissen zu fassen" (*Von der Wahrheit*, p. 93).

In attempting to answer this question, it is helpful to consider the point at which Heidegger begins. He gives two principal reasons for centering the inquiry on human existence, one negative, the other positive. We cannot hope to obtain an answer to the question, "What is the meaning of Being?" by considering beings other than ourselves. They must inevitably appear to us as objects, as beings. Even God we can treat only as a being; we must objectify and represent him to ourself. We can ask the ontological question about God but there is no hope of an answer. In taking this position Heidegger is, I think, accepting in wholesale fashion the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself. Much of his argument only repeats or elaborates the Kantian position. It is a moot question whether or not the shift in Heidegger's interest in his later essays represents a repudiation of the position of *Sein und Zeit*. It seems to me that the later writings do represent a genuine reversal on this point, but a change that is fully consistent with the method of *Sein und Zeit*. In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger maintained that Being does disclose itself in human existence, that, in *Dasein*, Being is related to itself.^{*} It is perfectly consistent, even necessary, to extend this commitment and allow that in all beings, Being is self-related and self-disclosing. In so far as one can find a Hegelian motif reflected in *Sein und Zeit*, this is exactly the direction in which one would expect Heidegger's thought to move. Since our concern centers on the program of the two earlier books in which he first develops his fundamental theses, we need not consider the significance of any shift of viewpoint in the later essays. Precisely the same problems will occur if the context of the analysis is extended to include all beings.

The positive reason for beginning with human existence is that man is reflexively related to Being. Man's essence is his existence. He is self-related to Being and concerned about his own Being. The analysis of the modes of man's existence, the

^{*} "Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins. Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, dass es ontologisch ist" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 12). Cf. p. 15: "Die Seinsfrage ist dann aber nichts anderes als die Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehörigen wesenhaften Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses."

structural analysis of his essential nature, should disclose the fundament of his Being.

It is important to note that Heidegger does not hope to uncover the Being of *Dasein* as a sort of substantial ground or substratum which underlies his phenomenal existence. His phenomenal existence must itself be taken as the revelation or disclosure of his Being. Heidegger's method is phenomenological, yet his objective is ontological. It is not easy to see how a phenomenological method can produce ontological conclusions. To say that the essence of man is his existence would seem to imply that Being is exhausted in its self-objectification. Thus, it might be argued, a phenomenological analysis could yield ontological conclusions only if Being as ground is identical with being as manifest structure. Hegel's method is also phenomenological. But in order to claim that the results of his own inquiry are ontological Hegel is forced to insist upon the identity of the substantial and the phenomenal. The entire process of dialectic for Hegel is the movement from implicit being to fully manifest phenomenological existence. It is evident in the later essays that Heidegger does not want to subscribe to this doctrine, for he holds that Being remains hidden even in being disclosed. And in *Sein und Zeit* it is clear that he wishes to hold on to the transcendence of Being. The question is: how can he preserve the transcendence of Being while making such ambitious claims for his phenomenological method?

To ask the most radical question about Being is, as we have seen, to be concerned about it in the light of the absence of Being. In spite of the fact that he makes frequent reference to non-being, Heidegger leaves us very much in the dark as to the way it functions in our thought. He may be easily forgiven for not having illumined anything so inscrutable. Still, if it is to play the role he assigns to it, namely as the counter against which we may understand the meaning of Being, it must be dialectically related to Being in some fashion. Human existence is characterized by its finiteness and temporality. Man's highest possibility is the possibility of death, and death is the radical non-existence of the

self.* The existential analysis of man can be carried out only in relation to this possibility, for only in such an indirect fashion can the meaning of Being be disclosed. There are a number of questions which ought to be raised at this point. Does death mean absolute non-existence, the passage from Being to Nothing? Heidegger makes no attempt to prove that such is the case but takes it more or less for granted. But is he not, perhaps, assuming too much in his interpretation of death? Could we not turn it quite the other way round and say that we cannot understand death save in so far as we understand what it is that is extinguished? If the Being of the individual is absolute in some sense then the death of the individual may be absolute, provided that death involves the complete and perfect negation of the individual—which is surely very much open to question. The death of an animal is one thing and the death of a man another. To understand the significance of the death of either must we not know what a man and an animal are?

For Heidegger, death is the supreme principle of individuation. It is the possibility of death which discloses to us the finiteness and particularity of our existence as men. Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether it is human finiteness or human individuality that Heidegger is most concerned about. Death obviously demonstrates the finiteness of man, but I am not so sure that it serves to disclose individuality in the way that Heidegger believes. For death to function properly in making possible what Heidegger calls "authentic existence," it is important that it have the meaning which Heidegger assigns to it. But there is no one conception of the meaning of death. For every theory of the nature of man there is a correlative theory of the meaning of death. The reverse may also be true. But to take either one or the other for granted and employ it as a device for the interpretation of its opposite is to argue in a circle—though not necessarily a vicious one. The point I wish to make is that Heidegger's interpretation of the meaning of human existence, its authentic

* "Der Tod ist *eigenste* Möglichkeit des Daseins. Das Sein zu ihr erschliesst dem Dasein sein *eigenstes* Seinkönnen, darin es um das Sein des Daseins schlechthin geht" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 263).

and inauthentic modes, depends upon Heidegger's conception of the meaning and significance of death. But if the meaning of death cannot be determined independently of the question as to the significance of that being whose death it is, then the appeal to death cannot be accepted as a decisive test for any theory of human nature.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger relies heavily if not exclusively upon the fact of death as the principle of individuation. In the various possible activities of living, men may become forgetful of or virtually lose consciousness of their existence as individuals. For Heidegger this is tantamount to losing consciousness of one's Being.¹⁸ This represents one of the most original and interesting theses in Heidegger's theory. The problem of individuation, a special case of the problem of the one and the many, has been a perennial problem in Western philosophy.

But the problem of individuality has features of its own. Granted that there are real particulars, are there genuine individuals which are not interchangeable? Aristotelians argue that it is matter which individuates. But it is difficult to see how undifferentiated matter can combine with generic essences to produce unique individuals. A particular being may be interchangeable with another particular being of the same type. The two need not be unique either materially or essentially. Kant appealed to space and time in order to account for individuation. This solution has been attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers, among them Bertrand Russell. Kant argued that entities which are otherwise indiscernible may be distinguished by the particular and unique situation they enjoy in space and time. But even if satisfactory, this provides Kant only with a principle of individuation for phenomenal beings. The moral self remains unindividuated.

The objection has been raised against Kant that the moral individual for him is really a universal, and that he does not deal

¹⁸ "Der Tod 'gehört' nicht indifferent nur dem eigenen Dasein zu, sondern er beansprucht dieses als einzelnes. Die im Vorlaufen verstandene Unbezüglichkeit des Todes vereinzelt das Dasein auf es selbst" (ibid.).

with the self at all as a unique being.¹¹ The criticism is sound, though it cannot be counted as a very serious objection. It was not the uniqueness of the individual that Kant was interested in. He took individuality and particularity for granted and attempted to specify the a priori conditions for universality. He does leave the question, "How am I, as this solitary individual, to act?" unanswered, because he was not trying to answer it. Yet, this is precisely the question which has most concerned the existentialist thinkers. For Kierkegaard each man is ultimately confronted by God and, hence, required to answer for himself. It is this confrontation which discloses to him his sin and despair and, thus, his existence as spirit. In the encounter with God there are no rules or universal principles to which men may appeal. Each must answer for himself as a unique and solitary being.¹² He knows that no one else may answer for him and that he cannot justify himself in terms which others have used. For the absolutely unique there can be no principles or general rules. The individual is absolutely on his own.

But in spite of this emphasis upon the solitary individual Kierkegaard gives us what might be regarded as a phenomenological analysis of the life of spirit. Despair and sin, for example, are a priori categories which apply to all men. The situation of all men is unique, but this very uniqueness gives rise to a new mode of universality. If one wants to analyze that which is radically unique in man it may be the case that one can neither universalize it nor communicate it. Kierkegaard attempts to meet this difficulty by recourse to indirect communication. Some theologians, following Kierkegaard, adopt a confessional point of view and make no claim for universality. The question of universality and communication raises an important problem which pertains, also, to Heidegger. Is either Kierkegaard or Heidegger addressing him-

¹¹ Cf. Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart*, pp. 31 ff.

¹² "Now we reach the paradox. Either the individual as the individual is able to stand in an absolute relation to the absolute (and then the ethical is not the highest) or Abraham is lost—he is neither a tragic hero, nor an aesthetic hero." (Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, tr. Lowrie [Anchor Books], p. 122.)

self to the essential condition of man such that all men as men stand before God, in the case of Kierkegaard, or before death, in the case of Heidegger? Is the confrontation with God and the despair and sin which it entails a necessary condition of man *qua* man, or only a possible condition? Does it not follow that if, as Kierkegaard believed, he stands before God and is "transparently grounded in God," that this must apply to other men? If not, is God not a chimera or fiction? Does not the struggle of the individual with the problem of his own sin and salvation necessarily carry him outside of and beyond himself to the acknowledgment of the plight of other men?

Kant believed that all men are subject to the moral law and, hence, equal before it. To be aware of duty at all is to recognize that there is a transcendent and universal aspect to one's situation. Does one's uniqueness not inevitably reveal one's commonality with other men, whether before the moral law, before God, or before death? To take duty, sin, or death seriously is to universalize them, to regard them not only as possible conditions of man but as necessary conditions of human existence. Whatever may be said about Kant and Kierkegaard, it is clear that Heidegger did regard the existentialistic analysis as revealing universal and necessary conditions of human existence. He employs the term *a priori* in referring to the structural characteristics of *Dasein*; the similarity between his procedure and the transcendental method of Kant is apparent. Heidegger regards death as a universal and necessary characteristic of *Dasein*. Although he chooses to refer to it as a possibility he evidently regards it as an inescapable necessity. It is ultimately the fact that all men face death which individuates them and which, also, makes possible the authentic and inauthentic modes of their existence.

Unlike Kierkegaard, Heidegger regards man's existence in the world and his co-existence with other beings in the world as *a priori* characteristics of his being.¹¹ Communication does not constitute the problem for him that it does for Kierkegaard and Jaspers.

¹¹ Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 117 ff: "Dieses Seiende ist weder vorhanden noch zuhanden, sondern ist so, wie das freigebende Dasein selbst—es ist auch und mit da."

But in spite of this, there is a strong Leibnizian tinge to Heidegger's position. The ground for being-in-the world as, also, co-existence with others is to be found in the individual. He is not worldly because he is in the world but in the world because he is worldly. Similarly, he is not temporal because he exists in time but exists in time because his being is temporal. Space and time are ultimately to be explained, on Heidegger's account, in terms of human concern. The world is possible because of the possibility of the self-projection of *Dasein*. Heidegger seems to want to maintain a mediate position between that of Kierkegaard and that, say, of Hegel. *Dasein* isn't anchored in itself alone as Leibniz would have it. The world is not spun out of the self as in the case of the monad. It reaches to other beings and the horizon of its activity overlaps that of other beings. But at the same time the various "worlds" do not coalesce in such a way as to constitute an ultimate unity or identity.¹⁴ Hence, there are necessary limits on communication and we must be constantly reminded that the being about which we are concerned is our own.

The distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence in Heidegger is supposed to be merely descriptive. We cannot choose to exist only authentically, for both modes are equally necessary to our existence. Yet, Heidegger's readers have not been able to avoid the conclusion that the distinction has direct moral presuppositions and implications. It has, also, I think, metaphysical presuppositions and implications. The fact that Heidegger derives worldliness from the individual, that he explains everything universal and a priori in terms of the finite existent requires him to assign priority to the authentic mode of existence. For it is only in the mode of authenticity that we accept the fact of our radical finitude. If one were to deny this starting point, he might very well reverse the categories and regard the worldly existence of man as authentic. There seems to be a fundamental ambivalence in *Sein und Zeit* with respect to this question. Heidegger seems to be treating *Dasein* throughout as itself something universal while, at the same time, reminding us of our self-involve-

¹⁴ "Die Charakteristik des Begegnens der Anderen orientiert sich so aber doch wieder am je *eigenen* Dasein" (ibid.). Cf. pp. 7, 12, 42, 114.

ment in the inquiry. This ambivalence may be accounted for by Heidegger's attempt to naturalize Kierkegaard while not giving up the subjective moment.

There is, I think, a serious confusion which may be involved in the thesis that truth is subjective. It may mean that truth can be ascertained only subjectively, though having universal import, or it may mean that truth is subjective, i.e., that it cannot be made universal. Kant believed that the inquiry about morality is subjective and, in this sense, practical, since it is only as we examine our own decisions that we encounter the fact of duty. Yet, he argued, duty is a universal feature of human experience and is capable of being stated in rationally communicable terms. Heidegger stands much closer to Kant than to Kierkegaard on this point. If not, then surely we are entitled to construe *Sein und Zeit* as an exercise in philosophical anthropology or, more precisely, as an expression of Heidegger's own peculiar way of looking at himself and the world. In the latter instance the phenomenological analysis would apply to Heidegger's own experience and to the experience of others only in so far as they happen to share common features.

This is precisely the kind of criticism which a good many people are inclined to make of Heidegger's analysis. They interpret it as a reflection of and response to the situation in Europe between the two World Wars. To claim that it can be generalized to refer to the human situation at all times is, they would insist, to overlook the relativity of the situation in which it originated. But has the critic, perhaps, not testified against himself in making such an objection? If Heidegger's analysis is to be interpreted in this way, why not all analyses of human existence? Heidegger would surely say that his own thought is a response to his historical-cultural situation. Man is historical and temporal, on his view, and his thought is always a response to his situation.¹⁸ Only the naturalistic or rationalistic philosopher can claim that the question about man is not asked always in a historical context. It has been observed more than once that there is something oracular and pro-

¹⁸ "Primär geschichtlich—behaupten wir—ist das Dasein" (ibid., p. 381).

phetic about Heidegger's writings. He has a deep sense of fate and history and doubtless feels that his writings are an expression of his own particular fate. Perhaps the possibility of our understanding him or agreeing with him depends upon whether or not we stand in any measure in the same situation with him—and this may depend upon the way in which Being has elected to disclose itself in us.

There is something to be said for this alternative. It sheds a great deal of light on the disagreements among philosophers and understands the nature of inquiry far better than many of the theories to which it is opposed. Perhaps the question, "Does Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* necessarily apply to all human beings regardless of their situation?" is altogether inappropriate to his endeavor. Heidegger certainly is an individual inquirer who even now refuses to accede to the demands made upon him by his admirers and would-be disciples. In spite of the fact that from the beginning of his career he has tended to create the most fervent disciples, he insists that he would have no disciples. This need not be regarded as false modesty, for disciples are usually merely imitators and even Heidegger's most violent opponents would grant that Heidegger has succeeded in being fairly unique. In justice to Heidegger perhaps we should place the concern about Being above any conclusions as to the meaning of Being. It would then be necessary for every man to begin afresh to ask the question as to the meaning of Being—and in regard to himself. The door would then be open to radically different conclusions from those of Heidegger.

We really have at least two basic questions here which have tended to become somewhat confused in the exposition: 1) can the nature of man be defined independently of the process of determining his existence? and 2) is the being of man separable from his existence? Let us consider the questions in this order and thus conclude this study of Heidegger's approach to ontology.

The first question was already implicit in the consideration of the subjectivity and universality of Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. We found it necessary to inquire whether his analysis should be taken as a statement of the necessary conditions of human nature in general or as a statement of Heidegger's own understanding of himself and the culture in which he lives. The question assumed

that the two points of view might not be compatible, even that they could not be compatible. But now we must ask if this assumption is sound. If, for example, man is essentially what he takes himself to be and what he makes of himself, then Heidegger's analysis could be counted as at once subjective and, yet, as revealing essential characteristics of human existence. In other words, it may be that man is man only in so far as he asks the question, "What is the meaning of Being?" and answers it in the way that he exists. This would entail that he does not have a natural essence that is determined in advance of the inquiry. The theory of what man is could not, then, be separated from human existence as an objective and detached examination of it, but would need to be regarded as integral to the determination of what man is.¹⁶

In attempting to formulate a "fundamental ontology" Heidegger seems to be going beyond this claim. He appears to be attempting a naturalistic analysis of human existence in a manner not unlike that of Aristotle or Plato. But this may be because we read him from a naturalistic point of view. Perhaps the references to *Jemeinigkeit* should put us sufficiently on our guard against such misconception.¹⁷ In asking the question about the meaning of Being we are forced to ask the question as to the meaning of *Dasein*. But can we assume that *Dasein* has a meaning independently of our endeavour to determine it? Perhaps what man is and what he understands (makes) himself to be are one and the same.

If this is the case, then it is mistaken to regard the ontological inquiry as fundamentally naturalistic. Our problem would not be primarily to determine whether or not our own existence answers to the categories of Heidegger but rather to establish categories to which it does answer. We might respond differently to the fact of death and in terms of our response we would determine the nature of our existence. Necessity as it applies to the a priori structure of *Dasein* would need to be reinterpreted, if we

¹⁶ "Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins" (ibid., p. 12).

¹⁷ "Dasein ist Seiendes das je ich selbst bin, das Sein ist je meines" (ibid., p. 114).

take this viewpoint. It might remain analogous to Kant's transcendental necessity, but only analogous. Kant's necessity is a condition of temporal process but not itself involved in time. Heidegger's necessity, on the contrary, must be understood temporally. Man is, on his view, radically temporal, which means that necessity is historical and fateful. Again we seem to come upon a Hegelian moment in Heidegger's thought—though without the transcendence of Absolute Spirit.

The merits of interpreting Heidegger in this fashion recommend themselves strongly on two counts: (a) that such an interpretation is more in accord with Heidegger's own description of his method, and (b) that the other alternative requires us to read him as a scholastically rigorous dogmatist. It suggests that instead of looking to Heidegger or to any other philosopher, for that matter, for an account of what we are, that it is our problem to work this out for ourselves. Thus, if we disagree sharply with Heidegger, instead of this implying that Heidegger was mistaken as to the nature of man it would rather imply that we *are* different from Heidegger—neither a startling nor unattractive possibility.

But even if we interpret Heidegger's ontology in this light, there are still problems which we cannot avoid. Are there still *formal* conditions which govern our endeavor *to be*? However we determine it, either theoretically or practically, is our chief problem to respond to the fact of our finiteness? Regardless of the way in which we interpret death, does it constitute the horizon of our thought and effort? Is this what it means to think ontologically? I cannot see how one can avoid such a conclusion. Otherwise subjectivity is carried to such an extreme that it is no longer either interesting or philosophically significant. It seems to me that those *a priori* conditions which define man's task and describe the limits within which he must work out his own destiny must be distinguished from the particular way in which Heidegger accomplishes the latter for himself. The principles with which we would be left would be, like Kant's, formal only, but unlike Kant's, subject to temporal reinterpretation. Such principles would either apply to man regardless of his condition or situation, or they would be mistaken. Analyses of Heidegger's philosophy

have not sufficiently distinguished these two factors, with the result that the objections have often been irrelevant.

The second question concerning the relation between being and existence has also been implicit at earlier points in the discussion. The initial problem was: how shall we understand the meaning of "ontological difference"? It seemed highly problematic how Heidegger could pursue the phenomenological method in ontology and not obliterate the distinction. In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger does not claim to have overcome this difficulty with respect to any and all beings. Only in the case of our own existence is it possible to deal with Being as such. The reason which he gives for this limitation of ontology to human existence is that only human beings are related to their own Being.¹⁸ But is it the case that human beings are *related* to their own Being or rather that they are *conscious* of that relation? Heidegger makes much of the conscious and unconscious concern for and response to one's own Being. But his rejection of subjectivism and idealism requires him to assign a firm priority to the ontological self-relatedness of *Dasein*. The consciousness of and response to one's own Being follows upon and presupposes one's relatedness to Being. But if this is the case, then it is not apparent why human existence should be given a privileged status. May it not be the case that every being is self-related and, hence, that the fact of *ontological difference* is universally applicable?

In fairness to Heidegger it should be noted that even in *Sein und Zeit* he did not intend to restrict ontology to the analysis of human existence: The analysis of *Dasein* is not intended to be the whole of ontology but only the foundation of ontology (fundamental ontology). He does argue, however, that any and all relations to other beings are mediated through our relation to our own Being.¹⁹ Thus we confront other beings only as *vorhanden* or *zuhanden*, as objective phenomena.²⁰ We are not and presum-

¹⁸ Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 12: "Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, dass es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht."

¹⁹ Cf. note 14 above.

²⁰ Other human beings are assigned a special but ambiguous status

ably cannot be related to the Being of existents other than ourselves in the same way in which we are related to our own Being. The phenomenological analysis of *Dasein* discloses the fundamental Being of our own existence but only the relative being of things and objects. There is no indication either in *Sein und Zeit* or in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* that the phenomenological method can provide access to the Being of non-human entities. In attempting to go beyond Kant's phenomenalism Heidegger concentrated his attention on the subject, insisting that it is and must be open to ontological analysis. But from an ontological point of view Heidegger begins and ends with the subject in these two books. He offers no common ground between subject and object which might serve to mediate between them and, hence, make possible an inclusive ontology. This is an interesting alternative to the procedure of Hegel who begins with the phenomenal object and, as a result, always has at least three terms, namely the subject-in-itself, the object-in-itself, and the phenomenon. Whereas Hegel's phenomenological investigation progressively discloses the Being both of the subject and the object, Heidegger's analysis reaches only to the Being of the subject.

Heidegger is impatient with the subject-object dichotomy and prides himself on having established its artificiality. This much he shares with Hegel. But it is only *phenomenologically* and not *ontologically* that we are initially beyond the subject-object dichotomy on Heidegger's analysis. Transcendence does not complete the full circle of Being to Being, encompassing the totality of existence, but only the circle of my own Being. I am transcendent to myself and I transcend to other beings, though only as I represent them or use them and not as they are in themselves.

If my interpretation is correct, the limitation of ontological analysis to *Dasein* is and must be principally methodological. It

in *Sein und Zeit*. They are not merely *zuhanden* or *vorhanden* as in the case of non-human objects, but co-exist with *Dasein* in the world. *Mit-Sein* is a special mode of existence which characterizes human beings and their togetherness in the world. But Heidegger never asserts that we are related to the Being of the others (*Die Anderen*) analogously to the way in which we are related to our own Being. Even in the case of *Mit-Sein* the focus seems to remain on *Jemeinigkeit*. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 118.

reflects the initial unavailability of effective dialectical instruments for probing the Being of other existents. We must limit our inquiry to our own existence because we are related to Being only in our own existence, and not because other beings are not ontologically self-related. We are not only related to our own Being but are concerned about it and have a pre-reflective understanding of it. If we were in fact related to the Being of objects and also concerned about their Being, even the methodological limitation on ontological inquiry would be unnecessary. Heidegger is quite mistaken, I think, in his initial assumption that we are not related to and concerned about the Being of entities other than ourself. His restriction of ontology to human existence results in a sort of solipsism which permeates the whole of *Sein und Zeit*. It is not a psychological or even phenomenological solipsism which Heidegger embraces, but rather an ontological solipsism. We are related to other beings, on Heidegger's analysis, but our concern for them is always a reflection of our self-concern. The ontology of *Sein und Zeit* is the product of an exceptionally subtle and sustained introversion.

This criticism of Heidegger raises a number of fundamental questions which cannot be passed over lightly. Is Being one, or many, or both one and many? Is any being ontologically related only to its own Being? Heidegger has followed Kierkegaard in stressing the ontological integrity of the individual. But Kierkegaard considered man's relation to God to be integral to the definition of his existence. Why is it that only man's relation to God is constitutive of his existence? On Heidegger's view man co-exists with other beings in the world. Why, then, ontological solipsism? Has Heidegger offered any argument to show that we cannot be related to the Being of another being, that we may not be concerned about the Being of the other being, and that such concern for and response to the Being of other beings is not constitutive of our own existence? Or has he only assumed it? If my analysis is sound he has only assumed it and largely because his philosophical method is not adequately dialectical.

Being is temporal, on Heidegger's analysis. If this were not the case, there would be no ontological difference. *Dasein* is related to and concerned about its own Being, which means that

it is concerned about itself. To be concerned about oneself is to be non-identical with oneself. *Dasein* is always and forever possibility. To be at all is to be possibility and, further, to be the non-identity of oneself with one's own possibilities. *Dasein* is oriented toward the future and has its Being always partially in advance of itself.²¹ Death, for example, is a possibility which can never be realized, for the attainment of death is at the same time the extinction of the individual.²² But *Dasein* is also oriented toward the past and has an actual existence in the present. It is never identical with its own past, with its present actual form, nor with its future possibilities. Yet the temporal modes define its existence. They provide the fundamental existential and structural characteristics of *Dasein*. But if there is non-identity there is also identity. *Dasein* is itself the fundamental identity which makes the temporal non-identity possible. The ontological difference is the non-identity of Being in its temporal modes. It is not just the difference which is manifest in the modality itself, namely of past from future or of actual from possible, but the difference of Being from each and all temporal modes of existence.

Ontological difference for Heidegger has much in common with Hegel's notion of negativity. For Hegel, at least in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, there is also the most intimate connection between negativity and time. For both Hegel and Heidegger being is temporal and historical. In Hegel's philosophy negativity is otherness, and otherness is transcendence. But transcendence is always self-transcendence. Is this not true, also, of Heidegger's account of *Dasein*? Does not ontological difference involve negativity, temporality, and transcendence? Is not the difference between Heidegger and Hegel primarily due to the fact that Heidegger limits himself to the finite subject and, hence, must remain with negativity at a fixed level? *Dasein*, like the Hegelian absolute spirit, carries its own negation within itself. Death as the ultimate negation of *Dasein* is not a threat which has its locus and origin beyond man, but is nurtured and sustained within the

²¹ "Das Dasein existiert je schon immer gerade so, dass zu ihm sein Noch-nicht gehört" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 243).

²² "Das Erreichen der Gänze des Daseins im Tode ist zugleich Verlust des Seins des Da" (*ibid.*, p. 237).

breast of *Dasein* itself. I must die not because I live within a world which threatens me, but because I am finite. In *Sein und Zeit*, *Dasein* is taken as ultimate for the purposes of analysis. No explanation is given and no question asked as to the *possibility* of finite existence. Given human existence we can inquire as to its meaning, but if we remain within the horizon of man's existence in the world we will not obtain an answer to the question, "How is it possible for man to be at all?" In his later essays, notably in *Was ist Metaphysik?*, Heidegger formulates the more general and more radical question about being and nothing. And it becomes apparent that there are ontological questions which are more basic than those which he attempts to investigate in his "fundamental ontology." Being, negation, time, and transcendence pose questions which are universal in scope. An ontological account of human existence is not sufficiently *fundamental* if it does not deal with the question, "How is finite being possible?" The being, as also the negativity, which is manifest in *Dasein* is not ultimate but only relative. Perhaps the only being which we can understand as it is in and of itself is finite; this is certainly the case if we are restricted to Heidegger's particular version of the phenomenological method. But this hardly constitutes a justification for the assertion that Being is or must be finite.

Heidegger's notion of ontological difference is one of the most subtle but also the most obscure ideas in his philosophy. One gets a feeling for the distinction and gradually comes to appreciate what Heidegger means by the radicality of ontological inquiry, but is curiously embarrassed if required to translate it into conceptual terms. For one thing, it becomes clear that Being is not objective.²² It is for this reason that ontological difference cannot be equated with the traditional distinction between essence and existence. The Being of a thing can no more be identified with its existence, in the traditional sense, than with its essence. Existence, as Heidegger employs the term, has a special connotation and refers exclusively to human beings. Existential philosophy is altogether misunderstood when it is interpreted as assigning a *general* priority to existence over essence. It is not

²² Cf. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 27.

existence in general that is crucial but *human* existence. Ontological difference concerns not so much the distinction between essence and existence as that between essence-existence and Being.

So far as *Dasein* is concerned, we are ourselves the relation and, hence, the difference between *Sein* and *das Seiende*. We are the ground of our own existence and yet we are somehow estranged from it. Ontological inquiry is the attempt to overcome this estrangement. But if the estrangement itself is due to the fact that we are finite and temporal, then it cannot be finally overcome. To inquire ontologically is not, as we have seen, to explore a special subject matter or to investigate a special object or range of objects. It is rather to inquire radically about anything at all. It is to inquire about Being from the depths of one's own Being and, moreover, to give expression to one's Being in the process of inquiry. Ontological difference cannot be finally overcome or obliterated for Heidegger, but this does not mean, as Jaspers concludes, that ontology is impossible. Ontology is not primarily or even essentially a result. On the contrary, it is a mode of existence; we are ontological beings.²⁴ Inquiry is ontological if it is unqualifiedly radical both in origin and in intention. Ontological difference does not invalidate ontology but constitutes the very nerve of it. We noted earlier that the process of defining man is inseparable from the actual determination of human existence. There is no possibility of defining human nature once and for all. To ask what man is and to proceed to the formulation of a definition is man's perennial problem. His existence and his Being are problematic. What he becomes and what he takes himself to be essentially are inseparably related. The same is true with respect to the question about the meaning of Being. The question, "What am I?" is but a special case of the more general question, "What is the meaning of Being?" The analysis of *Dasein* is instructive for the more general ontological question, but it is not *fundamental* in providing a sufficient basis for all ontological inquiry. It should rather be looked upon as a paradigmatic investigation of an ontological question and, hence, as providing insight and guidance for ontological inquiry in other areas.

²⁴ Cf. note 16 above.

If we interpret ontological difference and ontological inquiry in this way, Heidegger looks even more like Hegel. Inquiry is a mode of being. To inquire about Being is *to be*, ontologically. This implies that truth is subjective, a thesis which both Hegel and Kierkegaard affirm, though admittedly in radically different ways. The fact that they agree on this fundamental thesis has not been sufficiently appreciated, largely because the issue between them has tended to focus on the tension between the absolute and the finite. If this thesis is distinctively idealistic and Hegelian, then both Kierkegaard and Heidegger must be counted as standing in the idealistic and Hegelian tradition.

It has not been my purpose to offer a detailed analysis of Heidegger's conception of Being or even of ontological difference, but rather to suggest a suitable perspective for understanding them. An adequate account of Heidegger's fundamental ontology would require a careful exploration of his conceptions of truth and temporality, both very obscure notions. I have attempted to make two major points: a) that Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" is not *fundamental* at all in at least two important respects: 1) that there are prior questions about being, negation, identity, individuality and time which are not considered in the investigation of *Dasein*, and 2) the analysis of the meaning and structure of *Dasein* does not enjoy the ontologically privileged status which Heidegger assigns to it. He makes fairly dogmatic assumptions about the relation of beings to Being, assumptions which require careful examination. The answer to these questions is prior to a special ontological investigation such as that exemplified in *Sein und Zeit*. b) that the question about the meaning of Being is parallel to the question about the meaning of human existence. In both cases Being is not independent of the attempt to determine what it is or what it means. This point is typically existentialist and stems from Hegel via Kierkegaard. It has important and interesting implications for ontology which Heidegger has not attempted to explicate.

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RELATION OF METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY

PAUL TILlich

Introduction.

THE difficulty of the problem put before us is that every answer, no matter how general and abstract it tries to be, is the expression of a special metaphysical understanding of metaphysics and of a special theological understanding of theology. There is no court above them to decide about them. This refers immediately to the definition of the two concepts, the relation of which is under discussion, metaphysics and theology. In the context of this paper, only the result of much philosophical and theological arguing can go into the definition, not the arguments themselves.

I. Definitions.

There are two problematic factors which must be considered in every definition of metaphysics, the first of which was effective for a long time, the other only recently. Metaphysics has suffered under the unjustified connotation that the "meta" in metaphysics points to a realm above the physical realm. This connotation was strongly supported by the Latin word "supranatural" which designated the realm of the divine above nature. Finally the term "experience" in its empiricistic application pushed metaphysics into the role of a "speculation" without an experiential basis. Against these distortions metaphysics should be defined as the analysis of those elements in the encountered reality which belong to its general structure and make experience universally possible. Metaphysics then is the rational inquiry into the structure of being, its polarities and categories as they appear in man's encounter with reality.

If this is accepted one may ask why one should not use the term "ontology" for this enterprise. It is the structure of being which is under inquiry, and this is what ontology is supposed to

do. But the difficulty is that there are structures of less universality like nature, man, history, which also precede in logical dignity anything concrete in their respective spheres but which are not structures of being as such, and which, consequently, are not objects of ontology in the strict sense of the word. Therefore, if the word "metaphysics" can be saved from its supranaturalistic connotations, it should be used. If, however, this is impossible, the term ontology must be enlarged so that it embraces all structures which constitute reality. Both ways are open.

The term "theology" needs equally careful consideration. It is burdened not only with semantic difficulties. Its literal meaning: *logos of theos*, the rational word about God, immediately leads to the question of where and when God has become manifest and in which situation his manifestation can be received. And here theology leaves the philosophical road. It asks the question of the concrete situation in which the manifestation of the divine has appeared. Theology deals with the concrete revelatory experience in which human beings have been grasped by an ultimate concern. Theology is existentially related to the concrete place at which the divine self-manifestation has been received. As theology it is bound to this place in time and space even if it claims universal validity. And that theology does. As the *logos of theos* it tries to show the universal validity of the concrete manifestation of the ultimate on which it is based. This is the reason why the early Christian theologians called Jesus as the Christ the *Logos*. *Logos* is the principle of the divine self-manifestation in nature and history. There is no *theo*-logy where there is no concrete, revelatory experience. And there is no *theo*-logy where there is not the universal claim for truth. This unity of the concrete-existential and the universal-essential gives theology its special position, its greatness and its dangers.

Theology is not religion, but it presupposes religion. Every religion expresses itself in symbols of its ultimate concern. These "symbols of faith" are the subject-matter of theology. Theology, in spite of its name, is not "science of God," but it is the *logos*-determined interpretation of the symbols of God's self-manifestation in a concrete situation. These symbols are not arbitrary interpretations of the concrete revelatory experiences. But they

appear within this experience itself. They are not created intentionally, but they are born in the same dimension in which the revelatory experience takes place. In and through its symbols the religious encounter with reality opens up the dimension of reality in which ultimacy appears. There is no other way of expressing our encounter with the holy than in symbols. Therefore, the "*logos of theos*," theology, is the *logos* of the symbols in which His manifestation expresses itself.

II. *The Existential Ground of Metaphysics.*

The definitive, or more exactly, circumscriptive, task performed so far emphasizes the divergent traits of metaphysics and theology. They are counterbalanced by convergent trends in both of them. Metaphysics (or ontology in the broader sense) is directed towards the observation and analysis of the categorical structure of being and its general spheres. It does not ask the question of its own existential roots. It does not look at itself and the ultimate concern underlying it. But the fact that metaphysics is directed towards being and its universal characteristics does not imply that it has no existential roots. It certainly has them, for the philosopher is a human being, and in every philosophical school human interests and passions are a driving force. No philosophy is without an ultimate concern in its background, whether this is acknowledged or denied. This makes the philosopher a theologian, always implicitly and sometimes explicitly. It is possible and even not difficult to trace the implicit theological elements in every philosophy, even that which restricts itself to logical analysis. The reasons given for this restriction betray an ultimate concern about man's relation to reality. The nature of this concern is sometimes openly expressed in the philosophy of religion of such a system. But it is manifest also in its logic and epistemology, in its philosophy of nature and its doctrine of man.

The effect of this existential element on metaphysics has not the character of interference. The experiential basis and the logical structure of a metaphysics are not affected. But the direction in which the question is asked and the dimension of reality which is opened up for experience are partly determined by the

character of the ultimate concern in a philosopher. As a philosopher he looks at the structures and categories of being; but the way in which he looks, the potentialities and the limits of his vision are existentially conditioned. This makes him a non-intentional theologian and produces from his side the common ground on which a conversation with the theologian is possible. It is partly for this reason that a spiritual conversation between Plotinus and Origen, between the Stoics and Tertullian, between Cicero and Augustine, between Aristotle and Thomas, between Spinoza and Schleiermacher, between Hegel and Kierkegaard, between Kant and Ritschl was possible. Intellectual history is full of these examples up to the present day. But in all these cases the common existential ground, whether in terms of agreement or in terms of conflict, is only *one* reason for the possibility of such conversation. The other reason follows from the nature of theology.

III. *The Metaphysical Form of Theology.*

Theology is the *logos*-determined interpretation of symbols of ultimate concern. It is directed toward the ultimate concern, as it has appeared and expressed itself in a religious group. It is not world-directed as metaphysics, but existence-directed. It looks at the place where it stands, where the self-manifestation of the divine has occurred and is effective from one generation to the other. In traditional theology, it is dependent on revelation—if revelation is not taken in the distorted sense of an authoritative divine information. Revelation is the self-manifestation of ultimate reality in ecstatic experiences, expressed in symbols. Theology does not create, but it interprets symbols. And these interpreted symbols may become creeds and doctrines and dogmas which often are also called symbols, but in the particular sense of signs through which the members of a community recognize each other. The way in which symbols produce doctrines is dependent on theology. The way doctrines become dogmas is dependent on decisions of the Church. Dogmas are parts of the canonic law; doctrines are creations of the theological *logos*, based on the symbols of revelatory experiences.

In this function the theologian uses metaphysics. Biblically oriented theologians in all periods of church history have contradicted this statement; but they never could prevail against the main trend of theological thought which used metaphysics for the interpretation of the Christian symbols. Not even the Neo-Kantian theologians of the second half of the 19th century who rejected metaphysics for the sake of epistemology and value theory, were an exception. There was too much partly hidden, partly quite open metaphysics in their anti-metaphysics.

Metaphysics cannot be avoided in any theology. For in order to interpret religious symbols, theology must use concepts which are either taken directly from a metaphysical system or which have already entered the general language without normally reminding of their philosophical origin. Anti-metaphysical writings by theologians are full of such metaphysical terms, like nature and history, time and space, subject and object, mind and spirit, person and self, becoming and being. Ordinary language is justified in using them without further analysis. Theological language is not, as long as it claims to be theology. Usually anti-metaphysical theologians fall into the trap of assuming a particular metaphysics without being aware of it, as for instance today a kind of unreflective nominalism which makes them suspicious of the ontological use of the term "being."

The reason for the ever-repeated attack of the theologians on the use of metaphysics in theology is the awareness of the theological element in metaphysics itself. It arouses the fear that the substance of the divine self-manifestation and the genuine meaning of the symbols may be lost or distorted. Doubtless this is a danger; and the early church was aware of it when it used concepts created by Greek philosophers whose existential background is symbolized by Apollo and Dionysius. They countered the danger in three ways—as Thomas also did when he received Aristotle. They rejected concepts which express Greek existence more than metaphysical analysis, and cannot be taken into Christian existence, e.g., the eternity of the world or the circular character of time. They accepted others which have the same strongly existential character, but can be taken into Christian existence, e.g., the *logos* or the *pneuma*. Third, they tried to formalize the

Greek concepts as much as possible, e.g., *physis* or *hypostasis*. This task is a permanent one in theology and refers to such terms as "history," "person," "self," our present discussions.

IV. *Metaphysical and Theological Attitudes.*

The philosopher is directed toward being, its structures and categories, the theologian toward a self-manifestation of the divine and its symbolic expressions. This can lead to the question whether or not there is a radical contrast in the attitude of the two toward truth. The metaphysician, one can say, keeps himself in analytic detachment; the theologian is existentially involved. The former is determined in his attitude by methodological doubt, the other by what is usually called faith. The word "faith," in such context, is then defined as believing in statements without evidence, including the unbelievable and improbable. It is indeed impossible to combine these two attitudes. They can be together in one and the same person only if the two spheres of truth have no relationship to each other at all. This, of course, would exclude a theological approach to the truths of faith. But this is not a picture of the real situation. Faith is not the belief in statements without evidence, but it is the state of being ultimately concerned, and the symbols expressing it have criteria of adequacy to what they are supposed to express and they have ontological implications which demand detached consideration. This removes the contrast of the metaphysical with the theological attitude. The involvement of the theologian has not the character of authoritarian subjection, but it has the character of a double risk, an existential one and a theoretical one. The first, the risk of faith, is a risk about the meaning of one's being. The second, the risk of argument, is a risk about the rational, analytic, and constructive element in theology. But this double risk is also the risk of the metaphysician. In his ultimate concern he takes the risk of faith as every human being. As a philosopher he takes the theoretical risk of error. Neither the theologian nor the philosopher has unconditional certainty about the contents of his faith or the results of his reasoning. In both of them doubt and the courage of affirmation are within each other. Therefore, the history of

philosophical and theological thought is overwhelmingly a history of interdependence of theology and metaphysics and not of their lying side by side.

V. *Essentialist and Existentialist Metaphysics
and Their Theological Significance.*

The relation of theology and metaphysics has been deepened by the independent rise of existentialist philosophy. There are elements of existentialism in most essentialist philosophers; but only in the first half of the 20th century has existentialism appeared as a philosophical method as well as a universal style of cognitive and artistic self-interpretation of man. It is this side of existentialism which makes it very important for the theological work of today. It would be a comprehensive description of present-day Protestant theology (including my own) if I went into the concrete problems of existentialist theology. But the following general statements may be made.

Existentialism helps theology to formulate the questions, and in doing so it exerts an indirect, formal influence on the answers. But it does not give the answers. Every answer concerning ultimate concern is given out of the experience of the self-manifestation of the ultimate. Theology, on the other hand, has opened up spheres of questions with which existentialism deals and is able to give it a focus and a definite direction, but it does not create the questions which are implicit in the human situation.

No matter how important existentialism is for theology, it does not reduce the importance of essentialism for it. For existentialism in purity cannot exist because it needs universals—essences—to make statements at all, even about existence. This is equally true of theology, which cannot exclude essentialist metaphysics. Only in confrontation with the essential structures of being can existentialism speak. An existentialist theology as such is as impossible as a purely existentialist ontology.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

ROYCE, FORTY YEARS LATER

RICHARD HOCKING

THE thought of Josiah Royce is undergoing reappraisal. During the five years leading up to the centenary of his birth in 1955, four books appeared independently which invite new attention to one aspect or another of his philosophy.¹ Two of the books, those of Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson, are primarily selections of readings chosen from Royce's published works in order to document distinct sides of his thought. The other two are original and important interpretations of crucial concepts in Royce's philosophy. Mr. Brown's selections focus upon practical philosophy, showing how the concept of loyalty furnishes the basis for a social doctrine of very considerable scope. Mr. Robinson's selections articulate the formal, especially the logical, side of Royce's philosophy. Mr. Smith and Mr. Cotton both trace the development of Royce's matured thought from the earlier writings. Mr. Smith deals especially with the theory of the community of interpretation, the doctrine found mainly in Volume II of *The Problem of Christianity*. Mr. Cotton takes Royce's philosophical anthropology as the clue to the whole of his philosophy. His careful and amply documented chapters draw on all of the published and much unpublished work.

On September 14, 1956, we shall be observing the fortieth anniversary of Royce's death. Fortunately, we are near enough to

¹ In order of appearance:

John E. Smith, *Royce's Social Infinite—The Community of Interpretation* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950).

Stuart Gerry Brown, *The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1950).

Daniel S. Robinson, *Royce's Logical Essays—Collected Logical Essays of Josiah Royce* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1951).

James Harry Cotton, *Royce on the Human Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

1916 so that two of the authors, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Cotton, can share with their readers some of the direct experience gained from having sat in Royce's classes and from remembering the living habits of his mind.

What turns of philosophical experience, during the intervening forty years, have put us in a frame of mind to examine Royce's intellectual achievement with new understanding? For one thing, we have seen the completion of the movement of logical positivism and linguistic analysis. This prompts us to turn to Royce's powerful studies in the mathematical logic of his day with their suggestions of how such analytical achievements should be brought into contact with the perennial themes of metaphysics. For another thing, the dramatic accomplishments of the exact sciences are arousing a new interest in the cosmological issues of philosophy. In this connection Royce's studies of time and evolution, of the varieties of serial order in nature, and related problems, deserve re-examination and reassessment. And turning to the practical branches of philosophy, Royce's writings, when reviewed, are seen at once to contain important and still clarifying contributions to our thinking about the human individual, his conscience and religious sense, and his relations to political and economic institutions.

Let us come first to the books in which there is particular emphasis on these issues last mentioned.

It is understandable that Royce's thought should be accessible to most readers in terms of his social doctrine, rather than by way of his technical writings on logic and cosmology. Mr. Brown's book on *The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce* contains, in addition to a helpful introductory essay, ten essays and chapters chosen from the last eight years of Royce's productivity and calculated to give the essentials of his practical philosophy. The intention of the book is to introduce the reader to Royce's social and ethical thought with a minimum of involvement in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Although there is a certain artificiality in this aim, and even some risk of distortion of so organic a philosophy, it has pedagogic advantages. The center of gravity of the selection is a group of five chapters selected from *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. Both the prior and the subsequent selections are seen

to draw their force from these central formulations of ethical principle.

It is peculiarly apt, in the year 1956, that the opening selection should deal with our major national problem. This essay, "Race Questions and Prejudices," reminds us of Royce's opportunities, during his Caribbean journeys, for observing at first hand different racial policies in practice, and for comparing them with those of his own country.

The latter selections of the volume, read in the sad light of twentieth century war, depression and war, disclose the shrewd practicality which motivated Royce's reflections on modern insurance companies, and on the application of principles of insurance to public disasters.

Mr. Brown's introductory essay rightly claims that the passage of years has made Royce's practical philosophy more, and not less, relevant to our situation. He stresses the aspect of this philosophy which works toward the overcoming of dualisms, particularly in the form of exaggerated oppositions between individual and community. He could have given more positive emphasis to Royce's habit of incorporating dualities, or polarities, within systems of triadic relations. There is a sense, surely, in which Royce's concern is to preserve creative duality rather than to revolt against dualism.

Mr. Smith's book on *Royce's Social Infinite* furnishes his readers with two helpful contexts for understanding the metaphysical bases of Royce's philosophy of community. The first is that of his American antecedents, especially C. S. Peirce. The bearing of Peirce's theory of signs on Royce's doctrine of interpretation is given its proper emphasis. The second context is that of contemporary developments in Protestant theology, particularly in the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. In this connection one appreciates Mr. Smith's unusual qualifications for pointing out the kinship between Royce's own kind of "dialectical theology" and that of a major movement of religious thought which has become prominent a generation or more later.

In the concept of infinite community we are to find what Royce regarded as "the correct view of the nature of truth, the true interpretation of the absolute, the final goal of all striving, and

the salvation which is the aim of religion" (p. 11). The task of achieving this synoptic grasp of Royce's thought leads to a careful examination of the last, and too often neglected, systematic work, *The Problem of Christianity*, in which the metaphysics of community and the logic of interpretation are merged into a single doctrine. Since Royce's debt to Peirce is especially evident in this late expression of his philosophy, Mr. Smith is able to present Royce to us, less as a latter-day Hegelian, and more as one of Peirce's earliest disciples and staunchest vindicators.

To what extent does Royce's final doctrine of the community of interpretation represent a departure from the principles of his earlier thought? One is tempted to sharpen the contrast between the earlier Royce of the *totum simul* and the later Royce of the progressively realized community of interpretation, with the consequence that this question becomes unavoidable. Mr. Smith refers to "the all-important change" in his conception of the Absolute (p. 13; cf. also pp. 17-18, 34). To be sure, the shift of emphasis in the course of his development should be in one's mind. But one may question whether it should be taken as suggesting discrepant or incompatible phases of thought in the life of one thinker. The record of Royce's writing shows a sustained struggle toward ampler treatment of his own original problems. And among the original problems those of process and time stand out as peculiarly insistent, whether treated in terms of the idea of the *totum simul* or of the community of interpretation. If one is going to maintain that the later doctrine displaces the earlier one rather than amplifying it, what must be shown is that the idea of a community of interpretation which is infinite, in the sense of possessing no temporally last member, rules out the idea of an actual perfect apprehension of the whole community all at once. It is not certain that Mr. Smith wants to establish the "displacement" interpretation of Royce's development (cf. especially p. 86). However, he does imply here and there that Royce has abandoned, in his mature philosophy, certain fundamental principles of his earlier thinking. In this connection, Mr. Cotton brings forward substantial criticisms of Mr. Smith for holding this view.²

² Royce on the Human Self, n. 40, p. 321.

It belongs to Royce's theory of the community of interpretation that each member self is known to itself as a community of interpretation inwardly. Indeed, to be a self is to be a present interpreter of one's past to one's future self (pp. 83-84). The negative counterpart of such a view states that no human self is given to itself in any fleeting instant through an immediate intuition. Mr. Smith shows that Peirce has here again furnished the groundwork for Royce's developed views; but he clearly dissociates himself from both Peirce and Royce in order to maintain that all self-knowledge through interpretation must presuppose intuitive self-knowledge: "that a self exists, that it is its own self, can never be the result of the interpretation of any sign, but must be known immediately by the self in question or it is never known at all" (p. 74).

In the conception of the Beloved Community, Royce's doctrine of the community of interpretation achieves its explicitly Christian expression. The Beloved Community is "the locus of the divine spirit" (p. 160); it is destined, through the dialectic of sin and grace, to take up into itself all human selves as its members. Mr. Smith's discussion of this conception by its very lucidity prompts the reader to raise a crucial question about Royce's theology. Is the "divine spirit" in any sense a *member* of the Beloved Community? Royce's language avoids the expression of God's presence in the Beloved Community as individuated being, a member among members, so that one is left with the sense that the "divine spirit" is an unindividuated *esprit* of loyalty rather than a divine person who creates. Mr. Smith gives us vividly Royce's sense of the paradox of sin and atonement which are the life of any "dialectical theology"; but he does not press the question stated above, and perhaps with good warrant, in view of the extent of Royce's silence on the matter.

Mr. Smith has done an important service in giving us this clear and unifying perspective on Royce's thought as a whole from the standpoint of his maturest guiding idea.

Mr. Robinson's collection of *Royce's Logical Essays* brings our attention around to the formal aspects of his philosophy. The seventeen essays, articles, reviews and lectures which are gathered together here can otherwise be found only with great difficulty

in widely scattered places. The dates of publication span the twenty-two year interval from 1892 to 1914, but two thirds of the writings appeared toward the end of Royce's life, indeed after the slight stroke of 1911. More is involved in this collection than the title "Logical Essays" at first suggests. When we recall that for Royce the technical tasks of the new algebra of logic were ramified widely among the disciplines of philosophy, we are not surprised to find treatments of cosmology (in parts of Essay II), of theory of knowledge (Essay III—the paper of which Mr. Cotton writes: "this paper alone would entitle Royce to the rank of greatness" ³), of the deduction of the categories (Essay XVI), of the relation of logic and mathematics (Essays III and XVII), and of the metaphysical problem of individuation (Essays VI and IX).

Several unifying themes stand out. One of these might be called "the new exactness." Royce writes, for example, that "the new logic and the new mathematics are making us acquainted with absolute truth, and are giving to our knowledge of this truth a clearness never before accessible to human thinking" (p. 94; cf. also p. 223). Another theme is that of "conceptual construction" as a principle unifying logic and mathematics. Royce stands with Poincaré here, and of the latter's *Foundations of Science* he writes, "the result of the book is a substantial justification of the scientific utility of theoretical constructions—an abandonment of dogma, but a vindication of the rights of constructive reason" (p. 274). Again, in another paper, "man first discovers order in the form of series of ideal objects, which are, indeed, suggested to him by the real world, but which he learns to understand through such constructive and ideally ordered activities as those which counting and measuring represent" (p. 219; cf. also pp. 93, 364-65). Underlying both these themes is a third, that of the "yes-no," or the principle of decision. For example, in Essay XVII on the system Σ , we come across his reference to "the 'yes-no' relation—the earliest exact relation defined by the human mind" (p. 386); and, in the important article on "Negation," the observation that "the not-relation is one of the simplest and most fundamental relations known to the human mind. For the study

³ Royce on the Human Self, p. 106.

of logic no more important and fruitful relation is known. And none has a wider range of exemplifications in the whole realm of the experience of the rational being" (p. 182; cf. also pp. 31-32, 91). In Royce's judgment, the operation of the "yes-no" principle in morality, mathematics and the orderliness of nature constitutes one of the strongest cases for affirming the primacy of will as a philosophical principle. (Royce is a very Schopenhauer sometimes in his view of the world as will!)

Reflecting on such recurrent themes as these, one sees that Royce's allegiance to the new mathematical logic was an allegiance on his own terms. He subscribes to the merging of mathematical order with the wider theory of order which is the new logic. From this point of view he breaks with the Kantian conception of logic in favor of a logic un beholden to any forms of intuition. On the other hand, his view of the new logic as the theory of order is not "empty" in the sense of taking no account of existential necessities in the world. On the contrary, and in the Kantian context, he writes "the 'Deduction of the Categories' is taking on decidedly new forms in recent discussion" (p. 368). The new logic, called by Peirce the Logic of Relatives and by Russell the Calculus of Relations, might, he proposes, be called "a new and general theory of the Categories" (p. 73).

Mr. Robinson's volume is helping to restore Royce to his rank among logicians in a period in which, as Quine puts it, logic has become great.

The last of our four books, *Royce on the Human Self*, by Mr. Cotton, provides an excellent context for the other three. His fifth chapter, "Logic as the Science of Order," leads the reader to Mr. Robinson's volume of logical essays. His last three chapters supplement the themes of Mr. Smith's book. And the second and seventh chapters deal with the themes of Mr. Brown's book. Generally, the order of chapters follows the sequence of intellectual biography. It is a happy inspiration to begin the discussion with a chapter on "The Self in Time." The reader is reminded at the start of Royce's constant concern with the problems of time and free will.

The reader is well advised to turn to Samuel M. Thompson's article in this *Review*, IX (March 1956), 433-40, for a more thor-

ough consideration of Mr. Cotton's work. But a few supplementary remarks here will be appropriate. The book provides a wide and proportioned access to the whole range of Royce's writings. Not only does a selected bibliography guide the reader to the chief publications by and about Royce, but it includes as well a representative list of the unpublished papers preserved at Harvard. In addition, the text is furnished throughout with quoted passages from both the published and the unpublished writings. These selections are flattering to Royce's style by reason of their conciseness—so much so that James's naughty outburst "he is the Rubens of philosophy" (p. 193) seems to miss the mark.

Mr. Cotton makes it a point of honor to "rely in no case on unpublished papers to authenticate a point that is contrary to anything Royce ever published" (p. ix). Furthermore, he preserves a scrupulous distinction between his presentation of various aspects of his subject and his own criticism of the views he presents.

The general standpoint of his criticism appears to be characterized, first of all, by a more realistic epistemology than that of Royce (cf. pp. 138-44), secondly, by a negative view of theology based on the ontological argument, and thirdly, by an appreciation of recent existential insights into the role of the irrational in human history.

With regard to the second of these points, Mr. Cotton finds that Royce has not established his central thesis, but only postulated it, the thesis, namely, that a being exists which perfectly unites thought and experience. (For the relation of this to the ontological argument, see p. 145.) If this be so, the edifice of Royce's philosophy comes tumbling down. What becomes, then, of his special blend of experiment and paradox called "absolute pragmatism" in which postulate and fact meet (p. 175)? Does it not apply to just such a thesis; and should we not rather say "a postulate, yes; only a postulate, no"?

Mr. Cotton criticises Royce for over-emphasizing the part played by rational purposes in human activity (pp. 101-05). Surely there is too much of the irrational at work in us to be overlooked. Royce "wrote as though Karl Marx had never lived" (p. 101). This pointed comment reminds us of the singular

impermeability of the English-speaking world generally to continental doctrines of unreason or reason-hidden. We have been the last to receive Kierkegaard, the least touched by Marx, oblivious of Nietzsche, influenced widely only by Freud, and then a Freud crossed with lucid positivism. For Royce, the Continent as a source of ideas was by preference that of the universities primarily; and in them in his day, not this remarkable group of rebels, but a dynasty of the greatest mathematicians was in the ascendancy. Their genius flowed over into Royce's metaphysics and implemented his formulation of the life of reason. In consequence of this preference, as Mr. Cotton justly observes, Royce was doomed to incompleteness of insight into the dialectic of history.

Incidentally, in this connection, an instructive irony emerges from Mr. Thompson's review of Mr. Cotton's work. Mr. Cotton finds Royce too much of a rationalist, too ready to exalt the will to know above other aims. Mr. Thompson's opposite view is that Royce is not rationalist enough. He should have discriminated more sharply between purely cognitive intentions and the practical aims of the will. Such cross-lights should help to sharpen the outline of Royce's special sort of pragmatism.

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OUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH REALITY

ROBERT N. BECK

PHILOSOPHERS have sought objectivity along many avenues: reality, they have said, must be constructed, or inferred, or guessed at, or hoped for. Others, to be sure, have denied any relation between ideas and reality; and some brave, if misdirected, souls have removed the problem by dissolving its ingredients of ideas, minds, beings, and reality. All such efforts, says the author of the book under present discussion,¹ are essentially misguided: they fail to see that objectivity is present in—is part of the very structure of—the most rudimentary efforts of a cognizing mind. An adequate phenomenology reveals that objectivity is *given* to the subject, that the being of objects is *apprehended*. The faith of the realist is found to be justified, and only realism can provide a ground for objectivity.

All cognitive consciousness, Professor Earle's realism asserts, is acquaintance with reality. Cognition is intrinsically "outside itself," for to be conscious is to have a part of reality as an object. Cognizing consciousness is any mode of intentionality which presents its subject with an object. Hence mind does not infer its way outside itself: it is always outside itself looking at an object. And all such objects without qualification have their own distinctive mode of being, and are independent of the subject and its act of awareness.

In having an object before it, the mind has truth: both *what* the object is and *that* it is are known in the same act. "Truth is identical with cognitive awareness" (p. 155). "The objective world is precisely what it presents itself as" (p. 156). Truth is not correspondence, for we are not aware of something that corresponds to something else. Nor is it coherence, for to have coherence one must have some distinct object (judgment) before oneself to cohere with some other object (judgment). Nor again prediction, for if one cannot truly apprehend either the premises

¹ William Earle, *Objectivity* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1955).

of the prediction or its final success, he cannot know if the prediction is correct. Truth is the world presenting itself in person to a subject that is "sheer spectator." The mind intends Being, and indeed Being is the object of such intention if any object at all is given. We have the idea of Being itself, in its pure formality; and this idea of Being is the image of God in man.

Such, briefly, are the theses which Mr. Earle discusses and defends in this lively essay. Though he touches upon many different subjects, his essential problem is the relation between reality and the objects of consciousness. The phenomenological description of knowing which he presents and upon which he bases his position is expressed in the proposition, "*subject thinking object which is real*"—where the italicized terms represent distinguishable but existentially inseparable components of knowledge. These components must be examined in more detail.

i) *Subject*. The subject of knowledge, cognizing consciousness, Mr. Earle asserts, is a pure spectator. It has no constitutive or creative role at all. The subject is that which acts and intends. It stands in the presence of a complex of objects, and its intention is to encounter the objectively real. This intention is fulfilled in principle by the intrinsic content of what is before it. The unity of apprehension belongs to the subject, but within the subject-field is found the real itself. Cognition is "sheer transparency" (p. 50)—it involves a *showing*, not a *concealing*.

ii) *Thought*. The universal structure of thought is: a subject grasping an object; or, an apprehension of an other. (It is not mere awareness of an object.) "Thinking is reality making itself evident to a subject" (p. 27). Cognitive intentionality is the apprehension of an explicit object, and indeed it is intrinsically related to a world of objects. Thought is not an enclosed monad trying to break out of itself. It has a part of the world as soon as it is mind at all, for it has the world as its object (p. 63). Thought must, further, guarantee its own validity. If it does not, there can be no guarantee at all, least of all by thought at some higher level of reflexivity. "If the first act of thought is not a genuine apprehension of its object, then I cannot assure myself of this by

reflecting upon it" (p. 25). The truth of thought—this guarantee — is nothing but its own transparency. Thought is a matter of appearance, what appears is precisely what it is, the appearance is the appearance of some reality, and its appearance is its truth.²

iii) *Object*. By object Mr. Earle means that which can stand before the awareness of a subject. Objects are first presented in prereflexive experience—an experience which is not simple, for it has accomplished the task of objectifying the stream of experience. Objectification renders the implicit explicit. These moments have the same content; the difference between them lies in the subject's mode of apprehension. To achieve the explicit, which is clarification, the subject must "step back" to look at experience as an object, to become a spectator. There are indeed two movements in clarification, one away from the world in which the role of spectator is assumed, and one toward the world in which a content is apprehended. These movements are described as love and hate (pp. 41-43); for not only is there motion away and motion toward, but what becomes or is made explicit depends on value. The self seeks what it wants to seek.

The content of the object is not dependent on thought: the intrinsic character of the object is absolutely independent of the extrinsic character of its being thought of. This independence of content is its reality. Indeed, both the essence and the existence of the object are independent of appearance: "The Objects live their own lives independently of our watching them" (p. 70); they are part of reality, and have their own mode of being.³ Our

² Mr. Earle sketches the theory of judgment involved in these assertions. Judgment occurs only when "we do not clearly see," i.e., when we have no intuitive guarantee of the being of an object. The copula directs an affirmation, viz., the being of what the terms describe or name. Judgment is a willed reality, though the rules of judgment are grounded in the apprehension of reality itself. Ultimately, however, truth must be seen. Hence the confirmation of any judgment reduces itself to apprehension or intuition.

³ The being of substance is also given. Phenomenal realities exhibit a systematic character which points beyond themselves—the grasp of the relatedness of qualities is their transformation into the status of properties of a thing. The world is not sensed as substantial, but it is understood to be such. The extension of the external world is also given in the

apprehension of objects is, however, either clear or unclear—clear, if what is in reality is exhaustively present in some idea, unclear if not. But clarity of apprehension depends in turn on our possession of the idea of reality in its formal sense; for without this idea, we could never know whether we had a true or adequate or clear idea of an object.

iv) *Reality*. The problem of reality arises only for reflexive consciousness. Prereflexive consciousness takes no notice of itself: it thinks its object, not about the awareness of the object. But when the problem of reality arises, it is guided by the idea of reality which it possesses. This idea is "nothing but the formal idea of Being, which is explicated by the laws of thought"—self-identity, non-contradiction, absolute determinateness (p. 75). (Only the Absolute is therefore in itself real, though there is relative independence of finite substances.) Reality must be defined such that a true judgment judges what is real; hence the idea of reality serves a normative function in being the criterion of meaning, truth and falsity, clarity and unclarity. Unclear objects are the ground of inquiry as well as of error; for particular contents are not for us fully determinate and self-identical, and must be rendered so by investigation. Yet reality must include everything we can clearly and distinctly see; hence there are many dimensions of reality, not merely a single mode of being.⁴

It is Reason which grasps formal Being, though its apprehension is but a formal one. The laws of thought or reason do, however, thus have an ontological grounding: they are *seen* as the formal principles of being. The discursive acts of reason rest on an intuitive grasp of formal self-identity, and are nothing but its discursive application.⁵

sense that one is directly aware of the extensity of his own body. But does the world end with my body? Here Earle says we must rely on probability (p. 111).

⁴ The objects of imagination have their own being as "possibility." Imagination, not cognition, is the source of imaginary objects; and they are presented to cognition as any object is.

⁵ The infinite reality posited by the ontological argument is defended (all too briefly) by Mr. Earle at this point. The idea of Being in its most formal sense, he asserts, is of course "a very odd idea," but most criticisms

Mr. Earle has combined three interests in this volume: phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological. The ontological seems uppermost in importance, however; and the goal of the book is to sketch an ontology of objectivity. The resultant theory is a realism with roots deep in the Aristotelian and scholastic tradition, but—if it is not a contradiction to say so—a realism influenced by aspects of Cartesianism and phenomenology. These references are difficult to make exact, however; for one of the main short-comings of the book for the professional reader is the lack of reference to, and discussion of, these historical positions.

But the theories which Mr. Earle directly opposes are identifiable. He is anti-Kantian in his denial of any categorial activity of mind or cognizing consciousness. He is anti-representationalism in holding that ideas are not copies, and that mind is not aware of copies but objects. And he is anti-idealism in arguing that the world of objects is discovered, not made. But it may be wondered just how, and indeed if, Earle has refuted these views, or how he has rejected them. He admits an activity in mind, though he assigns it to the imagination. The use of the word "copy" in representational theories is unfortunate, but difficulty with the word cannot be the sole basis for rejection of the theory. Surely, even a copy or an image or an impression is an object; and indeed the theorists who used these terms could have substituted "object" for them without embarrassment whenever they were writing of the relation of mind and "copy." But their concern was usually not phenomenology but the relation of object (copy) and reality,*

of the argument rest on a correspondence theory of truth which is here rejected. The formal character of reality is not derived from any phenomenology of finite appearance, he says; it is not a datum of sense, imagination or memory. "Its appearance to the cognitive subject in its purity is identical with intuitive reason" (p. 89). But the formal character of reality can be seen in the appearance of anything at all; for without the formal, there could be no appearance.

* Cf. Kant: "Everything, every representation even, in so far as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper inquiry what the word 'object' ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object" (*Critique of Pure Reason* [tr. Kemp Smith], pp. A190, B235).

and the inappropriateness of that analysis must be shown. Finally, many idealistic theories have urged that there is a given in knowledge (see, for example, McTaggart's interpretation of Hegel), though they differ from realism in various ways on the nature of the given.

The object of cognizing consciousness, Mr. Earle argues, has a content and an existence independent of the thinking subject. But there are two questions to be resolved here: the existence and nature of the independent order, and the process by which it becomes an object for us. In admitting the existence of an order beyond ourselves, our knowledge is not thereby explained. The problem remains as to how it can become an object for us. It can become such, it seems to me, only through our own activity—and this however "real" the object may be. Only by thinking the object, which is a type of construction in thought, can we make it our object: the world of things exists for us only as the mind constructs it as a world of thought. Nor is such thinking of objects a "masking" of reality (contra p. 51). Such masking is possible only on the assumption of a prior realism—whether grounds for the assumption be given or not—with an inference to phenomenalism. Earle admits that we "construct our world" (p. 63); though on his premises, with constructive activity limited to imagination, "our world" would seem to remain imaginary.⁷ He is right in noting that every judgment does indeed presuppose or relate itself to a fixed order which is independent of us; but to say that that order is intuited does not solve the problem of knowing that order. Appeals to intuition usually mean that no further question can be asked; denial of intuition is a request for explanation.

Cognition or apprehension gives not only essence, Mr. Earle

⁷ It was basically Descartes' observation of the power of imagination over mind, I think, that led him to "systematic doubt." In the *Discourse*, *Meditations*, and *Principles*, he holds the view that immediate awareness ("inspection") yields a true and completely adequate acquaintance with its "objects"; also that the knowing mind is purely contemplative and passive in the reception of objects, and hence does not distort them. But these observations apply to imaginary objects as well, and hence some criterion for verification of the veridical as against the imaginary must be found. I shall discuss the problem of verification briefly below.

insists, but existence as well. But the existence which is given, this being, is surely only phenomenal or epistemological; it can mean only instantiation within a system, the system, namely, of epistemological objects. Yet merely to note this instantiation is to say nothing about the system as a whole, or to relate it to the metaphysically real. To discover the fact of intentionality by phenomenological analysis does not in itself solve the problem of the ontology of intentionality.

Mr. Earle further urges that the system of epistemological objects be not reduced to a single mode of being—he is not going to commit the reductionist fallacy. But one may ask whether no reduction—no relating, no search for the dependent and independent—is not also a fallacy. Indeed, unless there is some reduction at least, the term “being” becomes as wholly vacuous as Hegel thought it was. The same observation applies to truth, defined by Earle as the world appearing: unless some reduction is made, it becomes vacuous and purely emotive.

But more important for Earle than this is that we do see or apprehend the formal idea of reality. Reality must be self-identical, non-contradictory, and determinate. It is true, I think, that we have this idea, and that it is *seen* in appearances is perhaps an adequate way of characterizing our knowledge of it. The laws of thought (if we are to talk this way) are the same as the laws of things. If they were not, knowledge would be impossible. This indeed is the basic assumption of thought. But thought does not intuit or grasp these laws of formal conditions in things. Even with its idea of reality, thought involves a dualism and a parallelism: dualism, for thought grasps objects and formal conditions only through conceptions, yet it cannot view its conceptions as real but only as valid of reality; parallelism, for thought grasps reality, but only through a complex activity in the former.

Indeed, the notion of intuition for either the metaphysically real or the formal conditions of the real will not do. That we have intuitions, that the relation of mind and its “contents” or “objects” is intuitive—these propositions are true. But it is also true that we cannot trust intuitions, and the attempt to qualify them (by consensus, self-evidence, or clarity) is in effect to give up intuition. Mind is confronted with objects; thought does

ultimately verify itself if there is any verification at all: as phenomenological descriptions, these statements are found in nearly all epistemologies. But, again, the phenomenology does not solve any ontological problem, even that of the formal idea of being.

Nor indeed does the problem to which the book is basically addressed appear to be solved. Thought is objective, or objectivity is had, Earle argues, because, although "we do not claim to know which things are real, nor how they are integrated into the universe, nor what is left of them after they are so integrated . . . the thing we do claim to know . . . is, *what it is to be real*" (p. 77). Apart from whether this is what is ordinarily meant by "objective" (which I would think applies more to knowing which objects are real—content—not merely the formal idea of reality), it does not touch what for most thinkers is the more basic question of objectivity, namely verification. The formal idea of reality is certainly not the basis of verification, for it applies to all objects of consciousness: "our world is in no sense exhaustive of the real world, but to whatever extent it is determinate for us, it is part of the total of reality" (p. 126). Verification is rather the problem of moving from essence as having a mental career to the belief that that essence is valid of reality; and self-identity, determinateness, and non-contradiction are no basis for this movement. As Santayana made plain, all essences have these characters.* The mere having of them does not produce inquiry.

The distinction between idea as a being with a career of its own, and as a conception claiming to be valid of reality, is surely essential.[†] Perhaps I misunderstand Earle's argument, but it does seem to be confused here. Traditional theories of the given,

* The principle of essence is identity. See, e.g., *The Realm of Essence* (New York, 1927), p. 5.

[†] Once again reference may be made to Descartes, who was forced himself to these distinctions, namely those between awareness and judgment; and between "appearance" as signifying something to be what it is not, and signifying appearances as they do in fact exist *qua* appearances. In this latter sense, of course, nothing can appear except what is, and it really is at it appears. But Descartes recognized that the problem of knowledge is not solved by these distinctions. In spite of the Cartesian, or Cartesian-like, aspects of Earle's theory, I do not believe he has met the Cartesian critique of realism.

for all their difficulties, have recognized the role of "objects" in the given, but they have denied any intuitive extension of the given beyond immediate consciousness. And this denial has rested on many facts, not just error alone: the nature of the past and the future, knowledge of other minds, the problems of secondary qualities and of imagination. From this denial arises the problem of verification. Earle recognizes the problem, I think, in holding that we construct the world with probability as our guide (p. 111), and his view that secondary qualities are modifications of sense organs.

But if all this is allowed, what beyond the traditional given is "seen"? One's body, primary qualities, and the formal laws of being are among the candidates. And what is the basis of taking them as seen realities beyond the traditional given? It is their being seen as such.

But again, this will not do, and that it will not do has been apparent, among others, to coherence and pragmatist theorists. Even if one states the problem in realist terms—that a predicate is abstracted from an object—there remains the problem of verifying the effects seen to follow from the predicate as having mental existence as against those which follow from the predicate having actual existence.¹⁰ Surely objectivity is not had by fiat; and indeed the only objectivity that matters is an objectivity which is achieved.

Strenuous criticism is reflective of strong exposition. This is a forceful essay, but its very expression will reveal difficulties to all who are not antecedently convinced of realism. The phenomenological description presented by Mr. Earle is excellent and rewarding; the epistemology and ontology are more debatable.

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¹⁰ Still arguing against reductionism, Earle states that there can be no single test of truth—there are rather as many tests as there are objects to be tested (p. 93), as indeed there are many existing orders of truth and many more possible orders (p. 78). But how this fits with his view that ultimately truth is seen (I would suppose all truths), or indeed whether the assertion is either trite or obvious, I do not know. And of course there are truths which matter more than others, though again I do not know how we could determine on Earle's principles an existing order of truth as against a merely possible one.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING METHOD IN PSYCHOLOGY

V. J. MCGILL

SINCE the triumph of experimental method in psychology, philosophical psychology has been almost entirely eclipsed. American psychologists avoid philosophical problems like the plague, and devote themselves to issues which are within the compass of their experimental and statistical techniques. One of the worst things a psychologist can say about a colleague is that he is a good philosopher. In the meantime, philosophers themselves have become more and more exclusive, increasingly conscious of their circumscribed role and reluctant to make judgments which might seem to contravene or compete with the empirical conclusions or hypotheses of the psychologists.

The resulting separation of the two disciplines was probably inevitable, but there is a question whether it has not gone too far and also whether it has actually gone as far as is commonly supposed. Do psychologists *succeed* in avoiding philosophy, and do philosophers *succeed* in maintaining their aloofness on analytic, methodological or categorical levels, with nothing implied as to mental activity or behavior? The jurisdictional problem cannot be resolved if each side simply retreats before the other, back toward its inner citadel: experiment, on the one hand, and logic, on the other. For experimental results have to be interpreted, and interesting problems of method and sometimes epistemology are involved which experiment cannot settle. Similarly, if the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments depends, in the final count, on attention-span or memory-span, and a theory of the meaning of proper names can be tested by a canvas of actual usage, then even logic is not autonomous.

On the Continent, philosophy and psychology are not nearly so exclusive, and even in this country there are many exceptions to the general rule. Illustrative of this are the four books to be discussed below. Broadly speaking, one might say that three of

these books deal with *becoming*, one with becoming a self, one with becoming through love, and another with becoming through self-transcendence, but actually they have little in common except that they are both philosophical and psychological. The fourth book, which is an incomparably thorough appraisal of fourteen different theories of perception, is straight psychology, yet the over-all concern with method, interpretation and the criteria which psychological theories must meet gives this volume also a philosophical character.

The last book mentioned is F. H. Allport's *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure*.¹ It illustrates a phenomenon sometimes thought peculiar to philosophy, namely: you cannot talk about one topic without talking about the others too. So comprehensive is Allport's treatment, so many diverse facts have to be covered and explained, in his opinion, that an adequate theory of perception becomes also a theory of learning, a cortical theory, a theory of sensation, of memory and reasoning, a theory of motivation and emotion as well. And conversely, an adequate theory of learning or an adequate theory of motivation and emotion has to become a theory of perception too. How could one, for example, determine the extent to which emotions influence perception without taking into account the scope of automatic psychophysical factors in perception and the many things which have been unconsciously learned through repetition?

Of the other three books, G. W. Allport's *Becoming, Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality*,² gives a many-sided view of the structure and dynamics of personality, half of the chapters being devoted to such topics as ethics, freedom, conscience, democracy and the religious sentiment. The philosophical character of the book is also shown by the fact that when experimental evidence runs out but the problem that remains is important, discussion of alternatives and probabilities and desiderata still continues. The same could be said for M. F. Ashley Montagu's *The Direction of Human Development*,³ which is

¹ *A Review and Critical Analysis with an Introduction to a Dynamic-Structural Theory of Behavior* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1955).

² *The Terry Lectures* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

³ *Biological and Social Bases* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955).

described as "a scientific confirmation of the enduring belief that human love is essential to all social growth." In documenting his thesis that love is the key to personality growth, to progress and happiness, Montagu utilizes biological and physiological facts, findings of experimental and clinical psychology, and data of anthropology and sociology, but also philosophical considerations. Like G. W. Allport, he has quite a bit to say about ethics, social policy, education and the reform of living, and is as much interested in what personality should be as in what it is.

Dialectique de l'Agir,⁴ by André Marc, S. J., is also concerned with how personality or the person realizes himself, or becomes what he really is, but the orientation is very different. The human being cannot attain to his true stature, according to Father Marc, except by relating himself cognitively, through love of the good, to a Being who, unlike himself and the others, is free from imperfection and change. If he is to understand his true nature and know how to conduct himself in the world, he must know what is superior to him, but this is fraught with difficulties. As a result, as Gabriel Marcel puts it, "A man knows himself less as a being than as a will to surpass all that he is and is not, for this actuality engages but does not satisfy him." The need for a religious orientation is also recognized as a psychological trait by G. W. Allport, but Montagu, on the contrary, contends that the preeminence of love can be established scientifically and requires no extra-natural sanctions.

F. H. Allport sets himself the task of assessing the claims of fourteen rival theories of perception based on different types of experiments and different philosophical presuppositions, and is obliged to state carefully what he means by a good psychological theory. He lists the following criteria of adequacy: (1) agreement with the facts, (2) generality, (3) parsimony, (4) immediate experimental availability, (5) logical consistency, and (6) explanatory value.⁵

⁴ Ouvrage publié avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1955).

⁵ It would probably have been better to have added another criterion which might have been called "relative adequacy." For suppose that, instead of 14, we had only one of these theories of perception. The fact

None of these criteria is novel except 4 and 6, and to these the author attaches great importance. The former states that "a theory is valuable in proportion as its concepts have clear, unambiguous, and manipulable referents," while the latter specifies that the explanations offered should carry "a feeling of inevitability." It is not enough to subsume phenomena under laws or generalizations, for we must also have enough understanding of the former to know how the latter apply. Thus if S-R laws are to explain a response there must be an implementing description of the structures involved, receptors, effectors and at least a plausible model of what goes on in the central nervous system.

Allport's requirement of experimental availability (criterion 4) becomes, as he elaborates it, very exacting. What he means by denoting a referent, he says, is "physically *contacting* or *encountering* it." Fortunately, this excessive demand is mitigated in one passage by the introduction of "quasi-denotation." An object x to be described is quasi-denoted if there is a chain of encounters between x and the perceiving subject S . In the case of the Brownian movement, for example, one encounter intervening between x and S is the encounter of the light from the fog track with the photographic plate. Finally, at the end of this chain of encounters, which have been checked for errors, S "interprets what he sees as the 'track of an electron'" (p. 27). This "last link" in the chain seems a very weak one, at least for an author who started out by demanding that the object described by a theory must be physically encounterable. But Allport is intensely aware of the problem of getting from the percept to a theory. In his own cortical theory, as in those of Hebb and the cyberneticians, an ingenious model is constructed, based on present neuro-physiological knowledge, designed to explain how the brain carries out its inferences.

Allport's requirement of "denotation" is so narrow as to exclude even the atomic theory, but his requirement of "quasi-denotation" accommodates well-accepted theories, so long as the

that it was the only one, quite apart from other considerations, would make it more probable than it now is.

chain of encounters between x and S includes intra-cranial encounters in which inferences are carried out and inaccuracies of observation and instruments are removed.

Phenomenological and Physicalistic Methods.

Phenomena or experiences fall into two kinds, physicalistic and phenomenological. The former can be denoted and are objective, whereas the latter cannot be denoted and are subjective, where "denote" is used in the narrow sense of tactual contact. The psychologist, for example, can denote a figure on the blackboard which both he and his subject can contact and measure, but he cannot denote his subject's private experience of it. Another distinction is said to be that physicalistic experience can correct phenomenological experience, and is also self-correcting, whereas phenomenological experience corrects nothing. Thus we can go on looking at the physically straight lines in the Hering illusion indefinitely. It doesn't help, for they continue to *look* bent. It is only when we use a ruler, thus making tactual contact, that we learn that they are actually straight. The phenomenological is how things *look*, whereas the physicalistic is what we know them to be after contact and corrections have been made.

Although unhappy about admitting phenomenological experiences among the referents of psychological theory, Allport is unwilling to take the behaviorist's course of rejecting them. In practice, this amounts to reducing the inexhaustible wealth of phenomenological detail and meaning "to a set of discriminatory responses" which is "a ridiculous oversimplification" (p. 54). He therefore decides to accept phenomenological referents, although it violates the rule of objectivity honored by all the sciences.

We might suggest that there would have been less difficulty if a better criterion of objectivity had been chosen, namely, correspondence with the properties of physical objects, as determined by physics. According to this criterion, some phenomenological, or uncorrected, experiences could have a great deal of objectivity, others less. The primary qualities in these experiences would correspond, in some degree, *directly*, the secondary qualities, *indirectly*. Thus a given blue, to take an example of the latter,

would correspond, not with a physical property of the object in question, but with a certain wave-length and with the albedo of this object. This criterion would fit in with Allport's realistic philosophy, and rescue phenomenological experiences from a uniform taint of subjectivity, permitting us to describe veridical (corrected) experiences as *more* objective than illusory (uncorrected) experiences are. It would have another advantage which seems really important. It implies—what would have to be recognized anyhow—that all experiences, even corrected tactual experiences, are only correct or reliable to a degree, and helps to dispel the illusion that any sense, however much corrected, provides a royal road to knowledge.

Tests of Method Applied to Rival Theories.

Since there are fourteen of these theories of perception, and some of them are quite technical, I shall not attempt to describe them all, but merely present a few examples of the application of methodological tests. It is the indefatigable testing and comparing of theories which distinguishes this book. The theories themselves can be studied elsewhere.

The first theory appraised by Allport is Titchener's core-context theory, which is largely concerned with the meaning of meaning. According to Titchener the core consists of sensations and images, which are usually in the focus, and its meaning is the context, i.e., other sensations and images. Kinaesthetic sensations, which may be replaced by kinaesthetic images, are most effective in conferring meaning on the core. Allport shows, however, that under analysis sensations as entities disappear, and the core itself disappears. The sensation-image complex A is as much the meaning of its context B, as B is of A. Moreover, A has an "inner meaning," or may have, quite apart from its context.

The theory, Allport concludes, is parsimonious and explains some things, such as object-meaning, very ingeniously, but it leaves too much unexplained. Its subjective data are not denotable (in the narrow sense we have mentioned) and do not lend themselves well to experiment. But core-context is bigger than the setting Titchener gave it. Allport shows how it can be gen-

eralized, and reformulated in more objective terms and with physiological implementation, thus proving that Titchener was wiser than he knew. Although the theory is remote from his own, Allport does his best to make it cover as many facts as possible.

The Gestalt theory admits a much richer range of phenomenological distinctions than does core-context, but Allport argues that its apparatus is still too limited to account for concrete meanings in perception. Here, since he evidently means not only *any*, but a *particular*, concrete meaning, he seems to be asking too much. In his final summation he states that Gestalt "rests upon a large number of experiments that support its phenomenological generalizations. Though it has become directly and experimentally available through brain-field theory, it runs into difficulties with the facts of brain physiology . . . Without better physiological support it will fail to achieve a satisfactory explanation of the perceptual process" (p. 589).

The classical Gestalt experiments, accordingly, provide no basis for a satisfactory theory of perception. And when later experiments were supplied with a cortical explanation, as in Köhler and Wallach's *Figural After-Effects* (1944), it was soon eliminated by a crucial experiment performed by Lashley. To account for the figural after-effects, which were most interesting in themselves, Köhler put forward the hypothesis that the physiological structure isomorphic to these effects is an electrical field, but Lashley set out to test whether in fact the brain does behave like an electric field. After two chimpanzees had learned to discriminate between a number of geometrical figures, a delicate operation was performed on their brains designed to disturb the electric field on which, according to Köhler's theory, the learning and its retention depend. The next day, on retest, it was found that the animals had lost nothing of what they had learned, and could make the same discriminations as before.

The second criticism of Gestalt we will mention relates to the whole-character. Allport challenges the contention that the whole is independent, dynamic and causal, something over and above the parts as "they exist and operate together." To claim that the

whole "acts by its own laws upon the parts" is, he says, not even a phenomenological observation—but metaphysics.

The argument against this over-all sovereign view of wholes is effective. On the other hand, there appear to be senses in which a whole can be independent and act upon its parts, and they are relevant to the discussion. Thus a melody, as a serial order of interval relationships, is independent of its parts in the sense that it can occur many times with different notes each time. And it can determine its parts in the sense that whatever combination fits the melody-pattern acquires the capacity of affecting the listener in a particular way.

The greatest shortcoming of Gestalt seems to be its almost total neglect of the role of learning in perception. This deficiency is corrected with a vengeance by "behavior theory," according to which, if we can judge by the foundations which have been laid down, perception is almost nothing but learning. Hull's system is of special philosophical interest because it banishes the entire phenomenological realm from its purview, or rather, attempts to translate this content into verbal and other responses. Thus subjects can be conditioned to dance or come to dinner, or say "This is a melody," when certain sound-waves are produced, while giving no overt response to other sound-waves.

The word "overt" marks, of course, a serious difficulty for behavior theory, even though ingenious use is made of the fact that a subject who responds covertly may later respond to the same stimulus overtly, for something psychological is going on when a man responds covertly and it ought to be included. What is needed, from Allport's point of view, is some kind of a physiological language to supplement the behavioral language. What is also needed, we should think, is some awareness of the amount of meta-behavioristics involved in these behavioral translations. Although Hull and the Yale school see no problem here, Jules H. Masserman recognizes that the response is *meaningful*, and must be interpreted in the light of the needs, percepts, and the distinctive capacities and "personality" of the animals in question (cats in this case). Though behavior theory formally extrudes phenomenological experience, it may be necessary to readmit it through the back door.

There seems to be no question about the over-all importance of learning in perception theory. All the theories on Allport's list concede it, except for Gestalt and the topological field theory of Levin. New evidence has accumulated. Hebb, for example, employing Senden's data on blind adults who acquired vision for the first time as the result of a cataract operation, Riesen's reports on chimpanzees raised in darkness, and other findings, concludes that the initial recognition of even simple two dimensional figures requires a good deal of learning. Similarly, experiments by C. Leuba and by L. Welch,* in which "conditioned sensations" were produced in the laboratory, seem to have implications for hallucinations in general, including those of the hysteric.[†]

The difference between perception and learning, according to Hebb's cortical theory, is simply that in the latter the cortical elements require a longer time to make a connection. When the joining of elements takes time, repeated excitations and a number of trials, we call it "learning." But if it occurs very quickly, or rather, as Allport puts it, "under conditions in which its repetitive or trial and error aspect cannot be observed, we call it perception." By means of this conception, he continues, Hebb is able to incorporate into the learning process "data from clinical, physiological, comparative and developmental psychology, but he has also provided a generalization that may increase the parsimony of psychological systems" (p. 181).

Wishing to allow for the rich associative processes which occur in perception, Hebb conceives his *cell-assembly* as an elaborate concatenation of sensory and motor cells, extending beyond the cortex to the association areas of the brain. Since alternative pathways occur in the cell-assembly, an impulse could get through to its muscle even though certain parts of the brain are destroyed, which squares, at least in part, with Lashley's principle of "equipotentiality" of different parts of the cerebrum. To account for all but the simplest perceptions, Hebb introduces "phase sequence," which is the phase relation of successive firings within

* F. Kornbecker, E. Tobac and L. Welch, "Factors Productive of Conditioned Images or Sensations," *J. of Genetic Psychol.*, 75 (1949).

† V. J. McGill and L. Welch, "Hysteria as a Conditioning Process," *American J. of Psychotherapy*, 1, 3 (1947), 253-78.

a super-assembly of primary cell assemblies. Yet with all his ingenious complications, Hebb does not carry his explanations much beyond the perception of geometrical figures, and to account for object-perception would require a big extension of the system.

Perhaps the required generality will eventually be supplied by the cybernetic theory, especially as developed by the neurophysiologists, Pitts and McCulloch. It provides a systematic picture of cortical functioning in perception, explaining feed-back circularity, control and regulation, and invariants of transformation, or "universals," but whether it agrees sufficiently with physiological facts is not clear, at least to the present writer. Allport gives it a high rating in terms of his tests of theory.

One key note which runs through a wide variety of these theories is *expectation* or *set* of the organism. For Tolman's purposive behaviorism it is the leading concept. In Hull's system it is included in "habit-strength," but perceptual set, as such, remains undeveloped. Hebb, recognizing the importance of expectation in the recognition of geometrical figures, gives it a prominent place in his neurological scheme. Other theories of perception which we will not have time to describe also accentuate this note. Expectation or set is pivotal in *transactionism*, which is based on the experiments of A. Ames and the theoretical formulations of Dewey and Bentley, non-veridical perceptions being predictable from the subjects' assumptions. Helson's *adaptation-level* theory, which explains the degree of felt heaviness (and of other dimensional qualities) in terms of the particular neutral point or adaptation-level assumed by the subject, is another example, and so is Sherif's *frame of reference* theory. Set is also central in *directive-state* theory, which emphasizes the changes in perception due to the subject's motivations and valuations, objects recognized, speed and accuracy of recognition, stimulus threshold and size, being so determined in some cases studied. In Bruner and Postman's revision of directive-state theory, which is called the *hypothesis* theory, the motivations and evaluations are absorbed within hypotheses, which are eventually identified with sets. Unlike some of the theories discussed by Allport, which are and were only intended as partial explanations, hypothesis theory has a wide coverage. It embraces the phenomena

of directive-state theory, the great mass of set phenomena and Tolman's expectancy, and it shrewdly combines the cognitive aspect of perception, emphasized by Gestalt, with the associative learning of Hull and Hebb. The generalization which makes hypothesis central in all perception is, of course, much broader in one sense than the insight of Brentano and Husserl that intention is essential to mental acts, because the hypothesis can be, and usually is, unconscious.

Allport's own theory also aims at breadth and generality. The leading idea is that since quantitative laws presuppose the existence of events and structures, they do not suffice for an adequate theory, but must be supplemented by qualitative descriptions and structural laws. "The notion that *all* structures in nature, at every level, may have some 'family resemblance' and may obey some uniform law or related set of laws that are as definite and general as those upon which quantitative relationships depend, has not been widely and seriously considered" (p. 622).

The geometrical model the author sets up to explain his theory is too intricate for explanation here. The exposition is also schematic and hard to assess, but the general pattern looks promising. The author sees the exciting opportunity of unifying different fields of psychology, than which nothing would seem to be more important, and of reconciling experimental findings: "We now see," he says, "that event-structure theory might be able not only to embrace perception and learning in a single theoretical system but to go on further and reconcile the issue over continuity and discontinuity in learning" (p. 648).

Allport's book is exceptionally important. His objective, impartial, sympathetic treatment of rival theories might serve as a model, not only in psychology, but also in philosophy where the competition of theories is more tenacious and unappeasable.

Method and the Restoration of the Self in Psychology.

G. W. Allport's *Becoming, Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality* is a graceful essay full of insights and perspectives, but it is also an *argument* against the main trend of modern psychology, an argument to the effect that man is a

rational being, with a self which is more than a catalogue of traits or a concatenation of conditioned responses, that he is possessed of freedom and a real conscience, in need of religion and worthy of democracy. The main point, however, is not to present a theory of the self with supporting evidence, but rather to argue that if prevailing methods are continued, the psychology of the self and of ego-involvement will remain obscure and undeveloped and that other methods would be more successful. Since G. W. Allport does not advance a theory of the sort we have been discussing, F. H. Allport's tests of theory do not apply directly to his argument, though they have some relevance to it.

The argument begins with a distinction between two broad trends among psychological theories: they are oriented toward either Locke or Leibniz. By this is meant only that they regard the mind as essentially either passive or active. The Lockean view, G. W. Allport says, "is still dominant in Anglo-American psychology," as seen in current environmentalism, behaviorism, positivism, operationalism, mathematical models and "what is cherished in our laboratories as truly 'scientific' psychology" (p. 8).

As illustrative of the Lockean trend the author also mentions mechanism, which excludes purpose and tends to fragmentize the individual, and elementarism and geneticism, according to which the simpler and earlier are regarded as more important than what is complex and develops late. He believes that the aversion for "problems having to do with complex motives, high level integration, with conscience, freedom, selfhood" is largely owing to a failure of objectivity, though he would doubtless grant that there are other reasons, such as the difficulty of providing controls.

Opposed to the Lockean trend is the Leibnizian, which is represented in its full flower by Brentano, Husserl, Scheler and by Gestalt and phenomenological psychologists and, in a diluted form, by "cognitive" and "hypothesis" theories, which Allport finds too static. His reference is to the theory of Tolman and probably that of Bruner and Postman, which were briefly discussed above. Kant, Herbart and Ehrenfels are also in the Leibnizian tradition, as well as recent thinkers such as Kurt Goldstein, H. Cantril, P. Lecky and John Dewey.

There seems little doubt that these two trends exist, but there is a danger of overstatement. Are behaviorism and conditioning altogether on the Lockean side of "passivity"? It is true that in classical conditioning the mind (defined in behavioral terms, of course) is as passive as could be imagined, but in instrumental conditioning, or trial and error, which is equally behavioristic and much more prevalent, we seem to have a peak of striving, whether we think of the rat in the maze (with such mind as it has) or of the complex "trial and check" learning* with very sophisticated trials, which is characteristic of advanced human problem-solving.

The appearance of Dewey's name among the Leibnizians also raises certain doubts, because for him it is not the self that is active but rather "transactions," in which subject and object participate and have their only existence. Here one is reminded of F. H. Allport's criticism of Dewey and Bentley's transactionism. Even if subject and object, as phases of the total situation, he says, derive their "very existence" from their participation, "there must be *other* aspects of their existence that are *not* so derived. That is, they must also exist independently. Otherwise everything must be participation with no one to participate."* Although this argument no doubt admits of answers, it serves at any rate to focus the question, which G. W. Allport himself does not answer, namely, what precisely is active when the mind is said to be active.

What Allport insists upon vigorously is the ubiquitous importance in psychology of *self-functions*—self-knowledge, self-image, ego-enhancement, ego-extension—and that these and many other self-functions not be reduced, as in certain psychological and psychoanalytic developments, to one function. But to the question what the ego, self or person is which has these functions or carries them out, he answers: The person is "the locus of the act." This position, it is interesting to note, is similar to Husserl's as late as the *Ideen*, where the self is described as the empty source of its acts. But Husserl soon found an agent which

* Woodworth's expression. Others speak of "approximation and correction."

* F. H. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

is only a blank source of its activity to be unsatisfactory. Similarly, from the opposite end of the methodological spectrum we have seen F. H. Allport protesting against functional psychology without denotable agents to perform the functions. We can foresee that he would want to have a cortical theory, with material for it drawn from the psychopathology of the self.

G. W. Allport, however, has no objection to a philosopher's or theologian's filling in the blank with a real self, if he should need it for his ontology or value-theory, but declares that to do so would lie outside the province of the psychologist. It seems to follow that the psychologist could never, under any circumstances, present a complete theory of the self, that this would have to be left to the philosopher or the theologian. And would this not also be true of other psychological subjects? If a self, as something more than its activities, must be assumed in value-theory, would it not also be needed to account for ego-involvements in emotion, learning and perception?

G. W. Allport's little book is strewn with rapid insights. He points out that leading theories of personality, such as "modal personality," "basic personality," and "role theory," fall into the Lockean rather than the Leibnizian tradition, since they picture the mind as reactive, not active. Though the cultural approach to personality contributes many facts, he says, there is too little recognition of man as agent—free and responsible, resourceful and courageous. And when he speaks of man's freedom he does not mean, as Sartre does, something ready-made, complete and inalienable, but rather a capacity which varies in degree, not only with circumstances, but also with his repertory of skills. "It is in this sense that the broadly educated man is freer than the man narrowly trained" (p. 85).

G. W. Allport also assails the abstractionism so typical of the work on personality, and urges reform. His language, at least, goes much too far when he states that whereas the natural sciences are concerned with classes and generalities, psychology must deal with the concrete personality, which is nothing if not unique. As one of Allport's critics once said, "psychology, as a science,

deals with universals, not with particulars."¹⁰ The problem is to control the more concrete universals.

Two Ways of Investigating "Love."

One reason why F. H. Allport's tests of the adequacy of theory, such as "immediate experimental availability," do not apply to G. W. Allport's book, is that the latter is too philosophical. The same could be said of Ashley Montagu's *The Direction of Human Development*. Note, for example, some of the conclusions he reaches:

"The love . . . between mother and child is the model and pattern of the human relationship which should exist between all human beings" (p. 301).

"Man requires no supernatural sanctions for love . . . Love is and should be the most natural of religions for human beings" (p. 314).

"Goodness', then, is virtually equatable with 'love', and 'badness' with a failure of love. Ethics, then, for us becomes both the art and science of reciprocal adaptation of human beings . . . in loving attitudes of mind and in loving conduct" (p. 309).

Montagu examines an array of really cogent physiological, psychological and clinical facts supporting his thesis that deprivation of mother-love is highly injurious to newborn, infant and child. There are also many pertinent citations of authorities in the general area of physiology, psychology and anthropology which, though highly selective, are nevertheless weighty in accumulation. The bibliography with analytical notes is very extensive and valuable in itself.

There is no question that Montagu has assembled fascinating material, enough to support the general thesis that mother-love is of extraordinary importance for normal development, achievement and happiness. But much more would be required to prove that all human relations should be modeled on the mother-love pattern, or that love is "fearless," "unconditional" and absolutely

¹⁰ G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Personality* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 167.

dependable, *but also* highly discriminating and the most efficient adjustive and adaptive process of all (pp. 294-96).

The argument of the book would have been stronger if alternatives had been considered, and more effort had been made to answer criticism. On one occasion, in the course of arguing that since the social ants and other infra-human species are cooperative, man must be recognized as essentially cooperative, Montagu does allude to a criticism of Schneirla to the effect that the behavior of these ants is instinctive, and might better be called *biosocial facilitation* than cooperation. In reply he says that the distinction is "simply one of organization at qualitatively different levels," and does not appear to see that there is any further problem. One odd implication of his position is that when we find symbiosis or other forms of cooperation in the animal world, this tells us something about what man is or should be, but when we find parasitism, this tells us nothing that is relevant to man. Is this not Social Darwinism in reverse, i.e., Social Kropotkinism?

Montagu, as we have said, gives too little attention to alternatives. It might be argued, for example, that what distinguishes higher animals from lower, and men of great achievement and success from those of less, is not so much their capacity to love and be loved, as their capacity and readiness to learn by "trial and test." The argument of the book could have been improved had the author tested his thesis against its rivals, such as Dewey's theory that what is most needed in the modern world is "intelligence" and maximum communication. But even as it is, the book makes out a good, if one-sided case, and reports many interesting facts and trends of recent research.

Father Marc, in his *Dialectique de l'Agir*, is also concerned with love—the love of God, and is much more sensitive than Montagu is to the differentials of love, to the variation of love and the value of love, with the knowledge and nature of the loved object.

We ordinarily speak of love being determined by its object as known, which of course is an *existing* object. To love a non-existent knowingly seems the height of absurdity and, in fact, it probably never occurs. The love of a non-existent Dulcinea imputes existence and invests her with life. Thus the Knight of

the Rueful Countenance is loath to admit his delusion, since in doing so he must renounce his love. Father Marc argues vigorously against the notion that there can be a love of an ideal conceived as unrealizable and unattainable, but does not claim that this in itself would prove that God exists, but only that, if He does not, our deepest desires are a mockery. He also appears to argue that since we necessarily love God (his perfect goodness) in loving ourselves and others (this limited goodness), either we do not love ourselves and others or our love of God is not delusive. The author does not rely on any one argument, but weaves many subtle analogical variations and perspectives. How man, suspended between the finite and the infinite, can transcend his imperfections to the extent of "attaining" the ideal is, after all, the theme of the whole book. In the end it appears that it is love, instructed by knowledge, that bridges the gulf.

The doctrine of the book is, of course, Thomist, but there is also much that is modern and distinctive. The author is responsive to contemporary phenomenology and existentialism, and is concerned to answer modern theological doubts and criticism. His argument seems to have three phases. First, there is the phenomenological report of certain conscious experiences and structures of consciousness, such as the essential striving for the good or infinite, implied in particular goods, and the tendency to personify it. The significance of such reports, of course, might be affected if it were found that the system of rewards and punishments in some societies favored the *learning* of certain experiences which were not reported in other societies. From the reports are inferred, in any case, often with long chains of reasoning, certain extra-natural and extra-scientific conclusions. Such inferences involve no methodological perplexity, since they can be adjudged in terms of rules of inference. But the same or similar conclusions may also be reached by arguments to the effect that these conclusions provide the most reasonable explanation of the totality of corrected phenomenological experience, and supply more overall coherence than is otherwise possible. At first glance this method might seem to be in accord with three of F. H. Allport's criteria of good theory, namely, generality, logical consistency and explanatory value. The difference is that *explanation*, in the one

case, would have to satisfy the scientist, who also demands denotability, parsimony, experimental tests and prediction, whereas in the other case what would have to be satisfied is the whole man, including desires and emotions, which are taken, along with other considerations, as cognitively crucial. There is no Kantian dualism, of course. The latter type of explanation is simply assumed not to conflict with the first, but to include it.

Since Father Marc does not undertake to harmonize these two forms of explanation, nor to bring his argument into relation with contemporary experimental psychology, it will be convenient to take a look at another recent book which does, namely, *The Human Person*,¹¹ edited by Magda Arnold and J. A. Gasson, S. J.

Thomism and Experimental Psychology.

The Human Person advocates a Thomistic framework for contemporary scientific psychology, and argues vigorously against the current naturalism, determinism and mechanism. The brilliant psychologist-theoretician, Magda Arnold, lays down the general principles in the first chapter: "According to the hierarchial concept of nature," she writes, "we know that the universe had a beginning in the creative act of One who had no beginning . . . and finally, the human being can and does choose whether or not he will strive for his goal or instead choose some other goal." This, she says, implies freedom, responsibility and purpose, which are what is needed.

To the objection that the hierarchial conception is not scientific, she replies that neither are the assumptions of "physical naturalism," "for both answers are given prior to scientific investigation" (pp. 14-15). The answers might be said to be equally philosophical, but how would they compare with respect to F. H. Allport's tests, such as explanatory value, availability to experiment and parsimony? Or would such tests be inapplicable? Dr. Arnold asserts that the hierarchial conception is more adequate, and that this can be demonstrated empirically.

¹¹ *An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality* (New York: Ronald Press, 1954).

Let us consider two or three cases in which she and her colleagues back up this claim, all of them in the area of free choice and decision. Dr. Arnold argues that the basic assumption of determinists, that even set is learned, is in contradiction with experimental evidence to the effect that without prior set (or intention) no learning takes place. And she points out that, on the contrary, her own view that men can and do decide whether to learn or not is consistent with these findings. She also cites the well-known conditioning experiments on adults by Gregory Razran, and also Razran's interpretation of his results. In his opinion, conditioning in adults is something quite different from conditioning in animals and children, for adults have the ability to prevent and reverse conditioning at will, and to escape from the laws of reinforcement and extinction. Dr. Arnold's comment is that in man, when he is not ill but in the possession of his full powers, mechanical conditioning does not work. Man is then free and responsible for what he learns. She denounces the view that mental and emotional disturbances are caused by external circumstances and that the patient is not responsible. As against this fatalistic view, which she regards as ominous, she quotes a recent statement by Anne Roe: "Every combination of circumstances which has been cited as an excuse for one disability or another can be found in the histories of normals."

These contentions raise several questions. The answer to the first point might be that the evidence does not show that no learning can take place without prior set, and Dr. Arnold herself concedes conditioning (of which the subject may be unaware) in children. We can agree that in Razran's "conditioning" experiments choice was a factor, but cite at the same time great numbers of conditioning studies on adults in which this is not the case. In conditioning the psychogalvanic response, for example, choice is excluded except for the initial willingness of the subject to cooperate, and even this is easily eliminated when the subject is taken unaware and does not know that he is being conditioned. On the other hand, instrumental learning, which is far more important and distinctive to man, involves choice at every turn, at every "point-choice" situation, and of course purpose too. This is not denied by the experimentalists Dr. Arnold is criticizing.

As to the contention that mental and emotional disturbance is a matter of choice it would seem more in accord with the facts to speak of *degrees* of freedom, depending partly on the circumstances of the patient. Or to put it in a way Dr. Arnold might prefer, circumstances may be more or very much less favorable to the exercise of free will. Sartre's extreme view that every neurosis is a project freely chosen by the patient is certainly hard to maintain. For one thing, it converts every hysteric into a malingerer.¹²

What then is the objection to the "physical naturalism" typical of American psychology? Dr. Arnold describes herself as an "indeterminist" and yet her examples of free choice seem to be cases of self-determination. If this is what she means by "indeterminism," however, there is nothing to prevent the determinist from agreeing with her, and the only question remaining would be the nature of the self which does the determining. Like Father Marc and G. W. Allport, she insists that there is a big difference between external compulsion and the internal "conviction of a logical necessity," and adds that the only internal restraint in free choice is the felt obligation of assenting to what is true. What is compelled, she says, is not a decision for action, but "the assent of the mind." But here again the naturalist might agree. Woodworth's and G. W. Allport's "functional autonomy," for example, provides a naturalistic basis for "higher" needs, including the logical and the moral, which, as many naturalistic psychologists have pointed out, *can be* even more imperious than basic tissue needs. The naturalist can also admit that decision is not entirely determined by the past, for the present moment may reverse past determinations, even strong ones (though to suppose it could reverse them all does seem bewildering); and can concede the potency of general truths, especially in the light of such developments as Pitts and McCulloch's cerebral theory of universals.¹³

The naturalist can also give due allowance to intention and

¹² Cf. V. J. McGill and Welch, "Hysteria as a Conditioning Process," *op. cit.*

¹³ W. Pitts and W. S. McCulloch, "How We Know Universals," *Bulletin of Math. Physics*, 9 (1947), 127-47. See also F. H. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

purpose. As we have seen, Tolman's theory and the directive state theory see expectation and purpose everywhere, and the hypothesis theory of Bruner and Postman makes set the matrix of perception. G. W. Allport's basic demand was that the active, intentional, purposive character of mind be recognized. Indeed at the present time there would seem to be a resurgence of purpose, as if McDougall, like Caesar, were still among us. In short, naturalists can and do subscribe to Dr. Arnold's new methodological program in psychology, at least to those parts of it which she emphasizes in criticizing them, though in general it may be that they do not so sufficiently.

But in one respect at least, Dr. Arnold's Thomistic approach gives her a clear advantage over psychologists who work within the framework of other philosophical traditions, such as that of Descartes and Mach. The Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of soul and body is a deterrent to theories which separate them or deny their difference. We have noted F. H. Allport's insistence that a full explanation of a psychological phenomenon must have its physiological implementation, but physiological implementation is actually rather rare, and the current positivism and functionalism often seem not to care if it is. In the field of the emotions we have had the James theory and the Lange theory (which are really quite different), but little else except the Cannon theory. In the meantime a vigorous minority thesis that emotions are cognitive had been pressed for a long time, but it was left to Magda Arnold to contrive a physiological model for it which would be consistent with the facts. In her 1945 article,¹⁴ she argued, against prevailing opinion, that such emotions as fear and anger could be distinguished on the physiological side, while in her 1950 article¹⁵ she made a careful criticism of Cannon's theory of emotions. Accepting the facts on which this theory had been built, she showed that they admitted of a different and more plausible interpretation, and advanced a theory of her own, which she

¹⁴ "Physiological Differentiation of Emotional States," *Psychol. Rev.* (1945).

¹⁵ "An Excitatory Theory of Emotions," in *Feelings and Emotions*, ed. M. L. Reymert (1950). This is briefly discussed in V. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason* (1954).

called an "excitatory" theory of emotions. The *complete* emotion, according to this theory, involves the following: observation and evaluation of the stimulus pattern or object, and an "emotional attitude" toward this object; then, an arousal of various physiological changes and a perception of these changes. As a result, other adaptive physiological changes occur and there is a "secondary evaluation," which is the ground of a "secondary attitude." The role of observations and evaluations, feed-back and readjustment, mark the process as cognitive.

Emotion does not result, as in Cannon's theory, from a reduction of the number of cerebral impulses *inhibiting* the action of thalamus-hypothalamus; it results from cerebral impulses which are *excitatory*, and stir up these mid-brain structures to action. If Cannon were right, as Dr. Arnold argues, we ought to be most emotional when we are asleep! If *she* is right, emotions arise from cognitions and evaluations which have their locus in the top brain. Her physiological interpretation, which seems to agree with many of the experimental and clinical facts, thus accommodates itself to the view that emotions are cognitive. According to Father Vincent V. Herr, who contributes a chapter to *The Human Person*, Dr. Arnold's theory is in accord with that of St. Thomas. He states that "its similarity to the description given by St. Thomas as well as to those of such modern scholastics as Joseph Froebes is well known" (p. 283).

Dr. Arnold claims to have adumbrated "a new and distinctive approach to method in the investigation of human personality." As with other methods which seek to embrace "the *whole* subject-matter," she says, there is no escape from philosophy; in the last analysis, the truth of the scientist's interpretation "will be proportionate to the truth of his philosophy" (p. 257). Father Marc would say the same, and G. W. Allport would probably go a long way toward agreement. Even F. H. Allport recognizes the importance of the philosophical framework, at least in relatively undeveloped areas of science where basic differences of method have not been overcome.

But science may "presuppose" philosophy in at least three different ways. When we say that scientific arguments presuppose the truth of the logical principle that *what follows from a true*

proposition is true, we can properly mean that unless this principle is true the conclusions of these arguments are not true. In this case, the truth of science *does* depend on the truth of philosophy, i.e., logic. But though there is no doubt that science presupposes logical rules of inference, whether it also presupposes ontological principles, such as *every event has a cause*, is controversial. A recent writer¹¹ has argued that the natural scientist does not have to assume that every event has a cause, but only that *some* have, "namely, those in which he is interested at the moment."

These two senses of "presupposition" are not always distinguished, nor clearly disengaged from a third sense, namely, that in which a particular kind of philosophy—naturalism, mechanism, positivism, phenomenology or Thomism, for example, serves as a guide to research problems and method in scientific work. Dr. Arnold would no doubt insist that philosophy is presupposed by psychology in all three senses, but it is the last sense that she emphasizes when she asserts that Thomism is a better guide to research in the field of personality than naturalistic philosophies are. We have seen that some of the superiorities she invokes are consistent with naturalism, when liberally interpreted, and that much of her criticism of naturalistic psychology is valid only against certain of its developments.

With positivism leading Skinner down one road, phenomenology guiding Gestalt and personalistic psychologists in opposite directions and philosophy, in general, inspiring all sorts of different psychologies, the science of psychology might seem to be condemned to divisions and contradictions not resolvable by its own methods. But this, of course, does not follow. F. H. Allport has shown, with skill and patience, how rival theories of perception can be measured, in spite of their divergent backgrounds in philosophy, by a single set of methodological tests. In some cases apparently conflicting tendencies were shown to be supplementary, and where the conflict was real, it could often be seen as instrumental to a wider, more adequate theory. As a result of his

¹¹ William E. Kennick, "Metaphysical Presuppositions," *Journal of Philosophy*, LII, 25 (1955), 773.

impartial comparison of fourteen theories of the same subject, the area of sheer diversity and disagreement seemed to dwindle and a unified theory appeared a possibility.

F. H. Allport gives a special example of what can be done when theories clash, which might well become a model for philosophers. In the course of certain tachistoscopic studies, L. Postman and his associates discovered that the recognition time for certain critical words, such as "whore," was greater than that for neutral words; they put forward an exciting hypothesis of "perceptual defense." Then R. L. Solomon and his associates repeated these experiments. They got the same results, but concluded that they could be accounted for by ordinary learning theory, in terms of the relative frequency of the occurrence of various words in the English language, and that Postman's fancy hypothesis was unnecessary. A controversy then ensued, until Postman and Solomon embarked on a very sensible project. These antagonists teamed up on parallel experiments, one performed by Solomon at Harvard, the other carried out by Postman in California, and then wrote a joint article in which they showed themselves in pretty close agreement on conclusions. Partly as a result of this criticism from the side of behavior theory, Postman and Bruner were able to enlarge their directive state theory into the more comprehensive hypothesis-theory, which seems to combine the merits of directive state theory, Hull's behavior theory, Tolman's purposive theory and even the cognitive emphasis of Gestalt theory.

The question at the end, then, is why battling philosophers, instead of hurling refutations at each other from a distance, should not sit down together and collaborate on an article or book, which would explore and diminish if not resolve their differences, with a prior understanding, of course, as to the criteria of adequacy to be employed.

New York City.

THE NORMATIVE IN THE DESCRIPTIVE

KONSTANTIN KOLENDA

1. "X is the case" implies "X ought to be believed," because "X is the case but X ought not to be believed" is self-contradictory or self-stultifying.

2. The proposition, "X is the case and X ought to be believed," combines two apparent irreconcilables of epistemology: the descriptive (X is the case) and the normative (X ought to be believed).

3. The descriptive, "X is the case," is epistemologically incomplete. It is completed by the tacit assumption that X is in principle knowable. Not to make this assumption is to commit oneself to the notion of unknowable facts, which is unintelligible.

4. For something to become true it must be recognized as such by some thinking being. Prior to this it does not exist as truth. A description of an objective fact is a description of it as encountered.

5. Since an objective fact is what it is, it cannot be affected by being known. But knowledge and its communication affect minds. Hence, to entertain a truth is to accommodate one's mental equipment to that which is the case. To communicate a truth is to aim at producing such accommodation in the minds of others.

6. To be concerned about objective facts means to be concerned about the *correctness* of one's *grasp* of them. To say that something is true is to proclaim that some objective fact deserves or has a right to be recognized. But this is another way of saying that minds ought to recognize it as such.

7. To regard a fact as objective is to regard it as equally constraining assent from all possible knowers of it.

8. A claim for a truth—scientific, moral, esthetic, religious—is an invitation to seek the encounter with that which this truth formulates. Such a claim expresses a concern for man's rational well-being.

9. The notion of factual truth is not normatively neutral. The reduction of the normative to the descriptive cannot be successful because the descriptive itself contains an irreducible normative element.

The Rice Institute.

COMMENTS ON KOLENDA'S THESES

I

ALAN ROSS ANDERSON

I am in sympathy with what I understand to be at least a part of Mr. Kolenda's general position, namely, that a sharp dichotomy between "judgments of fact" and "judgments of value" cannot be maintained. But I do not find his arguments convincing.

1. Granting for the sake of argument that "X is the case but X ought not to be believed" is in some sense self-contradictory or self-stultifying, it does not follow that "X is the case" implies "X ought to be believed." At most it follows that "X is the case" implies "either X ought to be believed, or else it is indifferent whether X is believed or not." I see no reason to deny the existence of truths p such that it is indifferent whether or not p is believed. It may be the case, for example, that Fermat's last conjecture is true, but even if this is the case, I can see no obligation on the part of anyone to believe so. On whom does the alleged obligation rest?

2. I would like to ask for elucidation of Thesis 4. Consider the fact that any axiomatic system of arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete. This fact would appear to be objective by the criterion proposed in Thesis 7, but it seems odd to say that this fact did not exist *as truth* before 1930. Did it exist at all? If so, what did it exist *as*? It appears also that Thesis 5 is inconsistent with 4. In 5 it is said that an objective fact "is what it is," and, for this reason, cannot be affected by being known. This suggests that an objective fact can be unknown. But then Thesis 4 says that an objective fact *is* affected by being known: after it is known it exists *as truth*; before, it does not.

3. Mr. Kolenda concludes (Thesis 9) that the normative cannot be reduced to the descriptive, but the denial of this con-

clusion (namely, that the normative *might* be reducible to the descriptive) would be equally compatible with his arguments. If the descriptive contains an irreducible normative element, as is claimed, then reduction of the normative to the descriptive would not entirely remove the normative element from the normative. No evidence is offered that the normative contains normative elements which are not reducible to the normative elements contained in the descriptive.

Yale University.

II

MAX BLACK

1. Suppose "X" is an abbreviation for the words, "that penicillin is a cure for cancer." Even if X should be the case, which it may be for all I know, there cannot be a moral obligation for me here and now to believe X.

2. I have never tried to find out whether X is or is not the case. It would be preposterous to hold that I have a duty to believe X (or its contradictory, if *that* should happen to be the case) prior to any inquiry into the matter. For this would imply that I have a duty here and now to believe one or other of every pair of mutually contradictory propositions—that is to say, the one which happens to be true.

3. It is hardly less absurd to say that I have a duty to find out whether X is the case. There is no general obligation to conduct investigations.

4. Suppose research has convinced some scientist that X is not the case, while all the time X really *is* the case. That scientist cannot be said to have an obligation, moral or otherwise, to believe X *on the evidence before him*. If the evidence is sufficiently strong, and no obvious mistake in reasoning has been made, that scientist would be unreasonable if he *did* believe X. When a man has sufficiently strong and good reasons for disbelief-

ing something, it would be unreasonable for him to believe it, even if in fact it is the case.

5. In any event, it is within no man's power to change his belief by an act of will. He can *try* to believe otherwise, by seeking situations that might influence his belief (propaganda, suggestion, hypnotism); but it is not his duty to try.

6. An acceptable interpretation of "P ought to believe X" is: "On the evidence before him, P would be unreasonable not to believe X." So, if I believe both Y and Z, and their conjunction entails X in a fairly obvious way, I "ought," in this sense of the word, to believe X. It would then be unreasonable for me not to, even if X is not the case.

7. There is, certainly, an absurdity in saying, "X is the case, but don't believe X." This is because in *asserting* X, I am offering the hearer a ground for believing X. A primary purpose in making informative assertions is to provide the hearer with a ground for believing what is said. (And this is understood by anybody who understands the rules governing the standard uses of assertion formulas.) Similarly, a primary purpose in pronouncing a promise formula is to give the hearer a reason for expecting performance. To say "I promise such-and-such, but don't trust what I say" is to ruin the act by eccentric behaviour—as when a man signs a check, but adds the words, "The above is a forgery." To say "X is the case, but don't believe X" is so to discredit the purported assertion that the entire utterance becomes unintelligible.

8. Do these considerations support the view that "the notion of factual truth is not normatively neutral"? They do not.

Cornell University.

III

IRVING M. COPI

1. Thesis 1 seems to me to involve a downright mistake. It is obvious that at a particular time there may be no evidence at all for a proposition X, and overwhelming evidence against X. This situation can obtain even though X is the case—as may subsequently be established by the discovery of new and conclusive evidence. If our beliefs ought to be determined by evidence, then at such a time we ought not to believe X, despite the fact that X is the case. Therefore, "X is the case, but X ought not to be believed" is neither self-contradictory nor self-stultifying, but is both sensible and true in circumstances of the sort just described.

2. Thesis 3 is rather puzzling. Of course, "X is the case" is *epistemologically incomplete* in some sense or other, but I do not think it is in any very significant sense. It is also chemically incomplete in not presenting a complete chemical analysis of the objects ingredient in that X. But it is not chemically incomplete in the significant sense in which an avowed chemist's report might be chemically incomplete. Similarly, "X is the case" is not epistemologically incomplete in the significant sense in which an epistemological theory might be epistemologically incomplete. (I assume that X is about neither epistemology nor chemistry.)

3. Thesis 5 seems also to involve an error of logic. I see no more justification for the inference "Since an objective fact is what it is, it cannot be affected by being known," than for the inference "Since an ash tray is what it is, it cannot be affected by being hammered."

4. There seems to be a general confusion of *fact*, *description of fact*, *truth*, *belief*, and *knowledge*. It must be granted that some of the theses are explicitly devoted to making distinctions among some of these items, as 4 and 5 distinguish between "truth" and "objective fact." But more needs to be said.

5. I think that I want to agree with the *spirit* of Thesis 9, though perhaps not with Mr. Kolenda's explicit formulation of it. I believe that objective facts determine not only truth conditions for human judgments, but also determine obligations for human agents. Any attempt to characterize facts in wholly non-normative terms must therefore abstract from their full richness and complexity. A *mere* description must therefore be incomplete; a *full* description must be more than merely descriptive, it must contain "an irreducibly normative element," in Mr. Kolenda's happy phrase.

University of Michigan.

IV

CAMPBELL CROCKETT

1. The sentences "X is the case" and "X ought not to be believed" are not opposed in the sense that the sentences "X is the case" and "X is not the case" are opposed.

2. Perhaps, however, the *meanings* of the sentences are self-contradictory (or "self-stultifying," whatever *that* may mean) in the psychological sense that one cannot imagine a circumstance under which a responsible person would accept, assert, or declare these meanings. Whether this is so depends upon the interpretation of these meanings that is given.

3. One might argue that the *statement* "X is the case" implies the *statement* "The asserter of the statement 'X is the case' believes normally that X is the case." The word "implies" is used in a number of different senses, and it could be used to refer to a *presupposition* of a statement. If you ask me why I believe that my car is in the garage, it is perfectly appropriate for me to say that I believe it is there because it *is* there. It is, then, absurd (self-contradictory?) to say that we do find out that something is so and do not believe that it is so.

"X is believed" is a sensible statement. "X is the case and X is not believed" (within the specified interpretation) is always

false, and whether it is called sensible or not is largely a matter of taste. "X is the case and X ought not to be believed" is not sensible since it is neither true nor false, and the reason that it is not is that "X ought not to be believed" has no established use in this context.

4. "For something to become true it must be recognized as such by some thinking being" (cf. Thesis 4). Propositions do not become true; they are true or false. Since verification is a temporal process, one might speak of a proposition becoming true. This would be odd linguistically and uninteresting philosophically. There is no evidence, however, that this recommendation is being made.

5. "To say that something is true is to proclaim that some objective fact deserves or has a right to be recognized. But this is another way of saying that minds ought to recognize it as such" (Thesis 6). Let us suppose that we understand, in a rough sort of way, what it means to say that we ought to recognize the facts, i.e., we ought to see that what is so, is so. This does not imply, nor is it synonymous with, the assertion that what is so "deserves" or "has a right" to be recognized.

6. It is worthwhile to show that norms cannot be reduced to descriptions. The most interesting ways of doing this, in my mind, are those which show that the norm-description distinction itself is muddled, being a label for a complex family of separate, overlapping, and criss-crossing distinctions. The uncritical acceptance of the distinction, without any attempt to explicate just what the distinction is or is not, is philosophically sterile.

University of Cincinnati.

V

ABRAHAM EDEL

1. "X is the case but X ought not to be believed" makes sense as a third person judgment where a man who knows that it is the case yet sees that the overwhelming evidence available to

everybody else is against X. The statement expresses, then, his general conviction that people should follow evidence in determining their beliefs. It makes no sense in a first person judgment because a person would never properly use the expression "X is the case" unless he had knowledge of it. Of course, even here, it might mean "I know (alas) that X is the case, but it would be much better if I could somehow manage to be deceived." (Here the Ought is derivative from Good, in some utilitarian or comparable theory.) It might, I suppose, arise in a very special case, that the knowledge of something might drive a man mad unless he could somehow repress it. If we put aside all reference to special conditions and circumstances, I am willing to go along with a *prima facie* rule that what is the case ought to be believed. But I would want to justify it at great length.

2. The two parts are irreconcilable only if the relation is analytic. Otherwise there is no more opposition than in "Her face has such-and-such proportions and ought to be admired."

3. Does "X is in principle unknowable" refer to logical impossibility of knowledge or to other possible senses of "possible"? Only in the logical sense is the notion of unknowable facts unintelligible.

4. What is meant by "becoming true"? Why not say that for something to *be* true it must be recognizable as such by some thinking being. Actual description involves encounter, but possible description involves the encounterable.

5. I accept Thesis 5, but not without some puzzles about how we know that the process of knowing does not affect the object of knowledge. To touch something affects it, to look at it may affect it. Can it be that the view that to know something does not affect it already presupposes a rather full account about the nature of the knowing process?

6. I accept Theses 6, 7 and 8, provided that these assertions involving the normative element are not taken to be expressing the *meaning* of the claim of objective fact or truth, but rather consequences that follow on the assumption of certain meanings for "ought," "desirable," "constraining," etc.

7. If the descriptive contains a normative element (Thesis 9), then we may just as readily say that the reduction of the normative to the descriptive has been accomplished as that it is impossible—but with the actual meaning of “descriptive” changed. It seems to me better, however, to distinguish between normative elements in the pursuit of truth as an enterprise, normative elements in the methods of pursuing the truth (norms of rationality) and normative elements in the notion of factual truth. I suspect that the last, as propounded in the theses, really refers to the first two.

City College of New York.

VI

ARTHUR PAP

1. Whether “X is the case” implies “X ought to be believed” (Thesis 1) depends, of course, on the sense of “implies” that is intended. The reason given suggests that strict implication (logical entailment) is meant, for if and only if p strictly implies q then “ p and not- q ” is self-contradictory. However, Kolenda confuses the contradictory “It is not the case that X ought to be believed” (i.e. you have no obligation to believe X) with the contrary “X ought not to be believed” (i.e. you have an obligation not to believe X). Because of this confusion his brief argument is invalid. For, let $q = X$ is the case, $p = X$ ought to be believed, and $r = X$ ought not to be believed. Then “ q entails not- r ” may seem plausible, and certainly p entails not- r . But the conclusion “ q entails p ” does not follow.

On the other hand, there is a pragmatic sense of “implies” in which the *assertion* of a proposition implies that the assertor desires that the asserted proposition be believed by whomever he is addressing—a desire that can be expressed by “You ought to believe it.” But if this pragmatic sense is intended, it would be less confusing to say simply that the assertion of a proposition is usually motivated by the desire to produce belief in the proposition.

2. Kolenda may be saying in Thesis 3 that “factual proposi-

tion which is in principle unverifiable" is a contradiction in terms. But it is impossible to evaluate this (empiricist!) claim prior to a lengthy, detailed examination of the possible meanings of the subject and predicate terms of the sentence.

3. If "*p* becomes true" just means "*p* comes to be accepted (believed)" (Thesis 4), then it is trivial to insist that *p* cannot become true unless it is "recognized as such by some thinking being." What else might "*p* becomes true" mean? A complete proposition is either true or false, and it is senseless to say that it is true now but was not true until now. (E.g., does it make sense to say "It was not true before 1956 that in 1956 an American president who had suffered a heart attack decided to run for a second term"? To see the senselessness of such a statement, just substitute "it was not the case" for "it was not true," which substitution is sanctioned by ordinary usage.) If the proposition is incomplete with respect to time, it can properly be said to *become* true, in the sense in which a possible state of affairs becomes actual at a given time. But even with respect to such temporally incomplete propositions it is incorrect to say that they do not become true until they are recognized as true. Many events happen before it is known by anybody that they happened; or, to speak with the caution of a skeptic, this is at least possible. And to say that an event happens at a given time is equivalent to saying that a temporally incomplete proposition becomes true at that time.

4. "An objective fact cannot be affected by being known" (Thesis 5) must be a tautology, for otherwise the tautology "An objective fact is what it is" could hardly be a reason for it. Therefore it is not surprising that the derived conclusions are themselves tautologies to the extent that they have intelligible meanings: I suppose that "I accommodate my mental equipment to that which is the case" is a picturesque way of saying that I believe a true proposition. And this is, in still different words, "to entertain a truth." Again, I don't know what "to communicate a truth" could mean except "to impart a true belief."

5. Thesis 6 makes a false claim about the English language: if I were to say "I am concerned about the fact that my wife does not like to cook," I would be saying that this fact worries me; I

would not express concern as to whether my belief that she does not like to cook is correct, for my using the very word "fact" indicates that I take this for granted.

6. Unless "objective fact" is contrasted with "psychological (mental) fact"—which is hardly Kolenda's intention in Thesis 6—we might as well speak of "fact" simply. To say "It is a fact that *p*" is cognitively synonymous with saying "It is true that *p*," and "objective fact" just serves as an emphasis, like "*really* true."

That a fact "constrains all possible knowers of it" means, if anything, that if it is a fact that *p*, then every possible knower is constrained to believe that *p*. Now, surely I can believe that *p* without believing that nobody can fail to believe the same proposition; indeed, I may know that quite a few people do not believe it and hence are not constrained to believe it. If, to be sure, "knower" is so used that one who fails to believe a fact is not really a knower, then it is an unexciting tautology to say that no possible knower can fail to know a fact. Finally, Kolenda may mean "constraining" normatively, i.e. that a fact *ought* to be believed by a rational being. This would be a repetition of Thesis 1.

7. I would agree, with regard to Theses 8 and 9, that frequently one asserts a proposition which one believes to be true in order to get other people to believe what one believes to be true; and if "man's rational well-being" consists in man's knowledge of the truth, then undoubtedly such behavior expresses a concern for man's rational well-being. True and trivial. Surely it does not follow that normative propositions (if there be such) are entailed by factual propositions in a sense in which this has been denied by those philosophers who brand the attempt to deduce norms from facts as the "naturalistic fallacy."

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RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

KONSTANTIN KOLENDA

1. Mr. Edel accepts Thesis 1. Mr. Copi agrees with the spirit of Thesis 9. Mr. Anderson disapproves of the sharp dichotomy between "judgments of fact" and "judgments of value." Mr. Crockett grants that the normative-descriptive dichotomy is a muddle. Mr. Pap admits that "the assertion of a proposition is usually motivated by the desire to produce belief in the proposition." Mr. Black (in No. 7) gives a very helpful elucidation of Thesis 1. However, Mr. Pap and Mr. Black regard the question of the use of assertion formulas as obvious, trivial, or philosophically insignificant. The point of the theses is precisely to raise the question whether this is so. What *are* "the rules governing the standard uses of assertion formulas" which, as Mr. Black says, everybody understands? I suggest that there are at least three such rules. To make an assertion in good faith means: A) To be able to support it by evidence. (This presupposes some acquaintance with and respect for rules of inference, verification, etc.) B) To regard the asserted fact as relevant, significant, and worth taking account of and reporting. C) To encourage a corresponding belief in the hearer (reader). It is important to recognize that the standard uses of assertion formulas are *standards*, or *norms*, and that their implied presence in assertions is the *ground* of the claim on the hearer's assent.

2. To use the objective form, "X is the case," is to indicate *prima facie* that the above rules have been observed in making the assertion and that the hearer is expected to take this for granted. Otherwise, special qualifications are normally added which indicate that the speaker knows of special circumstances which may prevent the hearer from believing X or make him for some reason incapable of following the evidence for X.

3. Mr. Pap and Mr. Anderson are right in saying that "X is the case" does not *strictly* imply "X ought to be believed." Hence the relation is not analytic. Nevertheless, a man who

makes an assertion not merely *denies* that it ought not to be believed. If it were indifferent to him whether the assertion be believed or not, there would be no point in making it (Rule C). I agree with Mr. Crockett that "X is the case but X ought not to be believed" has no established use. But I would add that it has no established use because it is not sensible, and not vice versa, as Mr. Crockett suggests.

4. Mr. Copi justly complains that the insufficient distinctions between *fact*, *description of fact*, *truth*, *belief*, *knowledge* invite numerous questions. Most of the criticisms turn on these distinctions, or lack of them. Of course it does not make sense to say, as Mr. Anderson and Mr. Pap illustrate, that a discovered fact was not a fact prior to being discovered. A proposition about it could be formulated and asserted only *because* it was "there," ready to be discovered. But I am not sure that the best way to make this point is to postulate the existence of timeless propositions. The advocates of timeless propositions presuppose that they *would* conform to the requirements of significance if they were to be completed or formulated. But whence come these requirements? I suggest that these requirements are norms of significant discourse and judgment (Rule A). And since, in formulating true propositions about facts, these requirements must be satisfied, the distinction ought to be made between facts and the propositions to which they may give rise under some conditions. To postulate the realm of timeless propositions does not help us at all in determining which of them are *worth knowing or formulating*. This additional claim is supplied by judgment, or assertion. The quest for knowledge is the quest for propositions which *ought* to be asserted for some purpose or other. For this reason I am inclined to believe that it is more appropriate to attribute truth to judgments than to facts or propositions. There is something peculiar in the notion that there was truth in the universe prior to the existence of any mind which could formulate and comprehend this truth. I grant the peculiarity of the statement that a fact does not exist *as* truth prior to being discovered. Mr. Anderson's question "What does it exist *as*?" is natural. But this way of speaking is confusing because

the subject of the sentence is "fact prior to being known." How can we assign a predicate to something prior to its being known?

5. While Theses 3 and 4 primarily affirm what I believe to be sound in the idealist theory of knowledge, Theses 5, 6 and 7 also acknowledge the claims of the realist position. Thesis 6 in particular affirms the old-fashioned virtue of intellectual integrity or of having respect for facts. The assertion of a proposition indicates to the hearer that there is a fact to be recognized and that it is not indifferent whether it is recognized or not, i.e., that it would be unreasonable to pay no attention to it (Rule B). The intent of the expressions "facts deserve to be recognized," or "constrain the knower," or "are objective" is to indicate that it is *up to us* to acknowledge facts, if we are interested in them.

Surely Mr. Pap will agree that "to be concerned" has other meanings besides "to be worried." For instance, one may be interested in finding out *whether* a certain person is a good cook. Then one would be concerned not about the absence of this talent, but about determining whether there is such a talent.

A judgment is something *in addition* to the presence of an objective fact, and makes no difference to it because, obviously, this fact did exist prior to this addition.

If we do not admit the independence of objective facts (i.e., adopt some version of the realist view) we undermine the whole enterprise of knowledge. But I am not sure whether this is sufficient to call Thesis 5 a tautology, as Mr. Pap believes it to be. (I grant that the formulation of the first sentence in it obviously invites Mr. Copi's criticism, but I hope that its intent is now made clear.)

Thesis 7 does not imply that everyone ought to believe *what-ever* is the case. It merely claims that the assertor does regard the fact as objective, i.e., true for him *and* for his hearers. Of course, there are facts which we regard as too insignificant to share with others, and then we don't bother to assert them.

6. Whether the standards presupposed in making assertions should be included among explicitly *moral* norms, I am not sure. Nor would I be prepared to assent without further qualification to Mr. Copi's view that objective facts "determine obligations for

human agents." I don't think that the recognition of the normative element in the descriptive sentences changes the meaning of "descriptive," as Mr. Edel suggests. I agree with him, on the other hand, that various forms of normativeness ought to be distinguished. The important thing, however, is to recognize that the pursuit of truth (including the factual) and its communication always presupposes and makes use of *norms*. Consequently, the norms of significant discourse ought to be respected by those who want to engage in it (Rule A). Responsible participation in such discourse carries a claim on the assent of the participants. I am sure that each one of the critics in analysing the present issue as he sees it invites his readers to believe what he finds to be the case. In this way he is concerned about the rational well-being of those who are also interested in the issue and thus constitute a community of interpretation.

The Rice Institute.

EXPLORATION

CONTEMPORARY VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY,

CONTINUED

GEORGE BURCH

5. *G. R. Malkani.*¹

IMPORTANT as the original developments of Vedanta philosophy are, the heart of its teaching is still the transmission of the orthodox tradition of Advaita Vedanta, the perennial philosophy of India. G. R. Malkani is a contemporary champion of the ancient wisdom. He does more, however, than merely repeat the teachings of the classical Vedantists. In the first place, Malkani, by restating Vedanta in English, has freed it from dependence on the Sanskrit language with which it has always been associated. This means not merely translating Sanskrit terms into English equivalents but rethinking the whole doctrine in the concepts of Western philosophy. "The method of exposition which I have adopted is that of European philosophy, but the ideas are essentially Indian,"² he says; "the substance is oriental but the form is very much occidental."³ In the second place, he carries out the implications of Advaita with a ruthless rationality which surpasses in rigor not only the doctrines of other contemporary Vedantists but even, so far as I know, those of any former ones. His relentless logic makes no compromise with common sense, current opinions, or even tradition, but pushes its arguments to their ultimate conclusions. Because of this his less rigorous colleagues sometimes protest that these extreme conclusions are not orthodox Vedanta at all but a unique philosophy of his own. In the third place, he presents the doctrine systematically, instead of in the

¹ This article concludes my study on contemporary Vedanta philosophy, the first two parts of which were published in this *Review*, IX (March, June 1956), 485-504, 662-80.

² *Philosophy of the Self*, p. v.

³ *Vedantic Epistemology*, p. v.

traditional Vedanta form of commentary on previous works. He claims, for example, that his *Vedantic Epistemology* is the first book in which Advaita epistemology is set forth directly, explicitly, exclusively, and systematically. His works consequently form an independent body of Advaita philosophy intelligible to those who have no acquaintance with the classical literature.

Ghanshamdas Rattanmal Malkani, a Sindhi Kshatriya, was born in 1892 at Hyderabad Sind, and educated at Karachi, where his principal philosophy teacher was T. L. Vaswami. When the Indian Institute of Philosophy was founded in 1916, he was one of the six original fellows chosen to attend it. He soon became its permanent director and, except for two years at Cambridge University, has been there ever since. Since 1926 he has also been editor of the *Philosophical Quarterly*, which under him has become India's leading philosophical journal.

The Indian Institute of Philosophy, located in the little mill town of Amalner, East Khandesh, is a unique institution. It was founded and endowed by Srimant Pratap Seth,⁴ proprietor of the Pratap cotton mills, who, converted to Advaita Vedanta by his guru Savalaram, established an institute to develop and propagate this philosophy in a way which neither the Westernized universities nor the tradition-bound schools of the pandits could do. It is a small institution, with a faculty of three and a few resident fellows, but it has had a great cumulative influence on contemporary Indian philosophy. Many of the leading philosophers of India have been associated with it for longer or shorter

⁴ Srimant Pratap Seth, whose foundations at Amalner also include a liberal arts college, a modern hospital, and a temple, while best known as an industrialist and philanthropist, is also himself a philosopher. He holds the most radical form of Advaita. Realization of the Advaita truth which we know intellectually, he says, is attained only by thinking about it. Neither good deeds nor love, consequently, can be of the slightest value for spiritual progress, which is accomplished only by knowledge. The problem of death, in which philosophy has its origin, is solved by realizing that only existence is real. There is no you; there is no God; and the traditional Vedanta definition of Brahman as "being-consciousness-bliss" is only confusion. There is only one truth, namely, that *I exist*. It is interesting to note, in view of the frequently heard claim that Vedanta is incompatible with altruism, that in this case, at least, the most extreme form of Vedanta is accompanied by the most lavish philanthropy.

periods, and have profited from the opportunity to speculate on philosophical problems in this secluded intellectual oasis.

The soul of the institute is Malkani, who has informed it with his forceful personality. His erect bearing reveals an inner integrity of character, but his brusque manner conceals an inner warmth of devotion. His habits are of Kantian regularity, he never leaves Amalner except for the annual Indian Philosophical Congress, he does the same things at the same times every day, and the people of Amalner could no doubt set their clocks by his evening walks. His mind is pure intellect. He is not interested in anything except philosophy, in any philosophy except Vedanta, or in the theories of any Vedantists except himself. He makes no pretension to scholarship, is not a Sanskritist, and reads relatively little. He says it is his practice to read an author, then forget what he has written, and then re-think the same problem for himself. Every day he thinks and writes about philosophical problems. He makes no attempt to advance himself, feels no mission to convert others, and never argues. He has a low estimate of his personal merits, but is absolutely certain of the absolute truth of his philosophy.

Professor Malkani has written several books* (all published by the Indian Institute of Philosophy, and all in print) and many articles (mostly published in the *Philosophical Quarterly*, almost every number of which has an article by him). The most important books for understanding his philosophy are *Philosophy of the Self* and *Vedantic Epistemology*. All are short, and written with a primer-like directness and simplicity which make the author's meaning crystal clear. The succession of writings does not, he says, indicate any change or development in his philosophical thought, but only a persistent resolution to formulate it with greater precision and clarity. He claims certainty and truth for all his works, though he pretends to have forgotten them once

* *Problem of Nothing* (1918), *Metaphysics of Energy* (1920), *Study of Reality* (1927), *Ajnana* (with Das and Murti, 1933), *Reality and Value* (1934), *Philosophy of the Self* (1934, his longest book, 218 pages, the most complete systematic account of his metaphysics, but superseded by a work now being written), *Life-Sketch of Srimant Pratapseth* (1952), *Vedantic Epistemology* (1953), besides several pamphlets.

they are published, his endeavor not being to seek the truth, which he has already found, but to express it.

Malkani's certainty is justified, he maintains, by his absolute rationalism. Free, so far as that is humanly possible, from prejudice, superstition, or tendencies toward mysticism, he endeavors to follow reason wherever it may lead. He has a Cartesian confidence in his own rationality. He does not acknowledge the influence of other philosophers on his conclusions, and in his teachings it is hard to find direct influence of any sources, Indian or Western, with two conspicuous exceptions. First is the obvious influence of the whole classical tradition of Advaita Vedanta, of which Malkani's philosophy is merely a new formulation.* Second is the influence of K. C. Bhattacharya,⁷ whose ideas are very prominent in his later writings, although he utterly repudiates Bhattacharya's conclusions and theory of alternation. Malkani's rationalism is pure in that it attempts to avoid perversion by non-rational elements, but it is not abstract in the sense of being separated from life. For him a significant rationalism must have a *motive*, a *content*, and an *application*. (1) The motive for philosophy is found in our doubts and questions about the world. To the person who is satisfied with the reality of the world, Malkani has nothing to say. If there are doubts, however, they can be resolved by logical analysis. For this reason he prefers questions to systematic exposition. He has no message to expound, but he is prepared to answer any question and refute any objection. (2) Mere rationalism as analysis of ideas he considers barren, since perception of truth, not rational explanation, is the important thing. His rationalism is concerned with our actual experience, and his philosophy is essentially a rational analysis of experience. Philosophy begins with phenomena, but it goes beyond phenomena. Metaphysics is the study of the ultimate ground of the reality of all things, and metaphysical truth is attain-

* He states in a 1927 preface that the only debt he has to acknowledge is to Srimant Pratap Seth, who initiated him to this way of thinking.

⁷ He has a great respect for K. C. Bhattacharya, whose oral teaching he found very clear, with a logical subtlety against which neither he nor any others could stand up. I do not believe Malkani would say this of any other person.

able. (3) A purely theoretical philosophy, however true, is of little value. Rational thought should be expressed in rational living, and Vedanta as philosophy should also be Vedanta as religion. The only value of knowledge is as a means to bliss.

Metaphysical truth is attainable but it is ineffable. No theory is adequate to the truth. Philosophy, therefore, is not a theory.* Philosophy consists of answers to questions. This point of view leads to an intellectual relativity. The same question may be answered differently for different inquirers. For example, the question whether God creates the world is answered affirmatively to a person in doubt between theism and materialism, but negatively to a person in doubt between theism and Advaita. A question need not be answered at all unless it is a real question, and it is not a real question unless it is a question for somebody.* For example, the question, very prominent in Indian religious thought, whether the individual who has attained freedom has an obligation to assist those who are still in bondage, is not a valid problem. Those of us still in bondage do not yet have this problem. The person who has attained freedom, since the freedom he has attained is freedom from individuality, does not recognize the separate existence of discrete individuals, and so does not raise this problem. The problem, consequently, is never a problem for anybody, and does not need to be answered. Problems are always relative, not absolute or abstract. They arise only in experience, and must be solved in terms of experience. But every real problem, theoretical or practical, has a solution for the person who has the problem and in the circumstances under which he has it. No genuine metaphysical problem is insoluble. The most common technique of solution is by demonstrating that the presuppositions of the problem are false, so that the problem vanishes without needing an explicit answer.

* This statement itself is not a theory but a point of view. Malkani objected, for obvious reasons, when I proposed to give it a name (*avada-vada*, "non-ism-ism").

* In our conferences Malkani invariably refused to speak until I asked a question, thereby indicating that I personally had a problem. He was willing to answer any question, at great length if necessary, but he had no theory which he wanted to teach on his own initiative.

Vedanta philosophy thus understood is part of the larger whole of Vedanta religion. This involves five steps. (1) The psychological prerequisites are the traditional "four qualifications" for spiritual progress. These are: first, self-control—including control of the mind, control of the senses and the body, ability to endure suffering, and contentment with little;¹⁰ second, discrimination between reality and appearance; third, renunciation of the fruits of action in this life and the future life (but not renunciation of true bliss, which is release from life); fourth (the most important, from which the others will follow), desire for release. These qualifications are necessary even before faith. All men, however, have them at least to some extent. (2) Listen-

¹⁰ This moral prerequisite of self-control constitutes the whole of Malkani's ethics. He rejects the obligation of duty (*dharma*), taught by orthodox Advaita as the first prerequisite to philosophy, as unnecessary; duty is derived, through education, only from scripture, and is valid only insofar as its performance leads to my own welfare here or hereafter—scriptural injunctions, perhaps valid as rules for attaining heaven, being fallaciously interpreted (as by the Mimamsa school) as pure obligations. He rejects non-injury (*ahimsa*) as a non-Vedic and non-Hindu doctrine unhappily introduced into Indian thought by Buddhism. He rejects pacifism (as taught by Buddhists, Jains, Quakers, and Gandhi) as non-Hindu, maintaining that only ascetics have a right to be pacifist, others not only betraying their country but retarding their own spiritual progress by it. He rejects altruism, interest in another's this-worldly or other-worldly welfare or spiritual progress, as having no basis in human nature (though altruistic acts may advance my own spiritual progress by helping me to free myself from self-consciousness). He rejects knowledge of truth as not being an end in itself, since knowledge has value only as a means to bliss (to which, however, it is indeed the only means). He rejects love as having no metaphysical value (except the self-love of bliss), since love, requiring an object to be loved, is significant only in the world of illusion (though in helping us get rid of illusory selfishness it has instrumental value as a means to knowledge). He rejects moral goodness (considered as an absolute value), since we have no knowledge, either rational or intuitive, of goodness, good acts being good only because they produce happiness, and being known to be good only by revelation or by social tradition originally derived from revelation. He rejects all non-hedonistic value, since value is created by desire, and only my own welfare, which means ultimately my own joy, is desired and so valuable. He maintains, however, that this ruthless criticism of conventional ethics does not imply selfishness, since we attain release only by getting rid of our attachment to ourself. (Malkani's aesthetic doctrine is equally ruthless: beauty exists only insofar as, and only because, it is appreciated by somebody.)

ing (*sravana*) to revealed truth and believing it by faith. This involves uncritical submission to a guru¹¹ (for he is not your guru if you doubt or criticize him). In the absence of a guru, the scripture, other books, or ordinary teachers may, as quasi-gurus, provide the material for faith—but eventually a real guru is necessary (even if only for a moment at the end of the discipline) if release is to be attained. (3) Thinking the truth out intellectually (*manana*), resolving all doubts, and demonstrating the revealed truth by rational understanding. This is philosophy. (4) Meditation (*nitidhyasana*), the persistent effort to see Brahman in everything, so confirming in experience the truth already heard and thought out.¹² (5) Release (*moksha*) from illusion by direct vision of Brahman—first *jivanmukti*, release while still appearing in the body, but behaving with the spontaneous altruism of the self freed from selfishness; finally *videhamukti*, no longer even appearing. Absolute truth is first desired, then learned, then proved, then experienced, finally enjoyed.

Philosophy is the third of these steps, the rational one. The Vedanta philosopher as a Vedantist accepts the revelation of the Veda and as a philosopher follows reason. Vedanta philosophy consequently has a problem of the relation between reason and revelation similar to that in Christian philosophy. Malkani's solution of the problem is Augustinian: to know the truth, faith is necessary psychologically but not logically. We cannot discover the truth without revelation, but having discovered it we can

¹¹ The guru (who must be more advanced than the disciple, although the disciple may eventually surpass him) need not be sought systematically, but will appear when the disciple is ready, the guru seeking, rather than being sought by, the disciple, and being recognized by the power of his influence.

¹² "Truth has not only to be found in experience, but it has also to be fully realized and lived. This is only possible by persistently checking the long-standing habits of wrong thinking, and keeping the mind fixed on the truth. It requires one-pointedness and devotion to a truth which we have begun to see intellectually. It removes the last impediment to a vision that will dispel ignorance for good. This is the only legitimate mysticism. Our rational faculties do not go to sleep. They are quite awake and alert. A mysticism based upon religious enthusiasm and the exercise of imagination or will is possible. But it has no theoretical value and is bound to be declaimed by reason." ("Rational Intuition," *Philosophical Quarterly* (July 1955), p. 118.)

understand and demonstrate it rationally without any premise derived from revelation. Without revelation we would never know the existence of a super-empirical reality because we would never think of it. Unaided experience and reason give objective knowledge only, never metaphysical knowledge. Revelation is necessary prior to metaphysical thought in order to provide the material for that thought and propose its problems.¹³ Revelation does not necessarily mean the Veda or a guru.¹⁴ Revelation is simply that metaphysical truth, inaccessible to the natural faculties of the child or the savage, which is known to any civilized adult through ordinary education in the tradition of any culture. It is handed down from teacher to pupil, and is always revealed (*sruti*, literally "heard"), having no human origin either in an intellectual genius (who could not transcend reason) or an inspired prophet (a concept unknown to Vedanta).¹⁵ Once acquired, however, the metaphysical truth *can* be understood rationally without any premise to be accepted on faith alone—although only by clear thinking and rigid dialectic. It can, consequently, be demonstrated cogently to any person willing to follow the requirements of pure reason. Pure reason does not mean abstract reason in the manner of Parmenides, Anselm, or Spinoza; it means reason apart from authority but not apart from experience. The business of philosophy is not to analyze concepts but to analyze our experience. Thinking (*manana*), as understood in Vedanta, is the rational analysis of experience.

A deductive system requires a premise not itself demonstrated. If the conclusion is to be proven true, the premise must be self-evidently true. If the conclusion is to be a metaphysical fact,

¹³ Not (as some authorities, notably Sankara's disciple Suresvara, have maintained) necessary *after* metaphysical thought in order to make us *see*, by a violent shift of attention, the truth we have already fully understood.

¹⁴ Although acquaintance with a person whose freedom from ignorance has progressed beyond our own, and by whose power we feel ourselves being progressively freed from ignorance, offers a very effective suggestion of the possibility of complete freedom.

¹⁵ Revelation must not be confused with religion; theistic religion, which is based on illusion, not knowledge, is not a step toward enlightenment but rather an impediment to it.

not merely a logical relation of ideas, the premise must be given in experience. This first premise of philosophy, according to Malkani, is the clear and self-evident distinction between the self and the not-self. This intuition, he says, is "the beginning and end of my dogmatism": to deny it is absurd, and to anyone who denies it he has nothing to say, but for anyone who accepts it he is prepared to deduce the rest of his system logically. Our experience, in which alone we can seek reality, is twofold, that of the subjective self and that of the objective not-self, which are radically unlike. In practice we confound them, but on reflection we discriminate them, and can never be uncertain as to what is I and what is not-I, except by inertia of thought which prevents reflecting. The object is known and contemplated. The subject is never an object, is not contemplated but enjoyed, and is not known except enjoyingly, that is, as knowing.

Malkani's dialectic proceeds from the self-evident distinction between self and not-self to the conclusion that Brahman is non-dual (*advaita*). This does not mean that we go from empirical things to their transcendental ground, for there is no way of doing this.¹⁶ We can seek reality only in experience. But experience already includes the super-sensible reality of the self. Everyone is aware of his own self, and is never in doubt that he himself exists as a functioning self which knows and feels. All that needs to be proved is that this is the *only* reality. The dialectic proceeds by a threefold argument—an ontological argument, an epistemological argument, and a cosmological argument.

The ontological argument, based only on the distinction of subjective self and objective not-self in experience, asks where reality is to be found. Reality cannot be found nowhere at all—for that would be absurd, implying that nothing exists. Reality cannot be found in some third field beside self and not-self—for that would be outside experience. Reality cannot be found in both self and not-self equally—for then the self would be limited

¹⁶ "We know the given or the immediate. We do not know what underlies it or what lies behind it. We might speculate. But how are we to verify the truth of our speculation? We simply do not know any kind of transcendental reality or a thing-in-itself." (*Philosophy of the Self*, p. 19.)

by the not-self and so become an object. Reality cannot be found in a unity of self and not-self (such as knowledge or will)—for the unity would be apprehended and consequently objective and consequently not-self, since the subject which includes all objects cannot itself be included in any possible whole. Reality cannot be found in the not-self alone—for this as objective must always be object for a subject, the object being constituted an object by the subject which knows it and so being necessarily related to the subject, apart from which it is nothing. Ergo, reality can be found in the self alone. There is no similar necessity for the subject to be subject for an object, for the subject, which is not known, has being in itself, not through knowledge, and so is free, not necessarily related. The self, consequently, is the only reality—"one without a second" (*advaita*), tolerating only an illusory, not a real, other.

The epistemological argument is based on the usual arguments for subjective idealism derived from the conditions of experience. Whether we approach the problem through the physiological conditions of sensation, the form of the conscious field, or the categories of thought, we conclude that the objects of knowledge are at least partly determined by the knowing self and so are a priori or subjective. Some objects are conceded by all to be completely illusory—including both percepts (objective illusion, especially dreams) and mental events (subjective illusion, especially false memory). But there is no ground for distinguishing true from illusory perception, either in the object, which in the case of illusory perception does not exist, or in the structure of the perception, else we would be able to distinguish them and so never suffer illusion.¹⁷ But even supposedly real objects are determined at least partly by the subject's contribution to their knowledge. Knowledge of objects is thus an internal relation, but this is opposed to the very concept of knowledge, which is awareness of something really existing prior to and independent of the knowl-

¹⁷ Both dreaming and dreamless sleep have metaphysical significance. The former proves that appearance of the object does not signify its reality; the latter, that non-appearance of the object does not signify non-being of the subject.

edge." Neither can ideas exist objectively, for ideas must be ideated, and ideating is not knowing, so the theory of objective idealism is false." The objects of perception, of introspection, and of thought are equally subjective and consequently illusory. The illusory must not be thought of as an appearance of the real. Reality does not appear, and appearances do not reveal reality. There is no real relation between appearance and reality. Reality is the ground of appearances, but this is not a relation between them. Appearances may be related to appearances, and reality to reality, but the only relation of appearance to reality is that of false identity (to be taken for reality when it is not). We cannot, therefore, argue from our false, subjective, illusory knowledge of appearances to any true, objective, certain knowledge of reality. Our actual experience, however, is not completely false, subjective, and illusory. Experience, however false, contains a true element, and when we eliminate the false part (everything which can be doubted), the indubitable residue is true. This residue, the ground of appearance, is never the object, which is always dubitable, but the subject, which is indubitable." When we dissociate from our intuition of the self all those elements which belong to the not-self, nothing remains to be intuited, and the self will be seen as pure intuition, with no distinction between being and knowledge. It is nowise determined by our knowledge of it and so nowise subjective but purely objective. The object is always subjective, but the subject is always objective.

The cosmological argument, based on an analysis of the phenomenal world itself, infers its unreality from its transiency

" "We therefore rule out a rational intuition in the sense that thought can think something and the same can become fact, quite as objective as anything real could be. Such a possibility, if it could be realized, would result in a dream-like world of mere appearances, not in a reality which could be said to be intuited in our sense of the term. Reality must pre-exist the intuition of it and not be a product of the same." ("Rational Intuition," *Philosophical Quarterly* (July 1955), p. 111.)

" "An idea is, *as* and *when* we think it. It is only in thinking the idea that we give a body or substance to it. It is otherwise with reality." (*Ibid.*, p. 116.)

" The subject is the knower, not to be confused with the content of consciousness, which is an empirical object.

and its finitude.²¹ That which ceases to exist cannot be said to *be*. That which is finite cannot be ultimate, since it is intelligible only in reference to the infinite of which it is a limitation and which alone truly exists. Illusory being arises out of reality, as a clay vessel arises out of the clay, stays in it, and disappears into it. The vessel, except for its name and form, is nothing but clay. Ontologically the world is nothing but Brahman. But the self, which is never known to cease to exist, and which is the infinite knower of all objects, is Brahman itself. It has no name or form: all we can say about its nature is that it is *not this, not this*. It is pure Being.²²

These arguments concur in the conclusion that the world is illusory and the self alone is real. When we negate all objectivity of the Being underlying all things, that Being is indistinguishable from the self which is never an object. The object represents a failure in knowledge. *Knowledge* must reveal the *real*, but any dualistic theory of knowledge based on the supposed reality of the object breaks down, because our supposed knowledge of objects is subjective, lacks self-evidence, and is subject to correction. Only the non-dualistic knowledge of the self, not mediated by sense or thought, and incapable of being reflected on or criticized, is certain. This conclusion can be elaborated by psychological studies which distinguish and describe the aspects of the soul (the witness, the individual, the ego, the intellect, the mind, the inner sense, the outer senses), the states of the soul (waking, dreaming, deep sleep, ecstasy), and the functions of the soul (knowing, feeling, willing). But such studies have no metaphysical significance, for the aspects

²¹ Reversing the argument to infer transiency from unreality, Mal-kani says that *time* is a necessary a priori form of the illusory world, else it could not come to an end and consequently would be as real as anything. So is *space*, else it could not be given and consequently would not be an object; and so is *causality*, else it could not be orderly and so taken to be real and consequently would not deceive us. All other properties of the world are contingent and so known only empirically, due to error and so inexplicable.

²² "All finitude, which is the very nature of appearance, has to be negated. What is left is reality as such or reality in itself, and that has no limitation of any sort. It is properly described as *pure being*." ("Rational Intuition," *Philosophical Quarterly* (July 1955), p. 118).

of the soul are illusory objects (except the "witness," which is the knowing self), the states of the soul are states of illusion, and the functions of the soul do not lead to "alternative absolutes" but knowing leads to the one absolute of blissful freedom through knowledge. The conclusion can also be elaborated by epistemological studies, as in *Philosophy of the Self* and *Vedantic Epistemology*. But such studies are posterior to metaphysics, for Vedantic epistemology, like any epistemology, is essentially a rational support for metaphysical conclusions already accepted on other grounds, and, while useful in offering easy steps to a difficult goal, it distinguishes grades of knowledge rather than grades of reality, which does not have grades. The conclusion does, however, present two important metaphysical problems, one concerning the illusory object, the other concerning the real subject.

If the world is illusory, the problem arises of distinguishing between the phenomenal world of ordinary experience which we all share and the world of dreams or hallucinations peculiar to each individual. Historically this problem has divided Advaita Vedantists into two schools. All agree that the self is real and that objects seen in dreams are unreal, but how about the objects seen in waking experience? According to realism (*srishti-drishti-vada*, literally "being-seeing-ism," to be perceived follows as a consequence from being), we see the illusion because it exists. According to subjectivism (*drishti-srishti-vada*, "seeing-being-ism," to be follows as a consequence from being perceived), the illusion exists because we see it. Realists distinguish two kinds of illusion. A mirage is produced by external causes, is seen by all observers in the same position, and although non-existent somehow is still there even if nobody sees it. A hallucination, on the contrary, is produced by internal causes, is seen by only one individual, and has no sort of existence apart from him. According to the realists the world is an illusion created by God (or rather, as Hindus put it, created, sustained, and destroyed by God under his three aspects Brahman, Vishnu, Siva). God creates the world as a magician creates an illusion on the stage, and we individuals (likewise created by God) then see this illusory world as the spectators see the magician's illusion, realistically—although by clear thinking we may avoid being deceived by it. The world is

not real, but neither is it unreal. It has an intermediate status—phenomenal reality or cosmic illusion. Both schools claim Sankara himself, but realism is the common doctrine of post-Sankarite orthodox Advaita. Malkani scorns this realism as "Advaita for the dull." While it may be true that God creates the world, this is true only cosmologically, not metaphysically, since God also is part of the illusion. The world as illusion is created, sustained, and destroyed by the self which has this illusion—created by illusion, sustained by ignorance, destroyed by knowledge. The illusory being of things depends on their being perceived, not on their being created by God. There is no real difference between dream objects and waking objects, since neither exist. There is no ontological hierarchy among nonentities. The only significant distinction between dreaming and waking, states metaphysically indistinguishable, is *pragmatic*. My this-worldly goals are successfully attained by ignoring dream objects and acting as if waking objects were real. So far as the problem of reality in the phenomenal world is concerned, Malkani is a pragmatist.

If the self is real, the problem arises whether it is one or many. This problem divides subjectivist Advaitins into two sub-schools. All agree that the real self is one and that the illusory individuals (including bodies and minds) are many, but how about the self as subject of ignorance, the self which produces the illusory objects by perceiving them? According to monopsychism (*ekajivavada*, "one-individual-ism") there is only one subject, plurality being characteristic of objects. According to polypsychism (*anekajivavada*, "none-one-individual-ism"), while there is only one real self (*Atman*, which is Brahman), the self as subject of ignorance (*jiva*) is manifold, the plurality of individual persons. The problem whether one individual can become free while others are still in bondage, together with the moral problem of the freed individual's obligation to those still in bondage, arises only in the context of *anekajivavada*. Malkani, however, insists that the two theories differ only theoretically, not practically, since the problem of the freed individual's relation to those still in bondage is never a practical problem for anybody. The theoretical difference depends on the question of the *ground of ignorance*. For *anekajivavada* this is the individual selves; but for *ekajivavada*, as

held by Malkani, it is *Atman*. Individuality is a product of ignorance, and consequently the individual selves cannot be the ground of ignorance. There is therefore only one *jiva*.²³ This theory is not quite like any Western monism. It is not like Eleaticism, for that is based on an analysis of being, while *ekajivavada* is based on an analysis of experience. It is not like neo-Platonism, for that recognizes degrees of reality subordinate to and emanating from the one absolute reality, while *ekajivavada* has no degrees and no emanation. It is not like solipsism, for that accepts the reality of one individual, while *ekajivavada* rejects all individuals, including myself, as equally unreal. When I wake from a dream I realize that the persons I met in the dream no longer exist, in fact never did exist, but I also realize that the person I remember myself to have been in the dream, with the body and behavior it had there, never did exist, but was just as illusory as the others. Likewise, when I attain freedom from ignorance (*moksha*) I shall realize, and even now I can understand intellectually, that the individual I called myself, with its body, mind, and ego, is just as unreal as other individuals. I can identify the *true* self with *my* self no more than with any other self. The only real individual, like that which finds itself awake after the dream, is that which finds itself really existing after the end of ignorance. It is this individual (*jiva*) which, by its ignorance, produces the illusion of many individuals, including itself as one among them. Malkani recognizes that this theory is paradoxical. In reply to my question, "If the *jiva* is one, what is many?" he stated that the very nature of *jiva* as *Atman* under the condition of ignorance requires it to be finite and so many, but that on the other hand *jiva*, being *Atman*, is essentially one. *Jiva* partakes both of self and of not-self: as self it is really one, but as not-self it appears to be many. The *self* (*Atman* or *Brahman*), limited by illusion, becomes, through false identification with the illusory body, the

²³ Some contemporary Vedantists ridicule *ekajivavada* as a fantastic perversion of Advaita taught historically only by the obscure writer Prakashananda and currently only by Malkani. Several of the philosophers whom I met, however, upheld *ekajivavada*, some of them accepting the formula that there are many *jivas* empirically, one philosophically, none really.

individual *jiva*, which then, by perception through the body, produces the illusory things of the world, including other bodies interpreted as other individuals supposed to perceive things realistically. Thus the world, including the plurality of illusory individuals, is an illusion produced subjectively by the one *jiva* (*Atman* limited by the body) and destroyed, together with all individuals, by knowledge. The true subject is the transcendental subject; this is the meaning of the Vedic formula *Thou art That*. *Ekajivavada*, Malkani maintains, is "the most satisfactory philosophical theory." Because of its paradoxes, however, it cannot be expressed systematically, but only as a series of solutions of problems taken in the context in which they arise.

The heart of a philosophy which takes the world seriously is its theory of knowledge, but the heart of Advaita is its theory of ignorance. An error itself has no explanation. It exists in its unreal way only because somebody thinks it. To recognize it as error, to say, "I was mistaken," is an explanation which leaves nothing more to be said about it. There is no logical reason for error. If it could be defended logically, it would not be error. But there is a psychological reason for error. Error occurs in thought, not in immediate awareness. Error is due to our attributing an epithet to *this* which *this* does not sustain. When seeing a rope I say, "This is a snake," there is no error about the *this*, which is real, but I erroneously judge *is a snake*. Error has no cause, but it has a twofold ground—the objective ground, the real *this* on which the illusion is superimposed by false identification, and the subjective ground, the psychological process which performs the superimposition. The objective ground, according to Advaita, is Brahman, the only reality. The subjective ground which superimposes illusion on reality, according to subjectivism, is the self, and this, according to *ekajivavada*, is not the individual (a product of ignorance and so not its ground) but also Brahman. Brahman, however, is not itself ignorant, for in that case it would be grounded in ignorance instead of ignorance being grounded in it. Brahman is not the ignorant subject (*jiva*), for absolute Brahman can only be thought of as omniscient, but it is the subjective ground of ignorance in the sense of being the intelligent principle without which there could be no ignorance.

Although Malkani maintains that his theory of the self (*ekajivavada*) is orthodox Advaita, he concedes that his theory of ignorance is different from that of orthodox Advaita. This, therefore, is the most original part of Malkani's philosophy, and should be distinguished from the corresponding doctrine of traditional Advaita. According to orthodox Advaita, ignorance (*ajnana*) has two aspects, mere ignorance, the negative power of concealing truth, and illusion, the positive power of creating error. Error occurs, and so has a cause, but ignorance has no beginning (though it may, indeed must, have an end), and so has no cause. Ignorance has no explanation, but exists beside Brahman, not as a second reality, but somehow as a second principle. Brahman conditioned by ignorance (which is God according to realism, *jiva* according to subjectivism) creates the world (including all individuals) by illusion. Ignorance therefore is prior to error, a necessary though not sufficient condition of error, the material cause, as it were, of error. According to Malkani, on the contrary, error is prior to ignorance. Ignorance, which merely conceals truth without offering any alternative, cannot produce any positive error. Error or illusion, however, being false, necessarily produces ignorance of truth. Ignorance, therefore, can be explained. But error or illusion cannot be explained logically. We arrive at illusory experience by superimposing, on the real ground, errors derived from previous errors. Psychologically errors are caused by desires, but desires in turn are caused by errors, in infinite regress. Error has no beginning and so no first cause. Error (*maya*), not ignorance (*ajnana*), is the inexplicable first cause of all illusion.²⁴

²⁴ In *Philosophy of the Self* (1939, p. 12), Malkani says: "If there is any ultimate cause for the illusory appearances, it can be no other than our ignorance of reality. . . . The illusory is essentially irrational. It should not be. The fact that we do take note of it, cannot be traced to reality, which should be the case with all legitimate explanation; it can only be traced to our ignorance of reality, which is the ultimate principle of irrationality." Malkani's present position seems to involve a repudiation of this statement. Cf. a recent statement (*Philosophical Quarterly* [January 1956], p. 246): "What is natural to us is error, and error is never pure,—it is always mixed with truth. To get at the truth, all we have to do is to negate the error."

Freedom (*moksha*) from the bondage of illusion and ignorance is attained by knowledge of truth. It is not attained by any action, for whatever we do with desire is bondage leading to further illusion. It is not attained by negating the will, for the will is always free.²⁵ It is not attained by love, for love involves distinction and so is just as illusory as hatred. It is not attained by mystical ecstasy (*samadhi*), which is a fruit of spiritual discipline and the goal of Yoga, for this is transient and has an objective content. It is not attained by a change of state (like awakening, which serves only as an imperfect analogy), for the self does not pass from one state to another; only the states (waking, dreaming, sleep, ecstasy) pass. It is attained only after meditation (*dhyana*) on the truth already contemplated intellectually, when a shift of attention, evoked by the Guru within us, makes us attend to what we always know directly. Just as the highest good is never really lost, so it is never really attained; it is lost only through ignorance and regained only through knowledge. Freedom is simply realization, through knowledge, of the non-dual character of the self.²⁶

The absolute reality (Brahman), knowledge of which is freedom, can be described in terms of its extrinsic properties, its intrinsic properties, and its essential nature. The extrinsic properties of Brahman are the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world. These are properties of the self—not of God, as the realists maintain. The intelligent self is the cause of all things which appear—a *free* cause, the existence of which does not necessitate the existence of its effects. The effects are differentiated from it and from each other not in substance or in real being but

²⁵ Moral freedom, however, is attained by counteracting desire by moral law (known from revelation, directly or indirectly through tradition, never by intuition or reason).

²⁶ The individual who has attained freedom (the *jivanmukta*), to speak from the point of view of illusion, cannot be infallibly recognized by any behavioristic criterion, so we can never be sure that any given individual has attained freedom, but we can be sure that most individuals have not, since their behavior is incompatible with freedom, and in the case of certain personages, both historical and contemporary (not necessarily well known), there may be a strong presumption of freedom. Professor Malkani has not attained freedom; he says that his incorrigible devotion to *thinking* is the principal obstacle to his own spiritual progress.

only in name and form. But it causes them only as illusions. Brahman is "one without a second" (*advaita*), and neither becomes nor really creates the world. These properties, therefore, only express Brahman's relation to the world, and have no metaphysical significance. The intrinsic properties of Brahman, which do have metaphysical significance, are either negative or positive. Negative properties are lack of qualities and lack of relations. Positive properties are being, consciousness, bliss, purity, intellect, freedom, reality, contemplation, infinity, perfection, and so forth. These properties, especially being-consciousness-bliss, are positive contents which distinguish the Vedanta ideal of freedom from the indefinite nirvana of Buddhism. The properties are distinguished, however, only in relation to our doubts. Really, in Brahman, they are all the same, for Brahman is without internal differences (*ekarasa*, "of one flavor"). The properties serve to refute false theories, but do not adequately describe Brahman. The essential nature of Brahman is ineffable. It cannot be conceived as being anything (negation of everything that can be known or thought) or as not being anything (negation of negation). It cannot be conceived at all, or known as an object, and has no character in itself. But it nowise follows that Brahman is remote, mysterious, or unknown—much less that it is non-existent. Brahman is directly intuited, for it is the self—not the felt body or introspected conscious content—but the self—which knows. The secondary statements of the Upanishads connote the intrinsic properties of Brahman, but the four principal statements ("Thou art That"; "I am Brahman"; "Brahman is intelligence"; "I am *Atman* and this *Atman* is the stuff of intelligence") denote the essential nature of Brahman. Brahman is truly known not through its description as being-consciousness-bliss but through its identity with the self. Reality is all that I know myself to be when I dissociate myself from illusory objects, with their characteristic transiency, materiality, and suffering. Brahman has the nature of the self because it is the self—the transcendental consciousness beyond all states.²⁷

²⁷ "It is the ultimate ground of changelessness. It has no history and no temporal dimension. It eats up time itself [which in Hindu thought 'eats up' all things]. It alone is truly eternal and immortal." (*Philosophy of the Self*, p. 190.)

When it is intuited, it offers no further problems. The non-duality of the self, formerly understood but now intuited, implies the truths that Brahman is the only reality, the self is Brahman, and the world is illusory. What we really know is that we really are.

The distinction between reality and illusion, the basic principle of Advaita Vedanta, is valid only from the point of view of ignorance. The higher truth, from the point of view of knowledge, asserts the reality of Brahman but denies the illusoriness of the world, maintaining that there is no world at all, and even the illusion is illusory. The world, the empirical consciousness which perceives it, and the individual which has this consciousness are equally unreal. *Really* there is no creation and so no world even illusory, no bondage by illusion and so no release from illusion. Since there is no world to explain, there is no theoretical problem to solve, and since there is no freedom to attain, there is no practical problem to solve. There is only the self (*Atman* or Brahman). This higher view, called *ajativada* (no-creationism), is not a theory. According to Professor Malkani, *ekajivavada* is "the most satisfactory philosophical theory"; *ajativada* is "the last kick of philosophy" before it lapses into the silence which alone can express the truth.

6. R. Das.

The certitude of Professor Malkani's speculative rationalism has its extreme opposite in the agnosticism of Professor R. Das's critical rationalism. Professor Das has complete confidence in reason, both in its speculative and in its critical functions, as the only way of knowledge. He rejects all religion as mere superstition, and considers philosophy, which is knowledge of truth and guidance of life by reason, as the highest human activity. But he is sceptical about the success of this activity.

Rasvihary Das, a Bengali Hindu, was born in 1894, and educated at Calcutta, where he studied under B. N. Seal and K. C. Bhattacharya. After receiving the M.A. degree in 1920, he went to the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner for 26 years. Since

1946 he has been Lecturer in Philosophy at Calcutta, except for two years at Saugor and one semester at Harvard.

Professor Das's secluded life has left him innocent in the world of affairs but wise in the world of books. An omnivorous reader in many languages, he is learned in the philosophical and other literature of India and the West. His familiarity with all sorts of ideas has bred a certain contempt for them, which prevents his embracing any philosophical system. He is never dogmatic, but always critical.

His English works, written in a fine literary style, include four books (all now out of print and scarce)—*Essentials of Advaitism*²² (1933), *The Self and the Ideal* (1935), *The Philosophy of Whitehead* (1937), and *A Handbook to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (a condensed free translation for use as a textbook, 1949)—and many articles.²³

Professor Das's philosophy has passed through two stages, a youthful speculative stage and a mature critical stage. The youthful speculative stage has its fullest expression in the book *The Self and the Ideal*. This work, although developed in Western concepts, is clearly within the Vedanta tradition, but it is an original theory which eludes classification in any of the traditional Vedanta schools.²⁴

"Philosophy aims at the knowledge of reality that can be attained by rational thinking," this book begins, but "the data for such thinking are supplied by the facts of experience," which implies that "the reality which philosophy seeks to know must be intimately related with the facts of experience." Experience, however, includes not only physical but also moral experience, and a rational philosophy must include the facts of morality in its

²² A free translation of the Vedanta classic *Naishkarmya-siddhi* by Sankara's disciple Suresvara. Authentic because by Suresvara and clear because by Das, this book is in my opinion the best introduction to Advaita Vedanta.

²³ He considers his most important contribution to Indian philosophy an article (*Modern Review*, April, 1934) which called attention to the previously little known K. C. Bhattacharya and led to his appointment as professor at Calcutta.

²⁴ He answered "Perhaps" to my suggestion that his theory could be called "qualified non-dualism" (*Visishtadvaita*).

scheme of reality. Metaphysics thus depends in part upon ethics for its data, but ethics depends upon metaphysics for the justification of its ultimate principles. The chief purpose of the book is to bring out the metaphysical implications of moral consciousness.

Moral judgments, like all judgments, are eternally true or false. The reality to which they refer is relative, since nothing is good except through its relation to other things, but not subjective. Judgments of value presuppose an objectively real standard of value, the *ideal*, in relation to which things can appear as good. Moral experience shows, however, that the ideal has yet to be realized. We are not what we ought to be. The ideal does not possess the sort of reality found in the natural world, nor could it be the ideal if it did. Attempts to define the ideal as the Good, as God, or as the Absolute are inadequate. The ideal is eternally existent, else moral judgments could not be true. It has absolute knowledge (inseparable from the being of things known), else it could not be infallible. It possesses ultimate satisfactoriness, bliss. It can be conceived, therefore, as absolute existence, knowledge, and bliss.

This definition of the ideal, however, does not explain why it is our duty to pursue it. To understand our duty we must inquire into our own nature. As pure subject of knowledge the *self* is identical with the ideal. But as active the self is a distinct individual related to others, an identity in difference requiring to be changed, the object of the moral judgment, "I ought to be good." The self as active is an appearance, that is, something which is real but lacks stability, and so part of the changing empirical world. The history of the world is a tendency toward the realization of the ideal. The tendency of the self as known in moral consciousness is also to realize the ideal. The attraction of the ideal is the root of both physical and moral law. But the self really is the ideal, so that moral compulsion is the compulsion of our own nature, that is, freedom. Our only duty is to be ourselves, and the expression of this self-realization is through love for our fellow beings, who are all appearances of the one self. Moral consciousness is the evidence for our unity with all mankind, and this unity is the justification of our moral obligation.

The mature critical stage of Professor Das's philosophy, as

found in his present teaching and in the article, "Pursuit of Truth through Doubt and Belief," in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, is a critical realism. Reason is the only philosophical method. By reason we can know the physical world more or less clearly. But the deeper we penetrate into reality, the more obscure we find it. This is not because there is no deeper reality, as positivists assert. Metaphysical reality certainly exists; the study of this reality is the most important thing both for theoretical interest and practical guidance; metaphysical truth is attainable, and the world is making progress toward attaining it; but it has not yet been attained. Whatever philosophy we hold we should hold lightly, realizing our uncertainty about it. The great rationalist systems, both Indian and Western, are dubitable just because they cannot stand up against rational criticism. Advaita Vedanta is not rational: its Brahman is unintelligible; its method is not really dialectical; and its thesis that the world is illusory is at best shown to be possible, never shown to be true. The teaching of K. C. Bhattacharya is a resolute attempt to penetrate more deeply into reality, but it is difficult to follow. Das's own system of philosophy, described above, he does not repudiate, and still accepts as a working hypothesis for life, but he "holds it lightly." Not knowing the Absolute, we must be sceptics. Scepticism is candor, honesty, and humility. Philosophy is not a theory but the clarification of ideas.

The concept of *illusory*, so glibly used by Vedantists, is in Das's opinion particularly refractory to logical analysis. *Illusory* is a predicate which never has a subject. Nothing is illusory except when you are talking about something else. It is meaningless to call the world, or anything, illusory. Das accepts the world as given, refusing to discriminate between its simply perceived aspect as sense data and its understood aspect as object, as he finds no such distinction in his experience of things. Our problem is to understand the world, not to deny it. *Morally* the world can be denied or called illusory in the sense of having no value for us, but this is a moral, not a metaphysical, judgment. What the world lacks is not reality but value.

The concept most important to clarify is that of the *self*. Our concept of the self is based on the body, but it goes beyond

the body, and even penetrates the eternal as it develops. The self is not a beginningless or unchanging substance. It begins in this life, is constantly changing, and will end with this life. Das does not expect or desire immortality or rebirth; he finds this life happy and satisfactory. It is satisfactory just because the self can grow in it. Basically body, and never ceasing to be body, it yet grows to include incorporeal and even eternal aspects. The eternal ideal is not actual, but it is real in the sense that it acts on the self and determines its growth. We may not know the essence of the self, but we do know its existence, and we do know the ideal which directs it.

Since we do know the ideal, the scepticism which is prudent in metaphysics is out of place in ethics. Das's moral teaching, just because it is based on what we can know, tends to take the form of moral clichés: knowledge is an end, but not the only end; the most important thing is spirituality, involving withdrawal from the body and its demands; we should live simply, not trying to be great; inner peace is good, yet we must be concerned for those we love; we should lead a life of service, yet being finite can be concerned only for those near us; we enrich our sympathies by conversation with our friends. The problem of evil is not so clear, yet we can see—though with great hesitation, and not allowing this to dull our sympathies—that perhaps even suffering itself is good in turning us to the spiritual. In aesthetics also, Das is not sceptical: he is a realist, considering beauty objective and capable of being apprehended with certainty, although its metaphysical significance is uncertain. The moral concept of *charity*, including sympathy and service, and the aesthetic concept of *beauty*, including delight and harmony, combine to form the concept of *love*. Love is an ultimate ideal, coordinate with the ultimate ideals truth and freedom, these three corresponding with the rational functions of feeling, knowing, and willing respectively. In our concern for these ideals we rise above the mere consciousness which we share with animals to attain the spirituality which is the highest concern of the universe and which forms the only immortality of mortal man.

Professor Das calls himself a realist in epistemology ("theoretical realist and practical idealist"), but he does not pro-

pose any realistic system of philosophy. To Vedanta he presents a challenge based not on any lack of sympathy with its ideals or any positivistic denial of metaphysical reality but simply on a demand that, if it wishes to justify itself, it must be actually what it always claims to be, rational.

7. *D. M. Datta.*

I will conclude by considering two philosophers, D. M. Datta and R. D. Ranade, who are outstanding for their contributions not only to the intellectual but also to the spiritual life of India. In India, which has no dominant religion or organized Church, a spiritual teacher teaches on his own authority, and he may also be a philosopher.

Dhirendra Mohan Datta, a Bengali Hindu, was born in 1898, and educated at Dacca and Calcutta. After graduating from college, he had a P. R. Scholarship, with a simultaneous teaching position, and continued his studies both with pandits and with professors, including K. C. Bhattacharya. In 1921 he abandoned his academic career to follow Gandhi, and after training at Gandhi's ashram devoted himself to social and educational work, teaching spinning, and establishing girls' schools. When poor health forced him to abandon this, he returned to academic life, and for 25 years was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Patna. He attended the East-West Philosophy Conference at Honolulu in 1949, and in 1951-1952 was visiting professor at Wisconsin and Minnesota. In 1953, having reached the retiring age of 55, he retired to Santiniketan.

Although Professor Datta's teachings and writings are substantial, and his scholarship and philosophical acumen are considerable, his greatest influence has been through his personality. Cautious and slow in thought, speech, and action, with self-conscious but genuine humility, he shows moral power rather than dialectical subtlety. His gentleness, enthusiasm, and Gandhi-like personality make him universally loved by those who know him, and his friends and colleagues profit both from his example and from his wise counsel.

His books represent a variety of interests. *The Six Ways of*

Knowing (P. R. Scholarship thesis enlarged for Ph. D. thesis, 1932) is a technical work on Vedanta epistemology. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (in collaboration with S. C. Chatterjee, 1939) is the standard textbook used by Indian undergraduates. *Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy* (1950), while devoted mostly to Western philosophy, also included the first systematic account to be published of K. C. Bhattacharya's doctrine. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (American lectures, 1953) is, in the vast Gandhi literature, the only competent account of the Mahatma's philosophy as such. Of his many articles in various journals,²¹ the most important for his own philosophy is "Philosophy of the Body."²² He was also a principal editor of the cooperative *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* (1952), the first attempt since Deussen's to produce a general history of philosophy.

Datta is particularly interested in semantics, considering semantic analysis a necessary prerequisite to philosophical agreement, and the discovery of categories the most important philosophical activity. He points out that Vinoba Bhave, for example, can appeal successfully to the Hindu people because he can take for granted certain categories inherent in Hindu culture. He compares the terms found in Vinoba's speeches (sacrifice, equality, love, charity, self-control) with those found in Eisenhower's (democracy, freedom, free enterprise, standard of living). He is making a special study of the meanings of *sat* (being), and suggests that Sankara's philosophy is simply deduced from his definition of *sat*.²³

Datta's own philosophy, a sort of panpsychism, he calls *dehatmavada* ("body-soul-ism"). This term, he points out, is used by materialists to mean that soul is only body, but by him to mean that body is only soul. We come in contact with the

²¹ Datta, like Das, also claims to have first made K. C. Bhattacharya well known, by his paper at the India Philosophical Congress in 1934.

²² Radhakrishnan: *Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of his Sixtieth Birthday*, 1953, pp. 315-31.

²³ When Gandhi said, "God is Truth, or rather Truth is God," he may have meant "reality," for *sat* (reality) and *satya* (truth) are pronounced the same in Gujarati.

universe through the body. Far from being its prison-house, the body is the liberator of the soul. He finds the historical prototype of his system in the *Satadvaita* (non-dualism of being) of Sankara's contemporary, Mandana Misra.²⁴

In ordinary life we are always revising our views. Philosophy seeks a point of view which cannot be falsified. By absolute reality we mean that which has no possibility of falsification. One attribute of such absolute reality is existence; we can hardly deny that being is. An equally obvious attribute is consciousness, for its denial is itself consciousness. Existence is essentially consciousness. All beings—not only animals but also plants²⁵ and inorganic things—are conscious, although the consciousness may be in a subtle form, not organized as in a mind. A third attribute of reality is harmony. Harmony is recognized by immediate intuition in our apprehension of beauty, goodness, and logical validity, although an understanding of its nature may require subsequent analysis. *Beauty*, especially as seen in art, which has greater freedom and less agreement than other forms of expression, is essentially harmony. But beauty, which is jointly subjective and objective, is not for its own sake but is associated with morality;²⁶ the entire personality works in the appreciation of beauty, and what harmonizes with the entire personality is a source of aesthetic joy. *Goodness* is harmony—those ways of living which stabilize thought in harmony with truth. *Truth* is harmony (non-contradiction) plus presentation. Existence, con-

²⁴ Datta accepts the following doctrines attributed to Mandana Misra: explanation of error as seeing something other than where it is; distinction of two kinds of ignorance—not perceiving, removed by hearing, and otherwise perceiving, removed by meditation; account of ignorance as having the individual soul for its seat and Brahman for its object; acceptance of revelation as generating only indirect knowledge of Brahman; acceptance of a combination of works and knowledge as means of progress; possibility and desirability of liberation by works and knowledge without renunciation. But he rejects the following: absolutism of the Word (*Sabdadvaita*); possibility of ultimate release while in this life (*jivanmukti*).

²⁵ Consciousness in plants is supposed to have been demonstrated experimentally by the Hindu botanist J. C. Bose.

²⁶ For example, the nude nymphs of the Ajanta frescoes, where the exaltation of the faces precludes any immoral suggestion and expresses the artist's spirituality.

sciousness, and harmony constitute reality as we know it; it may have other unknown attributes." The material appearances of things (including our own bodies) are carved out of the infinite consciousness by negation, and are defined as not being other things. Material things, consequently, are not unreal, but are abstract essences less real than the consciousness from which they are abstracted, and so may be called illusory.

The path of spiritual progress, according to the usual Vedanta teaching, is the way of introversion: starting from the body we turn inward to identify ourselves progressively with consciousness, mind, ego, and ultimately that inmost reality which is the absolute Self. According to Professor Datta, it is just the opposite. The path of spiritual progress is the way of extraversion. Starting from the body we turn outward to expand our consciousness by a widening of interest as we identify ourselves with progressively greater spheres of our environment. There are four ways in which consciousness may expand. It may expand in extent, as in astronomy. It may expand in quality, seeing all things as existence, consciousness, and harmony. It may expand in power, and so in freedom, as the control we have directly over our own bodies is extended to other things. It may expand in feeling, by an enlargement of sympathy, leading to universal love. It is inadequate, in fact it is bad, to expand the consciousness in one way only. Those who expand their consciousness in extent only become mere scientists. Those who expand it in quality only become mere philosophers. Those who expand it in power only become tyrants, like modern dictators or the asuras of Hindu legend. Those who expand it in love only are the persons of good intentions whose fate is proverbial. True expansion of consciousness is that which combines all four modes—knowledge, insight, power, and love. Expansion is accomplished by seeing *all* things in their *real* aspect as existence, consciousness, and harmony, and consequently *loving* and *controlling* them as we identify ourselves with them. Such expansion involves no rejection of existence, but a rejection of the predicates formerly attributed to it, a

²⁷ Bliss, the traditional third attribute of Brahman in Vedanta philosophy, is not an obvious attribute of reality.

re-evaluation of things valued no longer in themselves but as God " (absolute reality, or being-consciousness-harmony). Expanding selves intersect and so merge with one another. The ultimate goal is infinite expansion to embrace the whole universe.

Professor Datta would never claim that his own consciousness has expanded very greatly. But passing over the question of the extent of such expansion, which is a matter of degree in any case, and considering its manner, we see in his own wide interests, philosophical insight, extensive sympathies, and considerable influence an example of the simultaneous expansion of personality in all four modes.

8. *R. D. Ranade.*

The guru is a basic institution of Hinduism. Whether thought of as a transmitter of revealed wisdom or as a Socratic midwife assisting the disciple to realize truth already possessed, the guru is considered the essential agent of spiritual progress. The disciple does not look beyond his guru, who as the agent of his salvation is for him the manifestation of God and object of devotion.³⁹ Historically gurus have varied from founders of world religions to those with a single disciple. At the present time R. D. Ranade is one of the great gurus, and perhaps the one with the greatest standing as a philosopher.

Ramchandra Dattatraya Ranade, a Marathi Brahmin, was born in 1886, and initiated into religion by guru Bahusahib in 1901.⁴⁰ He was educated at Poona, where he specialized in mathe-

³⁹ Like Chaitanya embracing a black tree because he recognized it as Krishna.

³⁹ A distinction is sometimes made, however, between the guru and the satguru (real guru). In this case the guru, a person of advanced but not necessarily exalted spiritual status, is the disciple's immediate teacher, while the satguru, a personage of exalted spiritual status, often the guru's guru, in whose name the guru acts, is the object of the disciple's veneration. One of Ranade's disciples told me that Ranade is a satguru, another told me that he is only a guru and not a satguru, while Ranade himself told me that there is no real difference between a guru and a satguru.

⁴⁰ Ranade is the only one of the philosophers discussed in these articles to have a guru.

matics, but where his most influential teacher was the novelist F. W. Bain. While fellow of Deccan College he began having spiritual experiences and also became interested in philosophy, especially Greek philosophy, and was professor of philosophy at Fergusson College in Poona from 1914 to 1924. Meanwhile his fellow disciple Amburao had succeeded guru Bahusahib and established an ashram in the jungle near Nimbai, a village north of Bijapur. When Amburao died, Ranade was persuaded to undertake the responsibilities of the guruship, and he then both assumed the spiritual guidance of his former fellow disciples and began initiating disciples himself. He gave up the academic life to live at the ashram, at the same time undertaking research in Vedanta philosophy, but three years later went to Allahabad to serve as professor of philosophy, and sometimes dean, from 1927 to 1946. Here he developed his interest in mysticism, especially mysticism in Indian vernacular literature, much of which he recovered from oral tradition and published. He retired from teaching at 60, served one year as vice-chancellor of the University of Allahabad, and since 1947 has lived at Nimbai, dividing his time between scholarly research, mystical contemplation, and the direction of the ashram.

Professor Ranade's personality is the opposite of what one expects to find in a venerable guru. Unlike some gurus, who tend to be pompous or unctuous, he is completely free from such traits. In a community of disciples for whom he is their divine teacher (*gurudeva*), he still keeps his humility and perspective. He does not seek to be conspicuous, but is frank and friendly with those who come to him, eager to discuss both his own intellectual interests and theirs. Physically very small, slight, and frail (perhaps because he eats little or nothing), he is nevertheless vigorous, sprightly, one might almost say bouncy. He is active as a scholar, a philosopher, a mystic, and a guru.

As a *scholar* Ranade has produced a variety of works. In the field of Western thought he has published a comparative study of Greek and Sanskrit, a series of papers on pre-Socratics, and an edition of Carlyle's essays. In Indian philosophy he has published several works, of which the most important is *A Constructive*

Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy. Material for his study of Marathi mysticism is gathered in the four-volume *Source Book of Maharashtra Saints*. His most important work is a series of books on the mystical literature of the three vernacular languages with which he is familiar: *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, dealing with Marathi mystics, appeared in 1933; *Pathway to God*, dealing with Hindi mystics, appeared in 1954; the third volume, dealing with Kanarese mystics, is still in progress.

As a *philosopher* Professor Ranade teaches a doctrine which he calls *beatificism*. Speculative philosophy, he says, is uncertain and of little value. All we know of metaphysics is that all things emanate from God and tend to, but do not always actually, return to God. The search for beatitude, which is "as far beyond Socrates's happiness as that is beyond the pig's pleasure," is self-realization—the unfolding and realization not of our faculties but of the *Atman* within us. We should not ask premature questions, such as whether the Self is one or many, but should try to know the Self. This is not accomplished by yoga exercises, or by the Advaita way of knowledge, which is opposed to true mysticism and dangerous.⁴¹ The world is not illusory, or even morally bad, since it may lead us to God. We are of the same *substance* as God, but finite, and nowise identical with God. The means to self-realization include morality, meditation, the company of good people, and a guru. Meditation is threefold—intellectual (on various concepts of God), moral (on the virtues), and "practical" (that is, mystical). The all-important thing is love of God. Love of neighbor is secondary, and sexual love is helpful (marriage being best for most people). Not action or knowledge but the love of God is what leads us to beatitude.

As a *mystic* Professor Ranade understands mysticism in a theistic and conservative way (like Evelyn Underhill, for example), and finds his models in the commonly recognized great mystics of India and the West. The faculty of mystical intuition, he says,

⁴¹ While I was at the ashram, one of the disciples recited a humorous poem he had just composed on *Ten Great Saints*, in which the praise of each saint was qualified by pointing out the flaw in his sanctity. In the case of one of these (Suka), the flaw was that he was an Advaitin in philosophy.

is not opposed to the ordinary faculties of intelligence, feeling, and will, but underlies them. The mystic path involves first morality based on our own efforts, secondly God's loving us by grace, but because we are good, finally our loving God. The principal criterion of the reality of mystical experience is the individual's increased moral and social sensitivity. Since retiring from teaching, Ranade has devoted himself primarily to meditation, several hours a day. Unlike many Hindu mystics, however, he makes no claims to advanced experiences; he told me that he had never yet enjoyed the "unitive experience" described by the great saints.

As a *guru*⁴² he maintains, in opposition to a view commonly held, that the disciple must seek and choose his guru, that the guru does not seek the disciple. He expects his disciples, following his own life-long practice, to spend three hours a day in meditation. Morning, noon and night the disciples in residence gather to chant hymns to the guru, and when Ranade has completed his own devotions a bell calls them to assemble for a reading, lecture, or discussion. The guru's principal work, however, is the individual instruction of each disciple according to his own ability, and whatever spiritual progress each one makes he attributes to the guru's grace. In a country where philosophy has always been associated with guruship, but where, as many persons told me, there are a hundred false gurus for every true one, Professor Ranade is carrying on the institution of the true guru in the grand tradition of India.

Conclusion.

Of the eight contemporary Vedanta philosophers discussed in these articles, K. C. Bhattacharya, K. Bhattacharya, Murti, Chaudhury, and Malkani represent the school of Advaita (monism), Ranade and Das (in his speculative stage) represent Visishtadvaita

⁴² I was told that he has about 2000 disciples in different parts of India, but have no idea how accurate this figure is. Disciples in residence at the ashram when I visited it varied in social status from a raja to an outcaste, and included professors, doctors, lawyers, government officials, and business men.

(pantheism), and Datta represents Satadvaita (panpsychism). All have developed the doctrines of these schools in original and significant ways. Vedanta is only one among many Indian philosophies, and within Vedanta the various schools have little in common except a firm belief in the ultimate reality of Brahman as revealed in the Veda. But its unwavering search for Brahman has made Vedanta the dominant philosophy of India, and its unlimited scope for new problems and new insights has kept it a living philosophy.

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NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

WHY NOT NOTHING?

THOMAS S. KNIGHT

1. *Being and Nothing.*

"Why is there something; why not nothing?"¹ is a question that cannot arise at all unless Nothing is regarded as somehow prior to Being. If Being and Nothing are considered as absolutes in opposition, then the question is meaningless—when both are necessary, the why of either cannot arise. If, on the other hand, Being is given priority over Nothing, then the absence of Being is inconceivable. Only when Nothing is given priority over Being can one ask this question.

The Greeks could never have asked, "Why is there something; why not nothing?" Parmenides and Plato both held Absolute Non-Being to be inconceivable, and Aristotle's emphasis on the priority of the actual also excluded this question. The *ex nihilo nihil fit* of classical metaphysics may be taken as an implicit rejection of the why of Being. To say that nothing can come from nothing is to deny any priority for, or any ontological status to, Nothing.

The Thomistic doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* also excludes the question. Although Thomistic theology seems to consider Being and Nothing in absolute opposition, it cannot be thought to consider Nothing prior to Being. Being with a capital "B" is the first term in Thomistic thought.

Gilson² argues correctly that the Leibnizian question was unintelligible to the Greeks, but his contention that Christian

¹ This question was first posed by Leibniz in his *Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on Reason* in a slightly different form: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" The present formulation is that of Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I (Chicago, 1951), p. 186.

² Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1936), pp. 76 ff.

philosophy faced this problem is unfounded. Gilson holds that St. Thomas found a new meaning in Aristotle's argument from movement to an unmoved mover—the idea of creation. No matter how God is considered, as final or first efficient cause, the beings involved—"first mover, intermediary movers, the movement, and the beings generated by the movement"—are always given in Aristotle's world. Gilson believes that St. Thomas proved by Aristotle's argument that a first unmoved mover *exists* who is the cause of the beings generated by the movement. Gilson quotes the following from St. Thomas: "Since, then, many things come to existence in consequence of the order of movements, it follows that God is the cause of the existence of all these things."² Creation, for Gilson, answers the Leibnizian question, "why does something exist rather than nothing?" The idea of creation, for Gilson, is a ramification of Aristotle's argument which Aristotle could never have entertained.

"Why does something exist?" does not refer to one thing in preference to another; it refers to anything, Nature or God. The Thomistic theory of creation refers only to things. The question is meaningful only if absolute non-being is considered possible as an all-exclusive cosmological or ontological state, and although Thomists posit Nothing as a vague opposite to God, the consideration of Nothing as a possible all-exclusive state would rob their God of his necessity. Only when *everything* is contingent is the Leibnizian question meaningful; but as soon as the question is meaningful, it is unanswerable. The only possible answer to the *why* of contingent beings is a necessary being, but to accept this answer is merely to prefer the only possible answer to no answer at all.

St. Thomas and Gilson consider God as the answer to the *why* of contingent beings. Thus considered, God represents a perpetual conquest over nothingness, yet the *why* of a being that persists, so to speak, in the face of nothingness is illegitimate. This problem arises when God is taken as the answer to the Leibnizian question. Being and Nothing are vaguely opposed, with

² Gilson, p. 76.

Being in the position of absolute priority yet seemingly threatened by Nothing. My point here is that we are already beyond ontology when such a problem arises.

The great lesson of Plato,⁴ that an ontology beyond Parmenides, must deal with relative being and non-being, is important here. On the ontological level Being may be taken either as absolute, and hence without relation to non-being, or as relative to non-being. The first alternative results in the unsatisfactory monism of Parmenides; the possibilities of the second alternative are yet to be discovered.

For Plato being and non-being are Forms that make for combination and separation of all the Forms; for Hegel and Heidegger "Pure Being" and "Pure Nothing" are identical, but for different reasons—for Hegel because they are alike indefinite and immediate, for Heidegger because Being itself is only revealed as "Nothing" sweeps over man in "dread." Three radically different ontologies result from the relation of these two terms, and in each case being is regarded as relative to non-being—that is, being is less than absolute; being is not God.

The identification of God and Being prohibits a rationally tenable relation to non-being. As Heidegger phrases it, "... if God creates 'out of nothing' he above all must be able to relate himself to Nothing. But if God is God he cannot know Nothing, assuming that the 'absolute' excludes from itself all nullity..."⁵ As the Thomist is ever-willing to admit, this is not an ontological problem. Therefore, it seems that if creation is the answer to the Leibnizian question, that question is theological rather than ontological.

The negative formulation of the Leibnizian question "Why not nothing?" commits the questioner to the admission of a kind of "nothingness" that is itself questionable. Unless the questioner is prepared to admit not the disappearance of, not the disintegration of, but the total annihilation of everything as a possible

⁴ See F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1950), pp. 63 ff., and Constantin Ritter, *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* (New York, 1933), pp. 161 ff.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (Chicago, 1949), p. 376.

negative state, then the question "Why is there not nothing?" is devoid of meaning. Such a negative "state" is possible only if one can imagine the relation of being to nothing in some such sense as "suspended in," "extended on," or "superimposed on." Then the imaginary annihilation of being can take place, and the question "Why not nothing?" can be asked.

The image involving being spread out on or enclosed in nothing was not one most Greeks could entertain. Parmenides' One Being was limited, but not by void; limit was an attribute that contributed to the completeness of Being. Aristotle, on the other hand, never attempted an imaginary description of the cosmos, and Plato's image at *Phaedo* 109A, in which he pictures the earth as a spherical body in perfect equipoise at the center of the heavens, makes no reference to a possible nothingness beyond or bounding reality. Only the void of atomistic cosmology approaches the kind of nothingness that is a requisite for the asking of the Leibnizian question. But Democritus could not ask the question because the void was not considered logically or temporally prior to the atoms. Atoms (Being) and void (Nothing) were both necessary; neither was a condition for the other;⁶ and since both were eternal, neither could be temporally prior.

The requirements for the question seem to render it unanswerable. If Nothing is conceived as more ultimate than Being, then one can wonder *why* there is anything at all; but one can only wonder—the answer will not be forthcoming. So far as Being is concerned, explanation on the level of the why-interrogative demands an external principle, or cause, other than Nothing. This would immediately involve Being and Nothing again on the same level of ultimacy, and the answer would be again subject to the question itself. Tillich sees this clearly when he says of the question that "every possible answer would be subject to the same question in an infinite regression."⁷

⁶ Although the void was considered the necessary medium in which body could move or change, it was not considered an a priori condition for the existence of body, nor was it considered prior to the atoms in any way.

⁷ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, p. 186.

2. *The Why-Interrogative in Ontology.*

The Leibnizian question implies a range of subject matter. The word that designates that subject matter in the question is "something." If then "something" is accepted as a subject for inquiry, the question immediately arises: "What is meant by 'something'?" A possible answer might be: "Whatever 'is.'" The next question obviously becomes: "What is meant by 'is'?" Each question produces an answer that requires definition. But the *why* of that subject matter (presupposed in all inquiry) falls outside of the subject matter itself. Therefore, the positive formulation of the Leibnizian question "Why is there something?" is not an ontological question. In fact *why* cannot be an ontological interrogative.

Just as *why* in science seems always to demand an extra-scientific answer, so *why* in ontology demands an extra-ontological answer. *That* bodies fall with a force directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them does not satisfy the question *why* they fall. The *why* of gravity may then be asked, and the infinite regress can be stopped only by resorting to some ultimate principle of explanation beyond the domain of verifiable hypotheses. Grant something that *is*, whether it be the Cartesian *Cogito*, Being qua Being, atoms and void, or energy; unless that something is taken as self-sufficient or necessary, the *why* of that something will demand an external answer. If "what is" is regarded as self-sufficient or necessary, the *why* of "what is" does not arise. A question whose answer demands a transcendence of reason is not an ontological question. Such is the fate of the *why-interrogative* in ontology.

Plato's rejection of absolute non-being as a useful term for ontological investigation and his realization that affirmation and negation were intimately related in all statements led him to regard the question "How can non-being be?" as a statement of the ontological problem. For Plato no quality could be predicated of absolute non-being. Completely lacking in content and not implying its opposite, it was discarded as a useless term for explanation. Terms that do not imply their opposites are not

ontological. Questions that do not imply their opposites are also not ontological.

The positive and negative formulations of the Leibnizian question imply each other, but they are not opposites. "Why is there something?" certainly implies "Why not nothing?"; but the opposite of "Why is there something?" would be "Why is there nothing?" These cannot imply each other. Furthermore, the answer to one question does not constitute an answer to one opposed, and an answer to "Why is there something?" no matter what that answer is, also answers the implied question: "Why not nothing?" It does not answer the opposed question: "Why is there nothing?"

Just as ontological terms must have and imply opposites, so must ontological questions. "Why is there something?" has an opposite, but it does not imply it; it excludes its opposite; *something* is presupposed and *nothing* is excluded. "Why is there nothing?" is opposed to its own possibility, it is a question annihilating itself. It seems that the why-interrogative always presupposes being and excludes non-being; it inconsistently excludes exclusion. Without exclusion everything can be said to be, even absolute non-being (nothing). Therefore, an ontological question must contain an interrogative that does not exclude its opposite. *What* is the only such interrogative.

Where and *when* are spatial and temporal interrogatives too specific for ontology. They assume the being of the subject and are scientific, not ontological, interrogatives. The how-interrogative is similar because the subject is always assumed before the *how* is asked. *What* is the only interrogative that does not assume a subject; it places the very being of the subject in question. And only if the being of the subject is questioned can the opposed question concerning the not-being of the subject be meaningful. *Why*, *where*, *when*, and *how* all exclude the questioning of the not-being of the subject.

But only the general application of the what-interrogative is ontological. In its particular application it asks for definitions and descriptions of things assumed, i.e., what is an apple? or what is freedom? These are not ontological questions. Only when the very being of a thing is questioned is the question onto-

logical. When I ask "Do apples have being?" or "Does freedom exist?" I am asking ontological questions subordinate to the most general one: "What has being?" or, more simply, "What is?" When "What is?" is taken as *the* ontological question, its opposite is not excluded—the not-being of the subject is brought into question. "What is?" involves "What is not?" The subordinate ontological questions may then be reformulated with more precision, i.e., "Do apples have being or not?" and "Does freedom exist or not?" The same intimacy between affirmation and negation that Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel realized on the level of terms and statements is apparent in ontology on the level of questions.

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ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUALITY AND POSSIBILITY

PAUL WEISS

ACCORDING to some thinkers, to be actual is to exist. According to others, it is to occupy space, or time, or both space and time. To be actual, it has also been held, is to be effective, or active, or insistent, or resistant, or determinate, or complete. A similar range of characterizations has been enjoyed by possibility. It has been defined as the internally coherent, as what might occur, as the latent, or as the not yet known to be false, or as that which is not yet known to be excluded from actuality. It has also sometimes been identified with the indeterminate, with the universal, or with the incomplete. Which of these are the most appropriate designations it is well worth while to determine, but my concern now is not with that important issue. It is solely with the problem of the nature of the difference between the actual and the possible. What kind of difference is this? Is it only possible? Is it only actual? Is it both? Or is it something other than these?

That which distinguishes the actual from the possible is part of the possible or actual, is neither or both. The Platonist thinks it is the first. For him the possible is an ideal possessed of an excellence no actuality does and perhaps can ever have. The possible, it would seem, precisely because it contains all the actual does and more, must contain the element which differentiates the possible from the actual. Yet the actual, possessed though it is in his eyes of an imperfect and perhaps only apparent reality is, even for him, something produced, an outcome achieved, brought about by doing something with or to the possible. The actual has for him, as it has for almost everyone else, such features as temporality, activity, diversity, extensionality. These are not features of the possible.

In the end the Platonist is willing to admit that there are

two realms, one possible, the other actual. The idealist is bolder. He wants to acknowledge only the possible. He often speaks of course as if he were concerned not at all with the possible but only with the actual. And although he expressly affirms at times that the possible testifies only to an ignorance of just what is actual, he still insists that there are in fact nothing but universals which somehow get packed together in bundles to constitute what seem to be the actual objects of this world. Space, time, substance, individuals, action, movement are for him, in the final resort, nothing but possibility confused or compounded. But sooner or later, like the rest of us, he is faced with the fact that there are brutalities in the world, obstacles, "finite centres," extended active bodies, and that he himself, a living, pulsating, believing, searching being remains (as Kierkegaard remarked) an actuality forever outside his frozen system of possibilities.

One might, with Leibniz and Peirce, be willing to yield to these criticisms a little, and while granting that there are actualities now, insist that there once were only possibilities, out of which the actual was precipitated or selected. One can then say that before the actual appeared the difference between the actual and the possible could have been only possible. It is of course true that whatever is, can be. Everything that occurs, first has to be possible. But it is one thing to say that the actuality x was preceded by the possibility of x ; it is quite another thing to say that the totality of actualities was preceded by the possibility of such a totality. Each actuality may be preceded by its corresponding possibility, but this does not mean that there was once a state of affairs in which there were only possibilities. Moreover an act of precipitation or selection out of a realm of possibilities is itself possible or actual. If the former we have not yet begun to move to the realm of the actual; if the latter we have already reached it. He who starts with the possible either never begins to leave the possible, or suddenly leaves the possible behind to engage in an activity itself not merely possible. Be that as it may, if we once grant that we now have actualities, we must grant that we also have somehow distinguished the actualities by something which is not merely possible. If possibilities have any kind of being in contradistinction from actualities, we

are faced with the fact that what distinguishes them is now something in the actual.

Positivists, although in criteria and conclusion often indistinguishable from idealists, approach this issue from a different side. They would like, if they could, to acknowledge only pure intelligible forms, sheer translucent structures, bare possibilities, and then treat actualities as instances of these. But like the idealists they end with the opposite of what they desire. They never get further than the acknowledgement of brute, particular, actual occurrences, and what can be abstracted from them. For these thinkers the possible is a mental replica of the actual—faint, tenuous, incomplete, without being of its own. Since, however, nothing will be unless it first can be, the positivists, like the rest of us, are faced with possibilities which are not derivative from, but which in fact stand over against actualities. If there were no such possibilities it would not be possible for the positivist to become or to do anything. His being and his doing must be possible before they are actual. We cannot then say, as is customary today, following the line of Kant and Hegel, that the possible is only the actual approached from a distance, without full knowledge, without a grasp of what in fact makes the actual be. In a way the typical materialist sees this. He is more flexible than the positivist. Agreeing with the positivist on the priority and irreducibility of the actual, he acknowledges possibilities which, though in his opinion derived from the actual, now stand over against it as a lure and ideal, as norm, goal or objective. Like the Leibnizian, he improves an otherwise hopeless position. But his concession yields the entire point we seek to make to the effect that there are possibilities distinct from the actual, and that that which distinguishes them from the actual is not to be found in them.

There must be something in actualities which distinguishes them from their possibilities. The relation between the actualities and the possibilities is a relation of difference which (if there be nothing else basically real in the universe but possibilities and actualities) must be a mixture, a togetherness of both the possible and actual, but lacking their reality and finality.

There is something in the actual which distinguishes it from

the possible. This need not be something itself actual; it may be a phase or an aspect of the actual, having no being of its own, analogous to a border, or a shadow or a weight. But whether or not the feature differentiating the actual from the possible is actual or not, it is part of the actual. Since whatever is can be, it must also be possible. Every part of the actual, every feature of it, even its date, place and existence, must be possible. Yet, if this is the case, how can the possible and actual be said to differ? What is in the one seems also to be in the other. One might bring to the fore the case of possibilities which are themselves not actual, but this would in no way affect the fact that, keeping only to the possibilities which are or have been actualized, there seems to be nothing in them which is not also in the actual, and conversely. It seems then as if at one and the same time we must say that there is something in the actual which is not in the possible, and yet that there can be nothing actual which was not also possible.

This apparent contradiction is resolved with the recognition that what is distinguishable in the actual is not distinguishable in the possible. The realization of the possible involves the coming to be of what before was not at all. That which differentiates the actual from the possible is then only in the actual. It comes to be only through the realization of the possible, by making it actual, by determining it as no longer merely possible. It will be a possible distinction only in the sense that the possible is actualized as having just such a distinguishing feature. To be possible is to be capable of becoming more than possible, of becoming determinate, of having features it did not have before.

The actual is not identical with the possible; it stands over against it, with features all its own. Whatever in the actual enables it to stand over against the possible is precisely that which is not in the possible, and strictly speaking is not possible at all. To move from the possible to the actual is to bring something new into being; to move from the actual to the possible is to move away from that factor in the actual which differentiates it from the possible.

That which differentiates the actual from the possible is of course not impossible. But also it is not possible, if by the

possible we mean a distinct determinate duplicate of what was actual or any part of it. Possibility in a way is a compound idea. As we sometimes say, it is what "can be." In itself it is what "can," and the fact that it permits of being realized makes it something that can "be." A possibility is a "can-be" which requires determinations that must be imposed on it from the outside before it can actually be.

Not everything then that will be is first possible, if by its possibility we mean that it must enjoy the same distinct or distinguishable status in the possible that it has in the actual. Everything that will be is first possible only in the sense that the realization of a possibility is the coming to be of the factor that distinguishes the actual from the possible. To be possible is not yet to be realized; if the possible is realized we must have moved away from the possible and all it contains. There is no possibility of being realized; there are only possibilities which are realized.

The possible is the actual as shorn of its determinateness; the actual is the possible as subject to extraneous determinations. We can of course imagine these determinations. We will then in fact, through the agency of mind, produce ideas of them, thereby transforming our ideas of possibilities into ideas of actualities. We will of course thereby not move any closer to actualities than we were before.

One of the reasons for the perpetual opposition between those who insist on the reality of freedom and those who deny it lies in the ability of each to see a fatal weakness in the views of the opponent, and inability to see that weakness in their own. Both make the same mistake and rightly challenge it in the other. They both think of freedom, and particularly freedom of the will, as requiring the existence and an eventual adoption of one or another of a set of distinct possibilities. The determinist insists that the adoption is an act completely determined by what has been, by present circumstance, and by the nature of the will. Depending on what we are and what forces influence us we will, he thinks, either eat the apple now or we will not; the alternative we do not take we are precluded from taking by the facts that now occur. His view requires him to think of every one of us as necessitated beings, compelled by heredity, self and circum-

stance to eat the apple or not. But if we are so necessitated, why is it that there is a delay in the appearance of this necessitated outcome? If the outcome were necessitated, it should be here already; if it is not here already, something else must be added to what is given in order to turn the possible outcome into an actual one. The determinist's opponent, aware of these embarrassments, insists on man's responsibility. According to him, a man who takes x could have taken y instead. Yet y was not possible for the man before he in fact chose it; it is not possible when he chooses x ; and it is not of course possible to him after the choice of x is made. Only the chosen x is possible for him as well as for his opponent. Or, if one likes, the choice before it is made is only possible; the actualization of that possibility, the making of the choice, is the making x the chosen alternative. He was confronted by the possibility "either- x -or- y ", and in realizing this he made the x into a separate and chosen alternative, thereby defining y as the alternative rejected. The y which was not taken was not a real alternative, a genuine possibility; he never had an opportunity to take it, for there was no y to take.

We avoid the tedious opposition of the determinists and their opponents by avoiding their common error. Both think that one selects possibilities out of a multitude, irresistibly in the one case, freely in the other. But both are faced with the fact that what is not chosen is not possible at all. Selecting a possibility necessarily or choosing it freely are not ways of turning other possibilities into impossibilities. Even when we are confronted with what seem to be two clear-cut alternatives—say candidates x or y , or roads a or b , we do not take one and reject the other. What we confront in these cases are possibilities such as "accepting a candidate" or "going up a road," and then spend our energies in determining these in the form of an x or y , or of an a or b . We may be given x and y , or a and b as distinct in actuality. There are two candidates or two roads. But they are not the possible objects of our choice. When we fold a paper along an imagined line on the paper, we use the line as a guide. We do not think it is a fold already. Just so the actual candidates or roads are guides, material we use in order to make our indeterminate possibility assume the guise of a determinate and chosen candidate or road.

The alternative chosen is an actuality made determinate then and there, whether or not it is a determinate actuality apart from the choice.

The determinist has caught a basic truth, since what is not realized is excluded by the world and is therefore, as he sees, not a real possibility for that world. What is really possible in this world must be realized. But the determinist overlooks another equally important truth. The realization of a possibility involves the coming to be of something which was not inevitable. The determinist's opponent gains and loses in opposite ways. He knows that what occurs, freely occurs. But he overlooks the fact that this freedom is a process of filling out what is inevitable.

An actuality is not a possibility to which some element has been externally attached. It is the possibility itself as bounded, delimited, chastened, restricted—and also enriched, detailed, activated, empowered with a being and status, a career and value it never had before, thanks to a determination imposed on it by some actuality.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

V. C. CHAPPELL AND STAFF

AHMED, M. *The Theory of Judgment in the Philosophies of F. H. Bradley and John Cook Wilson*. Dacca: The University Press, 1955. 295 pp. Rs. 10.—Purports to be a "critical survey of the fundamental problems of logic and epistemology and their metaphysical implications," but is mainly an exposition. It is difficult to discover a unifying thesis explaining why the author chose to compare precisely these two philosophers. — C. M.

AVERROES. *Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, tr. with Introduction and Notes by Simon Van Den Bergh. 2 Vols. UNESCO Collection of Great Works, Arabic Series. London: Luzac & Co., for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial," 1954. xxxvi, 373; 219 pp. £3.3.0.—A translation of an important and neglected work of Averroes, with an excellent introduction, placing the book in its historical context and evaluating it philosophically. In the course of his close and meticulous refutation of Al Ghazali, who had denied the possibility of a rational philosophy and advanced arguments for the priority of mystical revelation, Averroes discusses the eternality of the world, the logical relation between cause and effect, and the relation between potentiality and actuality. There is also a separate volume of notes, indices and an interesting list of contradictions to be found in Aristotle. A significant scholarly work. — A. R.

BAILLIE, JOHN. *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. viii, 151 pp. \$3.00.—A brief survey of recent Protestant thought on the nature and meaning of revelation, touching on such topics as man's need of Divine self-disclosure, the historical nature of God's self-revelation, and the distinction between revelation conceived as a body of truths about God and as confrontation with God. The author offers some suggestions as to how we should conceive of the demanded response to revelation—faith—and also examines the claims for Scripture as the sole and infallible repository of revelation. A brief historical essay serves as introductory chapter. — C. M.

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief resumé, report or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The summaries and comments will be written by the Managing Editor and his staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed, in this issue, by Alan Ross Anderson, Irwin C. Lieb, Louis Mackey, Roderick N. Smart, and Frederic Vester.

BAIRD, JAMES. *Ishmael*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. xxviii, 445 pp. \$5.50—Taking the artistic return to "primitive symbols" to be a sign of renewed religious consciousness, Mr. Baird analyzes in detail the use and meaning of symbols in the work of Melville, Gauguin, Stevenson, and others who have travelled in the East. The author, who is much influenced by Jung and Langer, finds this atavistic return promising both artistically and culturally. An erudite work, critically perceptive, but far more valuable for its literary insights than for its psychological theses. — A. R.

BERLIN, ISAIAH. *Historical Inevitability*. Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture, No. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 79 pp. \$2.00—Mr. Berlin offers, with characteristic brilliance and insight, a compelling indictment of the modern tendency to deny the relevance of moral considerations to history: to minimize the influence of human individuals upon—and their responsibility for—historical events, as well as to eliminate evaluation and moral judgment from the writing of history. History, it is maintained, neither can be nor should try to be "objective," i.e., free from evaluations, in the way that physics is "objective." Mr. Berlin's points are not always clearly organized, but they are sensible and telling; his running critique of the prevalent naive "scientism" of contemporary social scientists is especially effective. — V. C. C.

BRILL, JOHN. *The Chance Character of Human Existence*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 150 pp. \$3.75—An extended polemic, couched in familiar and fairly naive terms, against "faith, myth and superstition." Chance, the author argues, and the physical processes of which it is the dominant feature, form "the guiding principle for our lives." — V. C. C.

BÜCHLER, LUCIANO. *L'Armonia dei Contrari*. Quaderni di Logica, Matematica, Fisica, Filosofia, Vol. I, Nos. 1-6. Trieste: Edizioni I.G.O.P.P., 1955. 125 pp. L.800.—An application of Einsteinian physics to biology and psychology, in the hope of developing a "unified ethical theory." — A. R.

CAPONIGRI, A. ROBERT. *History and Liberty: The Historical Writings of Benedetto Croce*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955. xi, 284 pp. \$4.00—Traces the development of Croce as an historian, from his early essays on Neapolitan art history up to his last writings on post-war Italy and Europe. It is maintained that Croce's historical works can only be understood in the light of a philosophic conception of man and human existence, and that this conception is itself a human creation in time. The author is not primarily interested in criticism, although he does occasionally take exception to Croce's ideas, notably in regard to his view of the counter-reformation as a spiritually "negative" event. — R. H.

CARILLA, EMILIO. *Lengua y Estilo en el "Facundo"*. Cuadernos de Exten-

sion Universitaria, 4. Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, n.d. 31 pp.—A literary re-appraisal of the style of the Argentine writer, Sarmiento. — L. K. B.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Myth of the State*. Anchor Books, A52. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955. xiv, 382 pp. \$1.25—Cassirer's provocative analysis of the role of myth in political thinking, from Plato to our own day, in an attractive reprint. The original edition was published in 1946. — V. C. C.

COHEN, JOHN, and MARK, HANSEL. *Risk and Gambling: The Study of Subjective Probability*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. x, 153 pp. \$3.50—A discussion of some experiments concerning subjective attitudes toward games, gambling, risk-taking, guessing, etc. Some of the experiments described are novel and interesting; but insufficient account is taken of previous experimental results, and the reports in general fail to meet current standards of clarity and completeness. The theory of games, obviously relevant to the topics discussed, is nowhere mentioned. — A. R. A.

COMOTH, RENÉ. *Introduction à la philosophie politique de Benedetto Croce*. Liège: Centre d'Études Libérales, 1955. 79 pp. 50 fr.B—An interesting study of Croce's political philosophy, its relation to his ethics and metaphysics, as well as its place in the political milieu of pre-war Europe. The author argues that Croce's political philosophy, unlike Hegel's, is both humanistic and liberal. — A. R.

DE CONINCK, ANTOINE. *L'Analytique Transcendentale de Kant*, Vol. I, *La Critique Kantienne*. Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain, 17. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955. 327 pp.—A careful, often meticulous, analysis of Kant's key terms, method, and major doctrines in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. De Coninck argues that Kant's transcendental method is essentially analytic, assuming only a conception of human knowledge or "experience" and the principle of non-contradiction. A further volume is promised, in which the author will make his own evaluation of the Critical Philosophy. — R. H.

COVELL, HECTOR LUIS. *Los Factores Mentales de Spearman y las Potencias Escolásticas*. Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, Instituto de Metafísica, 1955. 152 pp.—In a critical study (from a Thomistic standpoint) of the factor-analytical theory of knowledge of the psychologist C. E. Spearman, the author tries to show that many so-called discoveries of modern psychology are mere elementary and unconscious repetitions of the older but much clearer Thomistic concepts. — L. K. B.

DOSTOEVSKY, FYODOR. *The Grand Inquisitor*, tr. by Constance Garnett. Introduction by Anne Fremantle. Milestones of Thought. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1956. xvi, 22 pp. \$0.65—One of the most famous passages in modern literature, conveniently reprinted in pamphlet form. — V. C. C.

EWING, UPTON CLARY. *Thresholds of Existence: A Cosmogony and Theory of Evolution as a Way of Life*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. xiii, 286 pp. \$3.75—The author attempts, with little success, to develop a theory of evolution more comprehensive than any yet devised, eschewing "mathematical abstractions" in favor of "behavioral" categories. — C. M.

FEUER, LEWIS SAMUEL. *Psychoanalysis and Ethics*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1955. vi, 134 pp. \$4.00—The main thesis of this book is that ethics ought properly to be an applied social science employing the method and findings of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic method enables us to distinguish authentic values from inauthentic values, and to criticize the latter; this psychoanalytic criticism of values ought, indeed, to be the primary work of the ethical philosopher. Since the ethical position which Feuer defends is in the liberal tradition of Mill, a large section of the book is dedicated to a critique of Freud's philosophy of civilization. The book's main points, unfortunately, are stated rather dogmatically and often with dubious justification. — R. B.

FRANK, ERICH. *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophiegeschichte und Existentialphilosophie; Knowledge, Will and Belief: Collected Essays*, ed. by Ludwig Edelstein. Erasmus-Bibliothek. Zürich, Stuttgart: Artemis-Verlag [Distributed in the U.S. by Henry Regnery Co., Chicago], 1955. 508 pp.—A collection of essays, German and English, including some not previously published. There are papers on ancient, medieval and modern philosophy as well as a number dealing with problems of contemporary interest, especially in the philosophy of religion ("Time and Eternity" was first published in this *Review*, II [1948], 39-52). Frank's general position is strongly reminiscent of that of the Existenz philosophers who were his friends, and whom he influenced. A long "Appreciation" by the editor describes Frank's achievement and relates it to the milieu, intellectual and personal, out of which it grew. — V. C. C.

FRANKEL, CHARLES. *The Case For Modern Man*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. 240 pp. \$3.50—The author's first purpose is "to see what a sober man can still believe about human history and destiny, . . . and what hopes he can reasonably permit himself in his political faith and public actions." He concludes that one can still accept most of the "liberal" philosophy of history, including belief in unlimited human progress and the solution of mankind's problems by means of scientific inquiry. In support of this conclusion, he offers sometimes facile refutations of contemporary critics of liberalism such as Maritain, Reinhold Niebuhr, Toynbee, and Mannheim. But the book is interesting throughout and is written in an easy, graceful style. — A. C. P.

FROMM, ERICH. *The Sane Society*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1955.

xiii, 370 pp.—Continuing and amplifying his earlier work, Fromm here maintains that modern society is not sane and is heading toward greater insanity. He begins by defining the human situation, and derives a criterion of sanity from this; examines in detail the development of man in modern society (especially capitalistic society), diagnosing some of its major ills; and finally proposes, as a solution, a Humanistic Communitarian Socialism. The book has a welcome positive approach, but it sometimes sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth of scope. — R. B.

GHIRARDI, OLSEN A. *Tres Clases de Introduccion a la Filosofia de la Naturaleza*. Cuadernos de Extension Universitaria, 5. Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, n.d. 56 pp.—By an epistemological analysis of empirical science, physical and biological, as contrasted with metaphysics, the author tries to focus on the philosophy of nature as an irreducible science intermediate between the empirical and the metaphysical. Like the former, its object is specifically mobile being; but like the latter, it aims to apprehend the intelligible essence. A clear summary of an undogmatic neo-scholastic critique of natural science. — L. K. B.

GINESTIER, PAUL. *La pensée anglo-saxonne depuis 1900*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. 134 pp. 500 fr.—A laudable attempt to inform the student of general trends in British and American thought. There are chapters on idealism (Royce, Bradley, and McTaggart), realism (Moore, Russell, and the New Realists), pragmatism (Peirce, James, and Dewey), logical positivism (Ayer) and evolutionism (Alexander and Whitehead). Though intended to promote better philosophic communication between the Continent and the "Anglo-saxons," this book will naturally be of more interest to Continentals. — A. R.

GOGARTEN, FRIEDRICH. *Demythologizing and History*, tr. by Neville Horton Smith. New York: Scribner's, 1955. 92 pp. \$2.50—An attempt to defend Bultmann's existentialist re-interpretation of Protestant Theology against its critics. The major areas of disagreement center around the existentialists' rejection of the subject-object scheme in epistemology, rival conceptions of history, and the relation of faith to the Bible as an historical document. Provides an interesting view of the troubled waters of contemporary Protestant Theology. — R. G. S.

GREENE, THEODORE M. *The University and the Community*. M. D. Anderson Lectures, 1955. The Rice Institute Pamphlet, Vol. XLII, No. 4. Houston: The Rice Institute, 1956. 72 pp.—A compelling manifesto on the function of a university in its dedication to significant truth and in its relation to the community. Suggestions are made as to the nature of the basic skills and disciplines which go together to make up a liberal education. The concluding lecture discusses "Seven

Deadly Academic Sins" which hinder the realization of the ideal of a university. — D. R.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954. 283 pp. DM16.80—Eleven essays, on a variety of topics, most of them first given as lectures or published in periodicals and *Festschriften*. This is "late" Heidegger (only three of the essays, apparently, antedate 1950)—alternately brilliant and mystifying, provocative and exasperating, at least to the uninitiated. Perhaps the best pieces in the book are the three which discuss passages in pre-Socratic philosophers—here, familiar texts are given fresh, if unorthodox, interpretations, and are made to suggest philosophical conclusions of remarkable subtlety and scope. — V. C. C.

HITSCHMANN, EDWARD. *Great Men: Psychoanalytic Studies*, ed. by Sydney G. Margolin and Hannah Gunther. Foreword by Ernest Jones. New York: International Universities Press, 1956. xiii, 278 pp. \$4.00—An attempt, by a disciple of Freud, to explain the motive principles underlying the lives and works of Schopenhauer, Goethe, Brahms, etc., by the techniques of psychoanalysis. These techniques, the author feels, constitute an important tool for biographical inquiry, and will eventually replace religion and philosophy. — E. E.

HOOKE, SIDNEY. *Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Legacy*. Anvil Books, No. 7. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955. 254 pp. \$1.25—The second half of this book is devoted to classic texts of Marxism, the first to a remarkably concise statement of the theories of Marx and Engels as well as of the major figures in the various Marxist movements. Mr. Hook's Introduction is rich in content, and critical without being unfair. Far superior to most introductory works on Marxism. — R. G. S.

HUTCHINSON, JOHN, A. *Faith, Reason, and Existence: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. xi. 306 pp. \$4.50—An exceptionally lucid account, intended for students and the "general" reader, of the "new ways of theology." Mr. Hutchinson declares himself in sympathy with the work of the Protestant "existential" or "dialectical" theologians, including Barth, Brunner, Tillich, and Niebuhr (he is especially influenced by the last two), but he also sets contemporary problems in traditional contexts and defends his own views in the light of their significant alternatives, both ancient and modern. Religion, he maintains, is primarily a matter of faith, but the rational or philosophical articulation of faith, far from being irrelevant to religion, is actually required, since faith by itself is not autonomous. In this Mr. Hutchinson sets himself against the "radicals" like Brunner and Barth, as well as against sceptics, rationalists, and Thomists. The book as a whole is sound, comprehensive, balanced, and informed. — V. C. C.

- HYDE, LAWRENCE. *An Introduction to Organic Philosophy: An Essay on the Reconciliation of the Masculine and the Feminine Principles*. Reigate, Surrey: The Omega Press, 1955. xi. 201 pp. 15s.—An attempt to reconcile the "Masculine and Feminine Principles," i.e., the intelligible, rational, formal, quantitative, and the sensible, non-rational, mystical, qualitative; the Western philosophical bias and the Eastern; science, and religion and art. The author's desire is to do justice to both areas, but his sympathy seems to be with the East. The result is a spiritual monism, not without insight, but with a minimum of self-criticism, and without concern for details. — D. S.
- JOHN OF SALISBURY. *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*, tr. with an Introduction and Notes by Daniel D. McGarry. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. xxvii, 305 pp. \$5.00—A careful and extensively annotated translation of the *Metalogicon*, the first to be made into a modern language. The translation, besides being accurate, succeeds in communicating some of the poetic and rhetorical devices used by John of Salisbury in his defense of the study of the Linguistic arts. — R. H.
- JOHNSON, R. C. *Psychical Research*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. viii, 176 pp. \$2.75—A sober account of some striking examples of various "para-normal phenomena," like telepathy, clairvoyance, materializations, and poltergeists. The author tries to show that "here in para-psychology are facts which completely undermine the complacent materialism of the past century." He adduces interesting evidence derived from experiments and controlled observation, but the explanatory hypotheses put forward are less convincing. — R. G. S.
- KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck. The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 52. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956. xxiv, 168 pp. \$0.90—A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second *Critique*, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography. — V. C. C.
- KAPP, REGINALD O. *Facts and Faith: The Dual Nature of Reality*. University Riddell Memorial Lecture, 27th Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 62 pp. \$0.80—An argument based on recent discoveries in physics and biology, for "ontological dualism," on the grounds that a materialistic determinism cannot account for the order discovered by science. The corollary that "space is not the container of all active reality" is also drawn. — A. R.
- KRIEGER, MURRAY. *The New Apologists for Poetry*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. xiv, 225 pp. \$4.00—The main object of this impressive study is to lay the groundwork, in contemporary terms, for a systematic and philosophically respectable "apology for poetry." The author finds that most of the so-called New

Critics agree in rejecting both the "sugar-coated pill" and "l'art pour l'art" views of poetry; their efforts to formulate a workable third view form the basis for his elaboration of the requirements of an acceptable theory, one which will accord with—and do justice to—the unique and irreducible aesthetic experience to which poetry gives rise. The details of such a theory, unfortunately, are never made entirely clear, owing in part to the diverse and often conflicting demands which must be met, but its main points are as follows: poems, though mainly self-contained, their meanings determined contextually rather than referentially, yet "reveal life," "illuminate human experience"; in poetic creation, though the poet's intentions somehow control the outcome, yet the language of the evolving poem itself determines its own final nature; and poetry, though it neither merely instructs or informs nor merely pleases, yet does provide a kind of "truth" and does produce an experience in some sense pleasurable. The strength of Mr. Krieger's study lies in the clarity and force with which he states the various issues, and in the scholarly care with which he examines the views of individual critics. The book, however, lacks tight organization and sustained, clearly directed argumentation, and its final outcome is rather inconclusive. — V. C. C.

KRONER, RICHARD. *Kant's Weltanschauung*, tr. by John E. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. xi, 118 pp. \$2.00—The thesis of this brief but suggestive essay in interpretation (the German edition of which appeared in 1914) is that Kant's critical works express a unified "Weltanschauung" whose determining principles are ethical rather than epistemological. The argument is subtle and complex, and is supported by references more to the spirit than to the letter of the Kantian writings; its consequent difficulty, however, is more than outweighed by its breadth and illuminatory power. In his concern with the relations between morals and religion for Kant, and in his emphasis upon the voluntaristic and subjective element in the Critical philosophy, Kroner draws a Kant who often looks like Kierkegaard. The result is challenging and, if nothing else, provides a useful contrast to the predominant "piecemeal" interpretations of the epistemologically oriented Marburg school. — V. C. C.

LIU, WU-CHI. *Confucius, His Life and Time*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xv, 189 pp. \$3.75—A warm and sympathetic reconstruction, by an obvious admirer, of the life, times and work of K'ung Ch'iu (or "Confucius"), based upon the Confucian Classics and a variety of historical sources, including the works of recent scholars. A helpful bibliography is included. — V. C. C.

MAHADEVAN, T. M. P. *The Re-Discovery of Man*. Presidential Address to the Thirtieth Indian Philosophical Congress at Nagpur, on December 21, 1955. No place or publisher given, 1956. 20 pp.—A brief but rather helpful survey of contemporary thought from the standpoint of "internationalism." The author feels that the existentialists do not go far enough in their search for inwardness and that their

approach needs to be supplemented by the more positive one of Vedānta. — D. R.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Man and the State*. Phoenix Books, P5. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 219 pp. \$1.25—Maritain's Walgreen Foundation Lectures on political philosophy, given in 1949, in a handsomely produced paperbound edition. — V. C. C.

MELLO, A. DA SILVA. *Man: His Life, his Education, his Happiness*, tr. by M. B. Fierz. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 729 pp. \$6.00 —The author, a Brazilian physician and psychiatrist, draws on his wide experience to present a description of the behavior and motivations of man in his private, social, and political environment. Touching upon all important aspects of human experience, the work is unified by the common impress of a powerful, distinctive mind. — E. T.

MILLER, JAMES WILKINSON. *Exercises in Introductory Symbolic Logic*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, 1955. x, 59 pp. \$1.50—Offers the logical tyro a varied diet, from Aristotle to Lewis Carroll, including the "neglected" forms of argument (e.g., sorites) as well as examples from the logic of classes and relations. To avoid translation among systems, the examples are all in "English." Copious explanatory footnotes and references recommend it to the self-taught. — E. T.

MILLER, OSCAR W. *The Kantian Thing-in-itself, or The Creative Mind*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. xix, 142 pp. \$3.75—A fanciful re-shuffling of Kantian words and hints from such works as Baldwin's *Dictionary* into a metaphysic involving an existential "I-in-itself" which posits subsistent things-in-themselves to constitute its world. — L. K. B.

MONSARRAT, K. W. *On Human Thinking*. London: Methuen & Co., 1955. 155 pp. 15s.—An analysis, of a rather general sort, of the nature and implications of human thought, based on the assumption that "the fundamental condition for successful [social] planning is consistency and propriety in our thinking." — L. H. E.

MORA, JOSE FERRATER and HUGUES LEBLANC. *Lógica matemática*. Mexico, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1955. 210 pp.—By confining themselves to elementary principles, the authors manage to cover with an appropriate balance of simplicity and rigor a wider range of materials than is common in so readable an introduction. There is an emphasis on logic as a syntax for language. Though not a text book, the work meets very well the authors' aim of "presenting to Spanish speaking readers, in a succinct, clear, and rigorous manner, the fundamental themes of the discipline." — L. K. B.

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *The Transformations of Man*. World Perspectives, Vol. VII. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. xviii, 249 pp. \$3.50—

The evolutionary stages by which man has progressed from organic determination to self-determination forms the subject of this "myth-historicus." We now stand on the brink of a new age, the author maintains, in which it is no longer necessary to devote our energies to the discovery of further "labor-saving devices" but in which the good life for the sake of which we saved labor will be and is already our proper business. — C. M.

MYERS, FRANCIS M. *The Warfare of Democratic Ideals*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1956. 261 pp. \$3.50—A critical discussion of the consequences for a democratic society of some contemporary philosophical positions. Traditional empiricism, the author holds, can consistently lead only to a politics of force; neo-Thomism leads to a special sort of democracy which, from the outside, is totalitarian; and no protestant philosophy since the idealisms of Royce and Hocking has been consistent. The correct philosophical basis for democracy it is argued, is provided by instrumentalism. The book's conclusions seem, at best, rather inconclusively established; for example, in discussing empirical defenses of the democratic ideal it omits any reference to the work of J. S. Mill. — D. S.

NAHM, MILTON C. *The Artist as Creator: An Essay of Human Freedom*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. ix, 352 pp. \$5.50—Proposes a theory of fine art which will account both for the artist's ability to "originate" novel individuals and for the intelligibility of the work of fine art. The theory recommended for this purpose in the second and systematic portion of the book seeks to establish the possibility of interpreting the work of art as "a structure in which what is made, what is symbolized, and what is expressed are complementary aspects of the same object or event." The author's historic insights in the book's first part make it well worth reading (despite his rather cumbersome style), but it is not clear that he offers much by way of illuminating the problem of freedom beyond saying that "if . . . fine art produces unique but intelligible symbols, it does so because for the individual there is a class." An extensive bibliography is appended. — C. M.

OBERHOLZER, EMIL, Jr. *Delinquent Saints: Disciplinary Action in the Early Congregational Churches of Massachusetts*. Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences, No. 590. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. x, 379 pp. \$6.00—A thorough and careful report on the variety and extent of offenses prosecuted by the Puritan churches from colonial times into the nineteenth century, with some asides on civil cases, such as the Salem witch trials. The text is lively with verbatim testimony. A large bibliography frankly notes the various reasons why some records are "unavailable." — E. T.

OCKHAM, WILLIAM. *Summa Logicae, Pars Secunda et Tertiae Prima*, ed. by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 2. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1954.

- 217-461 pp.—The Latin text of an important contribution to Medieval logic. This volume contains Ockham's treatment of the proposition and the syllogism. — R. H.
- O'NEIL, CHARLES J. *Imprudence in St. Thomas Aquinas*. The Aquinas Lecture, 1955. Under the Auspices of the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University. Milwaukee: 1955. 165 pp. \$2.00—A fairly routine work of Thomist scholarship which argues that, though both Aquinas and Aristotle regard prudence as a virtue, Aristotle cannot and Aquinas must analyze the vice of imprudence. The difference is found to depend on Aquinas' stress on the liberty of the will. — A. R.
- ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSE. *The Dehumanization of Art and Other Writings on Art and Culture*. Anchor Books, A72. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956. 187 pp. \$0.85—Five essays, all of them previously published in English but here brought together for the first time, consisting of delightfully overstated—and therefore highly stimulating—observations on art and letters. — V. C. C.
- PATON, H. J. *The Modern Predicament: A Study in the Philosophy of Religion*. Based on Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews. New York: Macmillan, 1955. 405 pp. \$5.25—A remarkably lucid and appealing attempt to give a rational account of religion in non-technical terms. The predicament itself, namely the gulf between knowledge and faith, is not disposed of in any definitive manner, but many points that must be considered on both sides are discussed in a way that is both critical and fair. — D. R.
- PEREIRA, I. RICE. *The Nature of Space: A Metaphysical and Aesthetic Inquiry*. New York: Privately Published, 1956. 62 pp.—A highly metaphorical, sometimes rather fanciful examination of the nature of space by a practicing artist whose geometric paintings have attracted wide attention. — V. C. C.
- PLE, A., O. P., LOUIS BOUYER, CONG. ORAT., L. CERFAUX, IAN HISLOP, O. P., A. LÉONARD, O. P. *Mystery and Mysticism*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 137 pp. \$4.75.—Six essays on such topics as the phenomena of mystical experience, the history of the word "mysticism," an analysis of St. Paul's mysticism, and, most prominently, the meaning of mysticism in the early Church. The essays follow no general plan; consequently the various subjects are treated unequally, and there are repetitions and occasional inconsistencies. — R. B.
- RAPHAEL, D. DAICHES. *Moral Judgment*. New York: Macmillan Co.; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955. 224 pp. \$2.75—A systematic effort to state and answer the classical problems of moral philosophy, including that of the metaphysical foundations of morals. The outline of problems and the general position argued is reminiscent of Kant's *Grundlegung*; like Kant, Mr. Raphael locates the essence of

morality in the recognition that human personality, including the ability to choose freely, is an "evil in itself." Even more than Kant, however, he is doubtful of demonstrating the force of this conception of morality by rational argument. — R. H.

RIESENBERG, PETER N. *Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought*. Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences, No. 591. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. viii, 204 pp. \$3.75—A copiously documented, scholarly, and detailed history of the elaboration of the concept of the inalienability of sovereignty and the uses to which it was put in the late Middle Ages, when national monarchies were first emerging. — R. G. S.

ROSS, WALDO. *El Mundo Metafisico de Andres Avelino*. Ciudad Trujillo: Sociedad Dominicana de Filosofia, 1956. 23 pp.—A brief study of the metaphysics of the Latin American philosopher Avelino, showing his relations to, among others, Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. — E. E.

ROSSI, MARIO M. *A Plea for Man*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1956. 167 pp. \$1.55—An account of history and man's relations to it, surveying work done by the author in more detail in previous volumes. The vehicle of truth is biography rather than history, which cannot duplicate events as they happened. The claim that the unique man can be adequately described, while the unique event cannot, poses a paradox which the author attempts to solve in terms of man's essential rationality. The book moves too fast to be convincing, but is interesting nonetheless. Contains detailed bibliographical notes. — D. S.

ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES. *The Creed of a Priest of Savoy*, tr. with an Introduction by Arthur H. Beattie. New York: Frederick Unger, 1956. xii, 50 pp. \$.65.—A section of *Emile*, newly translated, setting forth Rousseau's influential version of eighteenth-century Deism. — V. C. C.

DE SAINT-MAURICE, BÉRAUD. *John Duns Scotus: A Teacher for our Times*, tr. by Columban Duffy. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955. viii, 348 pp.—A rather popular mixture of biography, philosophy, and theology, for the Catholic layman. Scotus' role in the defense of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception receives special emphasis. — A. C. P.

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, tr. with an Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. lxix, 638 pp. \$10.00—The first English version of Sartre's major work. Only time and use can decide the adequacy of a translation of a work so large and important, but on first examination the translator seems to have done an accurate and responsible job. There are extensive notes marking deviations

from the French text and idiom, and an Introduction deals with certain Sartrean problems and criticisms, though not in a very enlightening way. — L. M.

SINCLAIR, WILLIAM ANGUS. *Socialism and the Individual*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 168 pp. \$2.50.—The author tries to clarify the differences between the (British) Conservative and Labor parties and to justify his preference for the latter. The argument, owing to its informality, makes little contribution to political theory. The earlier case for and against socialist egalitarianism is thoughtful and honest; later chapters on Communism and on America are of lesser merit. — R. G. S.

VAN STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND. *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, tr. by Leonard Johnston. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955. 244 pp. \$2.00—Canon Van Steenberghen studies with some care and considerable scholarship the Medieval adventure with Aristotelianism, from its initiation in the twelfth century to its condemnation by the bishop of Paris in the latter part of the thirteenth. Grosseteste, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant receive brief but penetrating discussions. The book deserves careful study. — L. H.

STEWART, DAVID A. *Preface to Empathy*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 157 pp. \$3.75—The author, a practicing psychologist, argues that empathy among persons is at once a creative act and the ground of ethics and psychological therapy. An analysis of group therapy with alcoholics is given as an example of personal psychology at work, but it is recognized that further effort is needed to strengthen or modify the central thesis. — R. B.

SUÑER, AUGUST PI. *Classics of Biology*, tr. by Charles N. Stern. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. x, 337 pp. \$7.50—The eminent Spanish biologist Suñer has brought together a variety of texts illustrating the development of the key concepts of modern biology, ranging from cell theory to mechanism and teleology, consciousness, and the notion of organism. Each chapter is provided with a brief but lucid introduction outlining the significance of the concept and the major stages of its development. — R. G. S.

SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. *Logic and Nature*. 2nd. Ed. New York: New York University Press, 1955. xii, 199 pp. \$3.75—A new edition, with additions and revisions, of a carefully argued, sometimes persuasive defense of reason, in the traditional, transcendent sense, primarily against the reductionist program of evolutionary naturalism. The book first appeared in 1930. — V. C. C.

TAVARD, G. H. *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure*. Franciscan Institute Publications, Theology Series No. 4. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute,

1954. vii, 263 pp.—A detailed exposition of what the author considers to be the few fundamental principles in the theology of St. Bonaventure: the continuity between theology and revealed scripture, the preeminence of faith, the discontinuity between theological and philosophical reason, and the development of theology as "the progression of . . . (the) spiritual life." — A. R.
- VIANO, CARLO AUGUSTO. *La Logica di Aristotele*. Torino: Taylor-Torino, 1955. 314 pp. L2000.—The author discusses Aristotelian logic from the linguistic point of view and attempts to show that it formulates the rules of a language common to all the sciences. A defect of the work is its neglect of the work of Lukasiewicz. — R. N. S.
- VIVANTE, LEONE. *A Philosophy of Potentiality*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955. ix, 115 pp. 14s.—The needs of both metaphysics and art criticism for an understanding of creativity are approached here as a single task. The author illustrates his ontological principles in a study of D. H. Lawrence's conception of creative spontaneity. An unusual mixture of rigor, cryptic phrases, parapsychological fact-citing, and fanciful speculation. — L. K. B.
- WAHL, JEAN. *Vers la fin de l'ontologie: Étude sur l'introduction dans la métaphysique par Heidegger*. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1956. 257 pp.—A close study, paragraph by paragraph and often line by line, of a work crucial to the understanding of Heidegger's thought as a whole. M. Wahl is a conscientious reader and careful interpreter; he exhibits a sympathetic understanding of the Heideggerian method while dissenting at various points from its results, particularly as regards the important (for Heidegger) *Seinsfrage*. In general, it is suggested, Heidegger's *Einführung* is to be taken not as doctrine or a set of conclusions, but as an exercise, like Plato's *Parmenides*. — V. C. C.
- WEISHEIPL, J. ATHANASIUS, O. P. *Nature and Gravitation*. River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1955. viii, 124 pp.—A brief but scholarly history and critique of key concepts of gravitational theory: nature, motion, inertia, space. Arguing that mathematical theories concerning nature and natural philosophy are necessarily distinct but complementary sciences, the author attempts to reconcile the Aristotelian philosophy of nature with the Einsteinian theory of relativity. First published (1954-55) as three articles in *The New Scholasticism*. — D. S.
- WESTFALL, THAYNE DE BAUN. *Conscious Living*. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1956. 106 pp. \$2.25.—An exposition of some basic principles of a *Weltanschauung* heavily influenced by the anthropology of Rudolf Steiner, together with some enthusiastic reflections on art, education, and contemporary life. — L. H. E.
- WHITE, MORTON. *Toward Reunion in Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. xv, 308 pp. \$5.75—A fluent exposition and

critical discussion of some recent thought on the existence of universals, the analysis of a priori statements, and the justification of ethical judgments and decisions, centered on the work of Russell, Moore, and the Positivists. The main criticisms draw heavily upon the author's earlier discussions of synonymity, a weakly articulated notion of explanatory utility, and a fruitful extension of Austin's analysis of performative utterances. Mr. White suggests, but fails to develop, the view that ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics are intimately connected in any philosophical enterprise. — I. C. L.

WOLFE, BETRAM D. *Six Keys to the Soviet System*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. xv, 258 pp. \$3.75—An informative study of the conditions, the strengths, and the weaknesses of Russian totalitarianism by an expert on Russian affairs. The "Keys" are: the necessity of a struggle for power within the totalitarian regime, the necessity for secrecy and the complete control of all activity, the proscription of labor, the contempt for democratic election, the constant need for colonial expansion, and the subordination of the people to the state. — A. R.

WOLFSON, HARRY AUSTRYN. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Vol. I, *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*. Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza, III. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. xxviii, 635 pp. \$10.00—A monumental work of scholarship, consisting of thorough and comprehensive treatments of four relatively distinct motifs in the thought of the early Church Fathers (through Augustine). Part One deals with the origin of the problem of faith and reason, together with the various solutions proposed; Part Two treats the Trinity, the Logos, and Platonic Ideas; Part Three examines the three Christian "mysteries"—the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the generation of the Logos; and Part Four details the rise of the heresies, particularly gnosticism. This is a work of exposition rather than of philosophical evaluation, but its scope and detail make it an indispensable starting-point for any future effort to appraise the thought of the early Church Fathers. — A. C. P.

WUELLNER, BERNARD, S. J. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1956. xvi, 138 pp. \$4.25—A guide, intended for students, to the usage of some 1600 Scholastic philosophical terms, clearly presented and nicely arranged. There is no attempt at translating into "ordinary language," but the use of Latin is sparing. Textual references and diagrams and charts increase the book's usefulness. — V. C. C.

ZAEHNER, R. C. *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. xvi, 495 pp. \$13.45—A brilliant scholarly study of the rival Zoroastrian cosmologies, with particular attention to the Zervanite sect. The author shows that their supreme god, Zurvān, was tetramorphous, and appeared as either Time, Space, Wisdom, or Power. The latter part of the book is devoted to texts, notes, and translations of a great body of relevant material from various sources. — D. R.

Actes du Deuxième Congrès international de l'Union internationale de philosophie des sciences [Proceedings of the Second International Congress of the International Union for the Philosophy of Science], Zürich 1954.

I, Exposés généraux; II, Physique, Mathématiques; III, Théorie de la connaissance, Linguistique; IV, Philosophie et Science, Histoire de la philosophie; V, Sociologie, Psychologie. 5 Vols. Neuchâtel: Éditions du Griffon, 1955. 159, 152, 170, 136, 107 pp. 38 fr.Sw.—The texts of the papers on the philosophy of science read at the Zürich Congress of 1954. The papers vary widely, in scope, quality, approach, doctrinal basis, and subject matter (not to say tongue—each is printed in the language in which it was read), but the collection as a whole, if a bit bewildering, provides a good survey of the ways in which the philosophy of science is now being practiced and conceived. — V. C. C.

The Age of Enlightenment: The Eighteenth Century Philosophers, ed. by Isaiah Berlin. The Great Ages of Western Philosophy, IV. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956. vii, 282 pp. \$3.00—Shows the Enlightenment concern with human affairs, and in particular with the problem of human knowledge, by extensive selections from Locke's *Essay*, and the *Treatises* of Berkeley and Hume. The editor's comments point out major confusions and errors, and aid the reader in understanding the selections in their own terms. — R. H.

The Age of Reason: The Seventeenth Century Philosophers, ed. by Stuart Hampshire. The Great Ages of Western Philosophy, III. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956. vii, 186 pp. \$3.00—A well-chosen series of extracts from the works of Bacon, Galileo, Hobbes, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, and Leibniz, together with introductory material and interpretative commentary, intended as an introduction to "the century of genius." — D. R.

Autour d'Aristote: Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion. Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain, 16. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955. xxx, 594 pp. \$8.00—A rich collection of essays in honor of Msgr. Mansion, including a study of Mansion's work, several essays on Plato, studies of various aspects of Aristotle's philosophy—textual and systematic analyses of his metaphysics, logic, psychology and ethics—and some essays on the influence of Plato and Aristotle on medieval philosophy. Contributors include Diès, Wilpert, Ross, and Minio-Palaeolo. — A. R.

Christian Asceticism and Modern Man, tr. by Walter Mitchell and the Carisbrooke Dominicans. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xi, 262 pp. \$6.00—A series of essays by a group of French Catholic teachers and scholars, roughly half of which deal with the history of Christian asceticism. The remainder are addressed to theological and sociological questions concerning ascetic practice. — A. C. P.

Deutscher Geist zwischen Gestern und Morgen: Bilanz der kulturellen

Entwicklung seit 1945, ed. by Joachim Moras and Hans Paeschke, with the assistance of Wolfgang von Einsiedel. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954. 473 pp. DM12.80—A comprehensive progress report, by some thirty scholars, journalists, and educators, on the situation in Germany ten years after the *Zusammenbruch* of 1945, ranging from the reorganization of business and politics to recent developments in the arts and sciences. Though the authors try mainly to report and inform—and this they do with balance and clarity—there is also a good deal of soul-searching, amounting at times to an outright critique of the way things (e.g. the rebuilding of cities) have been and are being done. The editors refuse to draw, on the basis of "Gestern," any very definite conclusions about "Morgen," beyond the general conviction that at least the future is open. — F. V.

The Mahabharata of Vyasa Krishna Dwaipayana: Selections from the Adi Parva and the Sambha Parva, ed. by S. C. Nott. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. xii, 205 pp. \$4.75—Selections from the first two (of eighteen) parvas, or books, of the classic epic of Hinduism. The translation is that of Pandit Kesare Maham Ganguli, made for the Pratapa Chunder Raya edition of 1883. A glossary of terms is included. — D. R.

Present-Day Psychology: An Original Survey of Departments, Branches, Methods, and Phases, including Clinical and Dynamic Psychology, ed. by A. A. Roback, with the Collaboration of Forty Experts in the Various Fields. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xiv, 995 pp. \$12.00—A mammoth survey of contemporary psychological research. The subjects treated range from psychotherapy to psychometrics, and from neurology to military psychology. Most of the chapters include both a scholarly background and an introductory statement of the developments and the problems of the subject, and each is followed by a bibliography. The variation which is inevitable in such an undertaking is itself informative of differences in contemporary psychology. — R. B.

The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr. Phoenix Books, P1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. vi, 405 pp. \$1.75—The paper-bound edition of a unique and useful volume of selections, with critical introductions, from philosophical works of Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, and Juan Luis Vives. The original appeared in 1948. — V. C. C.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America has elected the following officers for 1956: President, George P. Klubertanz, S. J.; Secretary, Sydney C. Rome; Treasurer, Richard Barber.

The 1956 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, will be held at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, December 27-29.

Professor John Wisdom of Cambridge University will be Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia during the second semester of the 1956-57 session.

The National Science Foundation has initiated a program of support of basic research in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. A number of grants have already been made, and further research proposals are welcomed by the Foundation. Information may be obtained from the National Science Foundation, Washington 25, D. C.

BOOKS FROM CHICAGO



KANT'S Weltanschauung

By **RICHARD KRONER**

Translated by **JOHN E. SMITH**

The ethical and religious aspects of Kant's thinking emerge in new perspective through this incisive interpretation by one of the leading Kantian scholars of the twentieth century. Dr. Kroner submits that Kant's world view derives from his ethical principles and not from his theory of knowledge, and that moral dignity and the absolute worth of the moral will were for Kant of greater importance than either science or metaphysics. From the Heidelberg school of Kant commentary. **\$2.00**

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A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy

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